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The Virgin Islands (VI) is under-prepared for major natural disasters and 
terrorism. Many emergency plans are incomplete, based on inaccurate 
information, wrongly optimistic and assume an infrastructure that does not exist. 
The VI is at risk  to a direct terrorist attack and also subject to whatever 
secondary consequences result from a stateside attack, because virtually one 
hundred percent of food, fuel, medicine, oil used to make electricity and potable 
water - and tourists, the economy’s lifeblood -- are imported. Also, (1) 
geographically, help is not readily available from any neighboring city or state; (2) 
the VI’s first responders are likely to be affected by the same disaster they are 
responding to and unable to assist; (3) the VI must assume more of the 
emergency preparedness functions that would typically be shared between 
neighboring communities; (4) the VI must have more funding than similar 
communities on the mainland; and (5) preparedness planning must include the 
importing of mainland resources. 
The purpose of this thesis is to point out how the VI is different from the 
mainland U.S. This thesis documents vulnerabilities and shows how the 
Government’s existing infrastructure is inadequate. Included is discussion of how 
the police, social issues, and existing VI Government leadership affect the 
vulnerabilities. It examines existing preparedness plans. One chapter discusses 
how management can harm Homeland Security while another chapter deals with 
change and proposes a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. Lastly 
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The Territory of the United States Virgin Islands (hereafter “VI” or 
“Territory”) must recognize that as a collection of small islands, it is uniquely 
vulnerable to the consequences of both major natural disasters and terrorism. 
The VI is under-prepared for both of these! A significant natural disaster such as 
a hurricane, earthquake, or tsunami in the VI would have a grave impact on 
human life and the Territory’s economy. Similarly, a terrorist attack in the 
mainland U.S. or in the VI would severely threaten the Territory’s economy and 
the health of its citizens. Because the VI has much room to improve in its ability 
to respond to both natural disasters and terrorism, the initial damage and injuries 
caused by such a disaster would paralyze the islands, leaving its citizens without 
basic services such as electric power, food distribution and public safety. 
Compounding the VI‘s lack of preparedness, (1) the VI is geographically 
isolated so help is not readily available from the usual sources such as 
neighboring communities. Also, (2) the VI’s first responders who often fill multiple 
emergency response roles simultaneously, might be personally affected by 
whatever disaster occurs and thus not able to respond. For example, after 
Hurricane Marilyn in 1995, “police were hampered … because the department 
lost 90 percent of its vehicles… [and] many officers and their families are 
sleeping in cars and don’t have a change of clothing.”1 
Even though these are separate islands, St. Thomas is approximately six 
miles at it closest point away from St. John, and St. Croix is approximately forty 
miles away, these are close enough to each other that it is not certain one 
island’s rescuers could assist another’s – especially if there was a large and 
powerful hurricane that would affect all the islands. Plus, in any disaster, 
transportation between the islands is interrupted. Because neighboring islands 
                                            
1 Will Jones, “Davila: Cops are overstressed; St. Thomas hotels are no help,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, September 23, 1995, 6.  
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will be unavailable and incapable of assisting each other, each island in the VI 
must (3) assume more of the emergency preparedness functions that would 
typically be shared among similar communities or regions on the mainland. This 
sharing, sometimes called “regionalization,” is where neighboring communities 
avoid duplication of emergency capabilities by sharing resources. 
Without the benefit of regionalization, the VI (4) must have more 
emergency preparedness and Homeland Security funding than similar 
communities because it must train for, prepare and assume more responsibilities. 
In addition, (5) preparedness planning must include the importing of mainland 
resources because there are no neighboring cities and states where personnel 
from other places can easily drive or fly from to assist.    
Fortunately, most planning for natural disasters will benefit planning for 
terrorism and vice versa. This is sometimes referred to as dual-use or multi-use. 
For example, improved communications will help in the everyday emergency 
such as a car accident or fire. It will also help in terrorism. Another example is in 
the field of public health and agriculture. The same monitoring of traditional 
communicable diseases or traditional plant and animal diseases will also help 
track a biological terrorist attack.  
This thesis begins with documentation of the VI’s emergency 
preparedness vulnerabilities from several perspectives, including an analysis of 
how the existing inadequate infrastructure limits and creates special challenges 
for emergency response planning.  There is discussion of how the police, social 
and cultural issues, and the existing VI Government leadership create further 
challenges to any meaningful preparedness and response planning. The 
Territory’s existing preparedness plans are reviewed and evaluated, followed by 
a discussion of management considerations and then a proposal and outline for 
a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. This thesis concludes with 
methods to foster change and an Action Plan.  
xvii 
When compared against what is widely considered to be standard 
government operating procedures, the VI is seriously deficient in its planning and 
actions to harden and create backups and redundancies for critical 
infrastructures and systems, including communications, power, food and water. A 
weak, inadequate and fragile infrastructure make the VI a soft target, unable to 
protect itself and similarly unable to respond to a major crisis. The VI imports 
virtually one hundred percent of its food, fuel, medicine and oil used to make 
electricity and potable water through under-secured maritime ports. There are no 
roads to bring supplies from the next city, state or neighboring country.  A 
shutdown of the ports would result in severe economic and life-threatening 
consequences.     
In part because it is so isolated (one thousand miles from the mainland 
U.S.), a terrorist attack directly on the VI would have an impact more devastating 
than a similar terrorist attack directly on the mainland. In addition, the secondary 
and tertiary consequences that would result from a stateside attack are unique to 
the islands. The slowdown in tourism would have tremendous repercussions 
throughout the local economy, which is almost exclusively dependent upon 
tourism.  It would also affect the larger national economy because the local 
economy is inexorably intertwined with the mainland US economy.  A VI 
slowdown will have national economic repercussions. For example, most of the 
hundreds of cruise ships that visit the VI are based in the mainland. Most of the 
thousands of commercial airline flights bringing tourists originate in the mainland. 
If either of these stop, other economies such as Florida’s cruise ship industry, the 
nation’s airlines and all of their suppliers and support industries will be harmed 
too. 
The Water and Power Authority (WAPA) produces two of the three most 
important Level 1 infrastructures: water and electricity.2  Telecommunications, 
which is the third Level 1 sector, requires WAPA electricity to function. Although 
                                            
2 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html (accessed 3/16/06). 
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WAPA has a more-than-adequate generating capacity, it is a single-location 
generating facility on each island. (The generator on St. John is intended as 
emergency backup only and is too small to power the entire island. St. John, like 
Water Island, gets its electricity from St. Thomas through underwater cables.) A 
systems failure at the St. Thomas facility would completely eliminate the 
provision of water and electricity to St. Thomas, eliminate electricity to Water 
Island, severely reduce the amount of electricity available  
to St. John, and thus limit emergency response capabilities on all three islands. 
Essentially then, damage to the WAPA facility, its fuel storage tanks or 
distribution system would eliminate all public power in the Territory.3 
Equally important, because of its relatively small size, WAPA’s distribution 
system doesn’t have the stability of the larger power grids in the mainland United 
States or elsewhere. And unlike on the mainland, there is no power grid to import 
electricity from the next town, city or state. An essential component of meaningful 
emergency and disaster planning must include the protection, hardening and 
building of more redundancy and robustness into the Territory’s power 
generation and power distribution systems. 
The vast majority of the employees in the VI Police Department (VIPD) are 
intelligent, hardworking, dedicated and honest. Nonetheless, the quality and 
sophistication of law enforcement suffers because of the same general 
complacency and social dynamics that exist throughout the VI government 
generally.  The failure of the VIPD to develop an effective rapport with the 
community prevents it from effectively enforcing the law, solving crimes or 
responding to Homeland Security issues. It is widely acknowledged that the VIPD 
is under-trained and under-equipped. Law enforcement is inconsistent and 
sporadic at best. There are definitely exceptions, but the VIPD in general has a 
poor reputation. Because law enforcement is an inseparable component of 
                                            
3 For St. Thomas, St. John and Water Island. St. Croix has its own WAPA generating plant. 
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Homeland Security, it is essential to any effective Homeland Security plan that 
strategies are developed and implemented to improve trust in the VIPD.    
A review of the VI’s emergency and disaster planning documents obtained 
indicate that the quality of these plans is mixed. Some plans are well-thought-out 
and meaningful, while others are incomplete, based on inaccurate information 
and unjustifiably optimistic. There are more hazards than listed in some of the 
planning documents and the hazards identified are far more severe than 
reported. Some of the plans are theoretically sound, but many of them presume 
the existence of an infrastructure and support staff that simply does not exist. By 
nature of being on an insulated island, many people perform multiple roles – for 
example one single person might be all of the following: a police officer, a 
National Guard member, a Red Cross shelter manager, and a part-time ferry 
captain.   
The most fundamental challenges facing the VI’s efforts to improve 
Homeland Security and emergency response capabilities are political and social. 
It is generally believed there is widespread government mismanagement, 
corruption, nepotism and cronyism.  These factors are compounded by 
racism, poverty, stark and increasing economic disparity and poor education. 
There is also a large unskilled labor pool, lack of employment opportunities, a 
serious hard-drug problem along with a culture that largely accepts and 
promotes substance abuse. Perhaps most important is the absence of a 
sense of community within and between government agencies and among 
citizens in the community. These are the major inhibitors to improved quality 
of life, improved law enforcement and improved Homeland Security in the VI. 
From a social perspective, the population of the VI comes from all over the 
world. Most, however, are from other Caribbean islands and many have 
remained unassimilated and isolated; the VI is not a unified community.  Of 
course each island has its own identity. St. Thomas is different from St. Croix 
which is different from St. John. Yet even within a single island, there is disunity. 
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Many of the groups have their own meeting places and social and ethnic circles. 
There is very little intermingling and currently no unifying force.  
The Governor must develop a broad, unifying vision for the VI that 
includes honest and open government, economic recovery, social healing 
including recovery aimed at uniting the community, and dramatically improved 
law enforcement. This unifying vision must include a broad view of preparedness 
for both natural disasters and terrorism for the Virgin Islands. Collectively this is 
Homeland Security. 
The Virgin Islands should establish a Terrorism and Natural Disasters 
Planning Group (Planning Group) to thoroughly investigate the VI’s vulnerabilities 
and recommend solutions or policy options to “prevent, protect against, respond 
to and recover from incidents of national significance,”4 including natural 
disasters, the consequences of either local or mainland terrorism and a WAPA 
shutdown. 
An after-the-fact, crisis-driven response can and should be avoided. We 
have the opportunity to acknowledge and learn from our tremendous wealth of 
intellectual capital and to empower our citizens. Advanced planning based on the 
thorough, open and informed discussions of the Planning Group can help lessen 
harmful consequences of a natural or manmade disaster in a way that does not 
trample the cherished principles of liberal democracy. 
The threat against America in general and the VI in particular is real, 
current and cannot be ignored. An attack will be life threatening and economically 
devastating. When there is something wrong or inadequate with a system, those 
with the ability to take action have the responsibility to take action. The 9/11 
Commission Report criticized the U.S. government for a “failure of imagination” in 
anticipating the 9/11 attacks. Addressing and protecting the Territory’s 
vulnerabilities is thus limited only by our collective imagination. 
                                            
4 Universal Task List: Version 2.1 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State 
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, May 23, 2005), 2. 
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Homeland Security relates, in one way or another, to every aspect of our 
lives and every sector of our economy. The Territory needs a Planning Group 
because of such inter-dependency; because the topic of Homeland Security is 
simply too broad for any one person or one government department to 
comprehend and manage. Homeland Security requires interaction, 
interdependency and cooperation. Everyone has a role. 
A Planning Group will bring together experts from many and varied 
disciplines throughout the Territory. It will take advantage of the vast knowledge 
and experience of VI employees and citizens.5 It would correct inaccuracies in 
existing planning, and, based on factual realities, explore long-range, long-term 
and broad policy-based planning. When formed, the Planning Group will provide 
well-thought-out recommendations to the Governor, Senate, VI Department of 
Homeland Security and other leaders to consider for the development of a truly 
meaningful and useful Homeland Security plan. 
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: I invite anyone with comments or suggestions to contact me 
at malperen@chds-alumni.org. Thank you. 
                                            
5 In one sense, what is needed for the VI is reminiscent of the business concept of 
reengineering and “one way to ensure that reengineering has a cross-functional perspective is to 
assemble a team that represents the functional units involved in the process being 
reengineered…” Michael Hammer, “Reengineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate,” Harvard 
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I. UNDERLYING ISSUES 
The United States Virgin Islands (hereafter VI or Territory) is under-
prepared for any major natural disaster and is even more under-prepared for 
terrorism. The threat against America in general and the VI in particular is real 
and current. An attack against either entity will not only be economically 
devastating, it will be designed to be life threatening. The potential for attack 
cannot be ignored.  If there is something wrong, those who have the ability to 
take action have the responsibility to take action. If VI emergency preparedness 
is inadequate, it must be addressed by the local government and citizens before 
the federal government is forced to intervene. 
The Virgin Islands must recognize that because of the characteristics of 
small island states, the Territory is fragile in relation to the effects of natural 
disasters and terrorism. Its economy and the health of its citizens will be severely 
threatened if there is a terrorist attack in the mainland United States. Any 
slowdown in tourism will have repercussions in the local economy because the 
economy is almost exclusively dependent upon tourism.  
A nationwide port shutdown will stop the flow of goods, including food, 
fuel, medicine and eventually electricity and water. Unlike the mainland, there is 
no power grid so the VI cannot import electricity from outside of its borders. 
There are no roads to bring supplies from the next city, town or state. In the 
Virgin Islands, an attack on a cruise ship, Water and Power Authority (hereafter 
WAPA) or a blockage of the port will have similarly devastating economic 
consequences.  
An “after the fact” crisis-driven response can and should be avoided. We 
have the opportunity to acknowledge and learn from our tremendous wealth of 
intellectual capital. Planning based on the thorough and informed discussions of 
a Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group (hereafter Planning Group) 
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can help lessen harmful consequences of a natural or man-made disaster in a 
way that does not trample the cherished principles of liberal democracy. 
 
A. THESIS OBJECTIVE  
The purpose of this thesis is to point out how the Territory of the United 
States Virgin Islands (and all islands) is different from the mainland United States 
in terms of disaster preparedness and the ability to prevent, respond and recover 
from natural disasters and terrorism. 
Chapter I documents the problem. It describes vulnerabilities for the 
United States in general, then for seaports in general because the VI is vitally 
dependent on seaports, and finally, it documents vulnerabilities specifically for 
the Virgin Islands. It discusses vulnerable borders, weak infrastructure, 
geographic vulnerability, and what I have labeled “systemic vulnerability.” One 
section discusses various ways the VI may be attacked while another details 
some of WAPA’s vulnerabilities. 
This thesis attempts to answer the question of where are we at risk. What 
parts of our society and infrastructure are vulnerable and how can we fix them? 
Because we are not privy to the terrorists’ intentions unless they choose to 
threaten or warn us, we must rely on information from intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies around the world -- and on our imaginations.  Included are 
quotations from leading researchers, authors and intelligence and law 
enforcement leaders worldwide. 
Next this thesis shows how portions of the VI’s existing infrastructure is 
inadequate by demonstrating how several private, non-profit organizations and 
individual citizens fill urgent needs that are traditionally the Government’s 
responsibilities. Included here is a forthright discussion of how the police, social 
issues, existing VI Government leadership and perceptions affect Homeland 
Security.  
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Chapter II provides an in-depth analysis of existing VI and federal 
government preparedness plans, and identifies their strengths and weaknesses. 
Chapter III discusses mismanagement and how mismanagement harms 
Homeland Security. Chapter IV deals with change and proposes to create a 
Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. Change will require leadership 
and community involvement. Other required changes include increased federal 
level law enforcement intervention, improving the VIPD, fostering a sense of 
community and enacting The Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group. 
The Planning Group will correct the inaccuracies in existing preparedness plans 
and take advantage of the wealth of knowledge and experience in these islands. 
It proposes a wide range of contributors and will be completely open and 
participatory. The public will be welcome. The press will be invited. One goal is to 
empower our citizens to participate in their government and in fundamental 
decisions that will affect the Virgin Islands for the next century. Chapter V is an 
Action Plan that lists several things we can do immediately. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Three main islands comprise the U.S. Virgin Islands.  St. Croix is 
physically the largest and has a population of approximately 45,000. St. John is 
the smallest with approximately 5,000 residents and St, Thomas has 
approximately 55,000 residents. All of these islands have a daily or weekly influx 
of tourists. Other inhabited islands include Water Island and Lovongo Cay. 
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Virtually all food,6 over-the-counter medicines7 and fuel8 are currently 
brought to the U.S. Virgin Islands via port-based shipping. If this stops, it is 
estimated that stored food supplies9 and over-the-counter medicines10 will be 
exhausted in four weeks, not considering hoarding. Prescription medication 
usually arrives by air and thus will not be affected the same way as port shipping, 
except to the extent that manufacturers and distributors themselves rely on 
containers. If air shipment is not an option, locally available prescription drug 
alternatives and substitutes will help keep the medicine supply viable for 
approximately two weeks, but because some pharmacy products are ordered or 
reordered on a daily basis, these might begin to diminish immediately.11 
According to the 2000 Census, the U.S. Virgin Islands has a population of 
108,612.12 (July 2004 estimate is 108,775.)13 (This number is misleading and low 
because it counts residents, not the tourists.) 
Of that number, only 274 people (0.6 percent of the population) are 
engaged in farming, fishing and forestry.14 Only 11.76% of the total land is arable 
and permanent crops use 2.94% of the total land.15 One percent of the gross 
domestic product can be traced to agriculture.16  
                                            
6 Terry Buder (Owner, Quality Food Corp., St. Thomas, VI) and Chuck Gidley (Chief of 
Operations), interview, 1/5/05. 
7 Heidi Coyle (Owner, Chelsea Drug Store, St. John, VI), interview, 1/6/05. 
8 CIA, “Virgin Islands,” The World Factbook, 6, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vq.html, (accessed 3/16/06). 
9 Buder and Gidley, Interview. 
10 Coyle, Interview. 
11 Coyle, Interview. 
12 U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000,  
http://www.census.gov/census2000/usvi.html, (accessed 3/16/06). 
13 CIA, World Factbook, 2, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vq.html, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
14 U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Population and Housing Profile, 4, 
http://www.census.gov/census2000/usvi.html, (accessed 3/16/06).  
15 CIA, World Factbook, 2, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vq.html, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
16 Ibid., 5.   
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There are 247 farms in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Most are small (fewer than 
three acres), individually owned and earn less than $1,199.00 a year.17 Electricity 
is produced solely by oil and although there is a refinery on St. Croix, crude oil is 
imported by ship. The 2001 estimate for oil consumption is 66,000 barrels a 
day.18 Lastly, “[t]he two drivers of the U.S. Virgin Islands economy are 
commodity exports and tourism.”19 Both of these are dependent upon ports. 
 
C. DOCUMENTING THE PROBLEM – RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES 
 
1. America is at Risk  
We live in a dangerous world. Thousands of people all over the globe 
would like to bankrupt the United States, demolish our way of life, and kill us. Al 
Qaeda still exists but now more than ever it exists in theory rather than as an 
organized, hierarchical entity. It has changed into an ideology comprising many 
different groups and that increases the danger because there is no one center of 
activity, no focal point, no place for us to go and attack. A large part of American 
society does not believe these groups are dangerous or concern themselves with 
the problem. A large part of the VI does not either and based on what is 
discussed in this thesis, neither does the VI leadership.  
Some may ask, why would someone attack the VI? We are so small. We 
have always recovered from natural disasters before.20 The threat is real! On 
                                            
17 1997 Virgin Islands Census of Agriculture, Tables 1, 2, 5, 6, 17 and 19, 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/index1997.htm, (accessed 3/16/06).  
18 CIA, World Factbook, 6, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/vq.html, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
19 Government of the U.S. Virgin Islands, Five Year Operating and Strategic Financial Plan,  
Economic Recovery Task Force, April 27, 2000, 2, 
http://www.usvi.org/oit/5yrplan/vipartiifinal01_pages%201_15.htm, (accessed 3/16/06). 
20 “The West Indian is not exactly hostile to change, but he is not much inclined to believe in 
it. This comes from a piece of wisdom that his climate of eternal summer teaches him. It is that, 
under all the parade of human effort and noise, today is like yesterday, and tomorrow is like 
today; that existence is a wheel of recurring patterns from which no one escapes; that all anybody 
does in this life is live for a while and then die for good, without finding out much; and that 
therefore the idea is to take things easy and enjoy the passing time under the sun.” Herman 
Wouk, Don’t Stop The Carnival (New York, Little & Brown, 1965), 4. 
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February 6, 2006, our own Virgin Islands National Guard Adjutant General Eddy 
L. Charles referred to "the inevitable threat of terrorism." 21 
I quote extensively throughout this thesis from writers who are more 
expert than I am in their fields and because they express themselves eloquently 
and powerfully. It is my hope that if enough people say it in different ways, more 
of those reading this thesis will learn to appreciate the danger we face. The first 
sentence of the first quotation, below, is to me very powerful and that is why it is 
first. It is difficult to comprehend such powerful hatred. It is difficult to 
comprehend that there is such a thing as a god who could be so vengeful and it 
is difficult to believe that this god sends forth killers who believe killing leads to 
better things. But it is true.  
[Our] opponents [are] suffused with a vision of a vengeful god 
whom they serve as executioners, men who regard death as a 
promotion and disdain the humane coexistence for which we 
stand…[Our] future will not be peaceful.  We are in the early stages 
of a third world war.  This conflict may occasionally involve standing 
armies on both sides, but, more often, it will be fought 
asymmetrically, as in Iraq or Manhattan, with our enemies seeking 
to avoid our military strengths while capitalizing on the 
vulnerabilities inherent in a free society…22 
After spending trillions of dollars on high-tech armaments, the 
United States finds itself confounded by a dirt-cheap weapon of 
genius: The suicide bomber. The ultimate precision weapon and 
genuine “smart bomb,” the suicide bomber is hard to deter and 
exasperatingly difficult to defeat….impassioned faith still trumps 
microchips. Armed with a fervent belief in his god's appetite for 
blood, the suicide bomber can dominate headlines around the 
world with a few pounds of explosives … Except for 9/11, suicide 
bombers have conducted their missions abroad. That's going to 
change, but it's a credit to the patriotism and decency of American 
Muslims that none of our fellow citizens has strapped on a bomb 
and walked into a Wal-Mart. Nonetheless, our enemies will find a  
 
                                            
21 Anata Pancham, “Senate Studies VI Homeland Security Funds,” St. Thomas Source, Feb. 
6, 2006, http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1139374830 
(accessed 2/8/06). 
22 Ralph Peters, “Our Brilliant, Bloody Future,” Military Officer (January 2006), 69. 
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way to bring their deadly campaign back to our doorsteps. The 
suicide bomber is so powerful a weapon that not even the terrorists 
have realized its full potential.… We need to prepare for the 
suicide-bomber blitzkrieg, when murderous zealots come at us in 
waves.23 
…With Iran moving toward the development of nuclear weapons, 
we are getting dangerously close to that fatal point of no return on 
the world stage. … Yet there are few signs of alarm in our public 
discourse, whether among politicians, the media or the 
intelligentsia. There is much more discussion of whether 
government anti-terrorism agents should be able to look at the 
records of books borrowed from public libraries. The Iranian 
government is giving us the clearest evidence of what a nuclear 
Iran would mean, with its fanatical hate-filled declarations about 
wanting to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. But send not to 
know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee. Just last year, before 
the American election, Osama bin Laden warned that those places 
that voted for the re-election of the president would become targets 
of terrorist retribution. We could ignore him then. But neither we nor 
our children nor our children's children will ever be able to ignore 
him again if he gets nuclear weapons from a nuclear Iran. We will 
live at his mercy - of which he has none -…you cannot deter 
suicidal terrorists. You can only kill them or stop them from getting 
what they need to kill you. We are killing them in Iraq, though our 
media seem wholly uninterested in that part of the story, just as 
they seem uninterested in the fact that the fate of Western 
civilization may be at stake just across the border in Iran… The 
squeamishness, indecision and wishful thinking of the West are its 
greatest dangers, because the West has the power to destroy any 
other danger. But it does not have the will. …People insulated from 
dangers for generations can indulge themselves in the illusion that 
there are no dangers….Debating abstract questions is much easier 
than confronting concrete and often brutal alternatives. The big 
question is whether we are serious or suicidal.24 
Claims that al Qaeda will again strike the United States come from the 
highest levels of government, leading researchers and writers. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Porter Goss, addressing the U.S. Senate 
                                            
23 Ralph Peters, “Living, and Dying, With Suicide Bombers,” USA Today (January 4, 2006), 
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060104/opledepeters.art.htm (accessed 1/9/06). 
24 Thomas Sowell, “With Looming Danger of Nuclear Iran, Will We Be Serious or Suicidal?” 
Baltimore Sun, January 5, 2006. http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-
op.sowell05jan05,1,1583498.story?ctrack=1&cset=true (accessed 1/8/06). 
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Intelligence Committee on February 16, 2005, stated, “It may be only a matter of 
time before al Qaeda or other groups attempt to use chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear weapons.”25  It is, thus, not if, but when. According to a 
March 2, 2005, statement by Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble, al 
Qaeda has clearly stated its intention to use biological weapons, it has posted 
instructions on how to make these weapons on the Internet and Iraq has become 
the breeding ground for terrorist groups.26 South African Police Commissioner 
Jackie Seleb, speaking of biological weapons, said, “This is not science fiction, 
but a call for urgent prevention.”27  
Even more recently, on January 20, 2006, the nation's top law 
enforcement officials warned that al Qaeda may have plotters already inside the 
United States.28 Senior U.S. intelligence analyst and author of Imperial Hubris, 
Michael Scheuer, said  
I write this book then, with a pressing certainty that al Qaeda will 
attack the Continental United States again, that its next strike will 
be more damaging than that of 11 September 2001, and could 
include use of weapons of mass destruction.29  
Terrorists are seeking nuclear and biological weapons outside the 
United States, but they long to use them here.30  
                                            
25 “Goss Warns of Terror Threat to U.S.,” CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/02/16/intelligence.threats/ (accessed 3/19/05). 
26 “Interpol Sounds 'Urgent' Bioterror Warning. Police Said Ill-equipped to Handle 
World's Greatest Criminal Threat,” Associated Press, Updated: March 1, 2005, 11:17 a.m. 
ET, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7051447/  (accessed 3/2/05, 3/16/05). 
27 http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Interpol-Bioterrorism.html?oref=login  
(accessed 3/2/05); and Jocelyn Gecker, “Bioterror the Biggest Threat,” January 3, 2005, 21:17 -
 (SA), http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,6119,2-10-1462_1669685,00.html 
(accessed 3/16/05). 
28 “Al Qaeda May Already Be in U.S., Security Officials Warn,” ABC News, January 20, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1527874 (accessed 1/26/06). 
29 Michael Scheuer (formerly Anonymous), Imperial Hubris (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 
Inc., 2004), xii. 
30 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (3/31/05), 452, 
http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf (accessed 4/4/05). 
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Unfortunately, other suicide bombers are likely to follow those who 
struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, by attacking targets in the United States. Even before 9/11, 
suicide attacks had either been contemplated or planned but 
thwarted…. Four years before 9/11, two Palestinians plotted a 
suicide bombing of the New York City Subway. Their plan was 
foiled when an informant tipped off police…The spread of suicide 
terrorists worldwide suggests that the United States will not remain 
immune from this threat.31 
Al Qaeda is likely to select its targets based on the following three criteria: 
Targets that are recognized symbols of U.S. life and power, targets that will result 
in mass casualties and thus spread fear and panic, and targets whose 
destruction will negatively impact the U.S. economy. 
The threat is broad. “Terrorists can turn aircraft into cruise missiles (as in 
the 9/11 attacks) or boats into torpedoes (as in the 2000 attack on the USS 
Cole).”32  The threat includes more than bombs. Radio Frequency Weapons 
(RFWs) are a developing threat. An August 2005 report says,  
RFWs have already been used to defeat security systems, commit 
robberies, disable police communications, induce fires, and disrupt 
banking computers. Improvised RFWs have been demonstrated to 
jam satellites, cause a catastrophic failure in a locomotive and 
damage automobiles. Devices that can be used as RFWs have 
unintentionally caused aircraft crashes and near crashes, pipeline 
explosions, large gas spills, computer damage, medical equipment  
 
 
malfunctions, vehicle malfunctions such as severe braking 
problems, [military] weapons pre-ignition and explosions, and public 
water system malfunctions…33 
                                            
31 Bruce Hoffman, David W. Brannan, Eric Herren and Robert Matthiessen, “Preparing for 
Suicide Terrorism, A Primer for American Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers,” (RAND 
National Security Research Division, 2004), 1. Unclassified//For Official Use Only//Law 
Enforcement Only.  
32 Hoffman et al., “Preparing for Suicide Terrorism,” 2.    
33 The Threat of Radio Frequency Weapons to Critical Infrastructure Facilities, Technical 
Support Working Group(TSWG)  and Directed Energy Technology Office (DETO), TSWG & 
DETO Publication: August 2005. 
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On February 28, 2005, the President’s Information Technology Advisory 
Committee wrote:  
The IT infrastructure is highly vulnerable to premeditated attacks 
with potentially catastrophic effects. Thus it is a prime target for 
cyber terrorism as well as criminal acts. The IT infrastructure 
encompasses not only the best-known uses of the public Internet –- 
e-commerce, communication, and Web services -– but also the 
less visible systems and connections of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure such as power grids, air traffic control systems, 
financial systems, and military and intelligence systems. …Beyond 
economic repercussions, the risks to our Nation’s security are 
clear.34 
One of the inherent problems of dealing with terrorists is that they do not 
advertise their plans. Furthermore, because of poor intelligence in general, we do 
not even know for sure what we know. On March 31, 2005, the Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction said, “…we still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs 
and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous 
adversaries.”35 
These threats will be with us for a long time. “Like the Cold War before it, 
the Global War on Terrorism will be the work of a generation.”36 “The terrorist 
threat has been and will likely remain one of the most pervasive challenges that 
[the Department of Defense] faces.”37 [Antiterrorism] must be taught as a way of 
life for every [Department of Defense] employee - whether military, civil service, 
                                            
34 “Report to the President, February 2005, Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization,” iii and 
1,  http://www.itrd.gov/pitac/reports/20050301_cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf (accessed 4/1/05). 
35 “Report to the President of the United States, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the 
United States,” Letter to the President, March 31, 2005, 1, 
http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf (accessed 4/1/05). 
36 Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 
“Statement to 109th Congress Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities,” Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, March 15, 
2005, 3. 
37 United States Northern Command Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, 7. 
11 
family members or contractor.38  “We may thus be on the cusp of an even 
bloodier and arguably more sustainable campaign of al Qaeda and al Qaeda –
inspired violence in the years to come.”39  
As there is a possibility that multiple incidents will occur 
simultaneously or sequentially, organizations should always 
consider the need to respond to multiple incidents of the same type 
and multiple incidents of different types, at either the same or other 
geographic locations, in preparedness planning efforts. These 
incidents will invariably require the coordination and cooperation of 
Homeland Security response organizations across multiple 
regional, State, and local jurisdictions.40 
The Gilmore Commission concluded: 
[P]anel members all agreed at the outset that it could not postulate, 
as part of its vision, a return to a pre-September 11 ‘normal.’ The 
threats from terrorism are now recognized to be a condition that we 
must face far into the future. It is our firm intention to articulate a 
vision of the future that subjects terrorism to a logical place in the 
array of threats from other sources that the American people face 
every day - from natural diseases and other illness to crime and 
traffic and other accidents, to mention a few. The panel firmly 
believes that terrorism  
must be put in context of the other risks we face, and that 
resources should be prioritized and allocated to that variety of risks 
in a logical fashion.41  
The many quotations in this section have the sole purpose of convincing 
the reader of the great danger we face. No one quotation is more important than 
any other. They do, however, collectively represent the most knowledgeable 
people in the field and the goal is convince you, by saying this so many different 
ways and from so many different sources, of its truth. 
                                            
38 United States Northern Command Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, 8. 
39 Bruce Hoffman, “Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?” Testimony 
presented before the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation on September 29, 2005 (RAND, CT-250-1), 10,   
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT250-1.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06).  
40 National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, iv. 
41 Gilmore Commission, Annual Report Volume V, December 15, 2003, I, 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/volume_v/volume_v_report_only.pdf (accessed 3/7/05).  
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2. Seaports at Risk 
The seaports of the continental United States are highly vulnerable to a 
terrorist attack. Such an attack will either be focused directly on a port or the 
weapon will travel through a port to its final destination.42 It does not even have 
to be a detonated weapon. Merely leaving a container of nuclear material or a 
biohazard in a conspicuous place could cause ports to be shut down out of 
caution.43 
If this happens, ports will be shut down just as the U.S. civil aviation 
system was shut down on 9/11.  A local port shutdown will be followed by a 
nationwide shutdown, with a cascading shutdown effect worldwide and resulting 
worldwide economic disruption. Port-based vulnerability is a major concern.44  
                                            
42 Ted Bridis, “Study Warns of Lapses at U.S. Ports,” AP, Mar 12, [2006] 6:30 AM EST, 
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/P/PORTS_SECURITY_STUDY?SITE=COCOL&SECTION=
HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT (accessed March 12, 2006). 
43 Winston Chen, Esq., email Feb. 23, 2006. Attorney Chen was an Assistant Attorney 
General and Director of the White Collar Crimes Section with the Virgin Islands Department of 
Justice. He is now a Deputy Attorney General in the Antitrust Law Section of the California 
Department of Justice. 
44 Think tank reports and news stories about the vulnerability of America’s ports, shipping in 
general and the likelihood of a port attack abound and precede 9/11. Stephen Flynn was writing 
about this subject in the fall of 2000. Here, he describes a chemical weapon hidden in a container 
arriving in Newark, New Jersey.  
Stephen Flynn, “Council on Foreign Relations, Bolstering the Maritime Weak Link,” testimony 
before the United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Relations, December 6, 2001, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication_print.php?id=4239&content (accessed 3/16/05). Also: Stephen 
Flynn, America the Vulnerable (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), Ch 2. 
V. Dion Haynes, “U.S. Works to Shore Up Port Security,” Chicago Tribune, March 10, 2003, 
http://knxup2.hsdl.nps.navy.mil/homesec/ebird/s20030311/s20030311160785.html (accessed 
3/16/05). 
Bryan Bender, “Terror Risk Seen Highest at U.S. Ports,” Boston Globe, June 21, 2003, 1, 
http://80-knxup2.hsdl.nps.navy.mil.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/homesec/ebird/s20030623/s20030... 
A well-documented academic study concludes that our ports are vulnerable.  
Warren Allen II, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, and Seth Jacobson, “Port Security: Applied 
Policy Project. Recommendations to Improve Emergency Response Capabilities at the Port of 
Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach,” UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research, Policy 
Studies 298B: Applied Policy Project, March 20, 2003. 
Pam Fessler, “Port Security, Contingency Plans Scrutinized,” National Public Radio, March 8, 
2005,  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4526354 (accessed 3/8/05, 3/16/05).  
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[A] container-borne atomic bomb detonated in a U.S. port could 
wreak economic as well as physical havoc. Robert Bonner, the 
head of Customs and Border Protection with the Department of 
Homeland Security, has argued that such an attack would lead to a 
halt to container traffic worldwide for some time, bringing the world 
economy to its knees.45 
Some might challenge the notion that an attack is likely to come through a 
port.46 Although no one knows for certain exactly how an attack will manifest, 
there is near unanimous agreement that an attack is forthcoming. It is not if, but 
when.  
A report released February 21, 2006, from the New York State Office of 
Homeland Security provides an exceptional analysis of the maritime risk. It is 
quoted at length here with its internal footnotes listed immediately following, 
because it is so thorough and compelling.47 
                                            
Bruce Loveless, Claudia Risner, Daniel McClellan and John Valentine, “Protect Our Ports,” 
Baltimore Sun, March 14, 2003, http://80-
nxup2.hsdl.nps.navy.mil.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/homesec/ebird/s20030314/s20030 (accessed 2/1/05).  
The maritime threat is not limited to large container ships. Magnus Ranstorp, Director of the 
Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in 
Scotland, said passenger and car ferries could also be targeted because detained al-Qaeda have 
indicated this subject was discussed several years ago.  
Gregory Katz, “Risk of Shipping Attacks Growing,” Dallas Morning News, December 2, 2002, 
2, http://80-knxup2.hsdl.nps.navy.mil.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/homesec/ebird/s20021202/s20021.... 
A container attack is not the only way to disrupt our ports. Bell Labs conducted a study of 
“cascading impacts under disruption scenarios” testing how other factors affect ports. For 
example, ports require electricity and therefore implicate the power grid system. If there is no 
electricity, there is no way to operate electric machinery and lighting. Communications is also 
vitally important. Drop-off and pick-up coordination happens via the telecommunications system. 
If that system does not work, the port will not function properly. Ports also require fuel, other 
modes of transportation (trucks and planes) and so on. Disrupting any one of these will also 
disrupt ports. Walter E. Beyeler, Stephen H. Conrad, Thomas F. Corbet, Gerard P. O’Reilly and 
David D. Picklesimer, “Inter-Infrastructure Modeling-Ports and Telecommunications,” Bell Labs 
Technical Journal 9:2 (2004), 91-105. Published online in Wiley InterScience 
(www.interscience.wiley.com). 
45 Jonathan Medalia, “Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack using 
Oil Tankers,” CRS Report for Congress, order Code RS21997, January 18, 2006, 1. 
46  See, for example, Richard Clark, “Ten Years Later,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 
2005. 
47 Christian Weber, “New York State Office of Homeland Security Focus Report: Maritime 
Terrorist Threat,” February 21, 2006, 2-9. 
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As a result terrorists are seeking to exploit the largest area on the 
face of the earth, the sea, and has increasingly shifted their focus 
towards maritime operations. The maritime domain in particular 
presents not only a medium by which terrorists can move, but offers 
a broad array of potential targets that fit the terrorists’ operational 
objectives of achieving mass casualties and inflicting catastrophic 
economic harm.2 
The CIA warned as early as February 2003 that al Qaeda was 
developing and refining maritime attack capabilities.3 Recent 
indications point to al Qaeda’s intention to intensify operations 
against maritime targets and increase strikes against shipping and 
port facilities as part of a strategy to strike economic targets. 
British Royal Navy Admiral Sir Alan West, the First Sea Lord and 
Chief of Naval Staff, has warned that we are entering “an era where 
the maritime terrorist threat is a clear and present danger.4 
Suicide attacks against the USS Cole in October 2000 and the 
French-owned oil tanker MV Limbourg in November 2002 are the 
most notable manifestations of al Qaeda’s oceangoing threat. 
However, there is evidence pointing to al Qaeda’s growing focus on 
waterborne attacks. 
In May 2002, a joint Moroccan-CIA operation captured a four man 
al Qaeda cell planning to attack U.S. and British ships in the Strait 
of Gibraltar using bomb-laden Zodiac speedboats. The operatives 
described to American intelligence officers their plan to acquire 
speedboats, load them with high explosives, and after a series of 
test runs, utilize the boats as “human torpedoes” against U.S. and 
British ships. 
Furthermore, information gleaned as a result of the November 2002 
capture of al Qaeda’s nautical strategist, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 
confirmed that the Moroccan cell was just the crest of a planned 
wave of nautical terrorism. Nashiri, an expert in naval demolition 
and sabotage, detailed to interrogators al Qaeda’s strategy for 
attacking Western maritime targets. The strategy called for 
ramming underway vessels with explosive-laden speedboats, 
detonating vessel-borne improvised explosive devices in ports, 
attacking large cargo ships and supertankers from the air with 
explosive-laden small aircraft, and subsurface attacks by divers or 
suicide demolition teams, utilizing limpet mines (a magnetic 
explosive device used for disabling and destroying surface vessels) 
and other improvised explosive devices. 
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Along with Nashiri, coalition forces seized an al Qaeda maritime 
military manual detailing where to strike different classes of vessels 
and the quantity of explosives needed to cause critical damage. 
Saud Hamid al-Utaibi, a senior al Qaeda lieutenant, integral in the 
attacks on the USS Cole and MVLimburg, is believed to have 
replaced Nashiri as the new al Qaeda strategist. Al-Utaibi’s 
promotion reinforces concerns by security agencies around the 
world that the maritime industry is a prime target for future al Qaeda 
attacks.5 
On August 25, 2004, Stephen Flynn, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on 
Foreign Relations and a retired Coast Guard commander, in 
congressional testimony before the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation stated he had, “little doubt that al Qaeda possesses 
the means to identify those users of the maritime transportation 
system that US authorities currently view as low security risks and 
are fully capable of exploiting the many opportunities to intercept 
and compromise these legitimate shipments either at their point of 
origin or anywhere along the transportation route they travel.”6 
The very factors that allow maritime transport to contribute to 
economic prosperity also leave it uniquely vulnerable to terrorism. 
As Flynn characterized, the maritime industry is “the soft underbelly 
of globalization.”7 Any number of major attack scenarios against the 
maritime transport system could result in massive casualties, 
cripple global trade and have immediate and significant economic 
impact.8 
The security of our ports, sea lanes and maritime chokepoints is of 
vital importance to the United States. In today’s interdependent 
global economic environment, with more than 95 percent of the 
world’s commerce moved by sea, a catastrophic terrorist attack 
against the U.S. maritime industry would have a devastating impact 
on the global economy. Over 95 percent (by volume) of our non-
North American foreign trade, including 100% of key foreign 
commodities (i.e., foreign oil), enter the country through maritime 
channels.9  
Terrorists are believed to exploit this [registration] loophole to mask 
the ownership and identity of their vessels. The lack of transparency in 
ship ownership is a significant concern since most ships calling U.S. 
ports are foreign owned and foreign crewed. In August 2001, the 
Tonga-flagged Sara, which had changed names four times in two 
16 
years and flags twice during that span, was intercepted off the coast of 
Sicily with 15 al Qaeda operatives onboard all holding fraudulent 
Pakistani papers… 
It is widely believed that Osama bin Laden has control of an estimated 
20 merchant ships and crews.19  
It is believed that they play a vital clandestine role in the movement of 
operatives, funds, messages, explosives, arms, ammunitions and 
other terrorist-related material to al Qaeda cells strategically situated 
on key shipping lanes… 
The maritime threat posed by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and sympathetic 
extremist groups is limited only by the imagination of terrorist planners. 
Internal footnotes: 
2 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 20, 2005. 
 
3 Captain James Pelkofski, “Before the Storm: al Qaeda's Coming Maritime 
Campaign”, Proceedings, December 2005. 
 
4 Sean Rayment, “Navy Chief Has ‘Too Few Ships to Guard Sea Lanes from 
Terrorists,” Telegraph, July, 9, 2003. 
 
5 http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=532, [(accessed 3/16/06)]. 
 
6 Brucy Moody, “Shipping Containers: Poor Man’s Nuclear Missile?” Homeland 
Defense Journal, June 2005. 
 
7 CDR Michael Dobbs, “Homeland Security…From the Sea”, Journal of Homeland 
Security, November 2002. 
 
8 John F. Fritelli, “Maritime Security: Overview of Issues”, CRS Report to 
Congress, December 5, 2003. 
 
9 James M. Loy and Robert Ross, “Global Trade: America’s Achilles ’ Heel”, 
Defense Horizons, February 2002. 
 
19 James Hessman, “Shipping Container Security and the Weakest Link 
Scenario”, Sea Power, October 2003. 
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3. Virgin Islands Risk Factors 
The VI is at risk first and most simply because it is part of America. An 
attack in or through the VI is an easy way for bin Laden to attack America. 
Although the VI has just over 100,000 people, millions of tourists arrive every 
year. A slowdown or shutdown in tourism here would also result in mass layoffs. 
The vast majority of the cruise ships visiting the U.S. Virgin Islands are based on 
the mainland. The economies of the cruise ships and airplanes that bring tourists 
to the VI will be adversely affected, as well as each of these industries support 
systems for food, fuel, entertainment, etc. 
The VI is at risk also because it is vitally dependent upon seaports.  If 
mainland seaports shutdown, the Virgin Islands will be severely impacted and 
perhaps shut down with catastrophic and life-threatening consequences. For the 
VI, the consequences of a stateside port shutdown or interruption will be the loss 
of virtually 100% of all food, fuel and over-the-counter medicines because all of 
these items are imported through ports. For example, the VI “imports more than 
$9 million in fruits and vegetables compared to a local production of only 
$800,000…”48 It is thus doubly vulnerable because it will also suffer the 
consequences of mainland shutdowns or interruptions. 
In addition, because help is not available from the next city, town or state, 
the VI must assume a larger percentage of the emergency preparedness 
functions that would otherwise be shared between communities and regions. 
Planning for outside resources should be the norm because the VI cannot take 
advantage of this Regionalization. The VI must lay the groundwork for, demand 
and accept immediate off-island assistance. 
The Virgin Islands is an attractive terrorist target for four additional 
reasons. It has porous borders, weak infrastructure, it is isolated geographically, 
and it is an easy target. Osama bin Laden said his group’s goal is to bankrupt 
                                            
48 Christine Lett, “Sustainable farming, Financial and agricultural viability are elusive goals for 
many VI farmers,” Virgin Islands Daily News, February 22, 2006, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=13552192 (accessed 2/23/06). 
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America49 and economic recession in the VI following an attack would be one 
method for him to achieve his goal. Bin Laden said, “So we are continuing this  
policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is 
too great for Allah.”50 An attack on the VI is thus an easy way for bin Laden to 
attack America. 
A vital point that distinguishes the Virgin Islands from the mainland is the 
reality that the Virgin Islands’ first responders will likely be personally impacted in 
some way by the same disaster they are supposed to respond to and may 
unable to help. These first responders have families and homes to take care of. 
After Hurricane Marilyn in 1995, “police were hampered … because the 
department lost 90 percent of its vehicles… [and] many officers and their families 
are sleeping in cars and don’t have a change of clothing.”51 
An excellent recent example of this problem was Hurricane Katrina where 
most of the first responders lived in New Orleans and “…were largely 
overwhelmed and unable to perform their duties…”52   In contrast, for 9/11 in 
New York, the vast majority of those first responders lived outside of the city and 
were not personally affected.  
The VI will need off-island help because there is no town, city or state 
within driving distance! This requires planning beyond the typical staging of  
 
                                            
49 “Bin Laden: Goal is to Bankrupt U.S.,” 
CNN.COM,http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/01/binladen.tape/ (accessed 3/7/05, 3/16/05, 
12/26/05). Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 100-102. 
50 Osama Bin Laden, from his speech November 1, 2004, as quoted by Hoffman, “Testimony 
presented before the House International Relations Subcommittee,” 13, citing Al Jazeera.Net and 
a website that is no longer accurate (12/26/05). The Hoffman article is available at   
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT250-1.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06).  
51 Will Jones, “Davila: Cops are overstressed; St. Thomas hotels are no help,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, September 23, 1995, 6 
52 “A Failure of  Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,“ U.S. House of Representatives, February 15, 
2006, 1, 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainre
port.pdf (accessed 2/15/06). 
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additional resources/assistance because of the geographical complications of 
being islands with rugged terrain located more than 1,000 miles from the 
mainland US. 
The next four sections elaborate on the VI’s vulnerabilities. 
 
a. Vulnerable Borders  
Illegal aliens land in the VI openly and regularly, yet they are rarely 
apprehended. The vast majority is not caught. “The Virgin Islands, and St. John 
in particular, are busy drop-off points for human smugglers…It’s not a big secret 
that there are organizations using the Virgin Islands to get people into the United 
States.”53 The VI is thus at risk individually, and the mainland is at risk from 
terrorists whose physical entry point into the United States is the VI. The VI is 
“175 miles of unprotected shoreline”54 – it is a wide open back door! “The U.S. 
Virgin Islands are close to other islands, and are close to the U.S.;” ... “The 
                                            
53 Joseph Tsidulko, “Customs Cracked Down on Illegal Immigrants During Week,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, November 19, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=10744039 (accessed 11/23/05). 
Also, ICE spokesman Ivan Ortiz acknowledges that illegal immigration has taken place on St. 
John. Megan Poinski, “Joint Force Wraps Up Three-day Drug, Immigration Sweep Today,” Virgin 
Islands Daily News, November 18, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=10724212 (accessed 11/18/05).  
 “Customs said that of the almost 2,000 illegal immigrants taken into custody over the past 
four years, at least 75% of the arrests have been made on St. John.” Frank Barnako, “Helicopter 
Led Immigration Crackdown,” News of St. John, November 20, 2005, 
http://barnako.typepad.com/news_of_st_john_usvi/2005/11/helicopter_part.html (accessed 
11/23/05). 
“From 2001 to 2005 Immigration and Customs Enforcement authorities detained more than 
1,900 illegal immigrants in the U.S. Virgin Islands, said Ivan Ortiz, an ICE spokesman.” Mat 
Probosco, “News Brief: Police Discover Infant's Body at Smith Bay,” St. Thomas Source, January 
25, 2006, http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1138079860 
(accessed 1/26/06). 
Andrea Milam, “ICE Investigation Leads to Arrests of 27 More Illegal Immigrants,” St. 
John Tradewinds, November 28, 2005, 
http://209.123.251.85/~trade/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=38 
(accessed 11/28/05).   
Tradewinds Staff, “ICE Arrests St. Croix Man Attempting to Import 10 Kilos of Cocaine into St. 
John,” St. John Tradewinds, November 21, 2005, 
http://209.123.251.85/~trade/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=95&Itemid=38(accessed 
11/28/05). 
54 Pancham, “Senate Studies VI Homeland Security Funds.” 
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geographic location [including close proximity to remote islands for other 
countries] is why many illegal immigrants choose to attempt to enter the U.S. 
through the Virgin Islands.”55 
After 9/11, it was apparent that smugglers’ methods, routes, and 
modes of transportation are potential vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by terrorists and result in terrorist weapons illegally 
entering the United States.56 
[T]he potential exists for a single individual or small group to cross 
the border undetected with biological or chemical weapons, 
weapons of mass effect, or other implements of terrorism.57 
Indeed, a person could already be sick with a deadly contagion 
before ever crossing the border. The mainland or national counter-terrorism 
consequences of porous borders in the VI are twofold: (1) it is easy to enter the 
Territory, and (2) once in the VI, a terrorist has his or her proverbial foot in the 
door and may more easily infiltrate the U.S. mainland. 
An ever-present threat exists from the potential for terrorists to 
employ the same smuggling and transportation networks, 
infrastructure, drop houses, and other support and then use these 
masses of illegal aliens as 'cover' for a successful cross-border 
penetration.58 
b. Weak Infrastructure  
Based on my personal observations, research, and having been a 
first responder in the VI for seven years, it is apparent the VI has weak and 
                                            
55 Andrea Milam, “Immigrants Come to U.S. VI for Easy Entry, Better Life,” St. John Tradewinds, 
Feb 6, 2006, quoting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) spokesperson Ivan Ortiz, 
http://www.stjohntradewindsnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=191&Itemid=3
8. (accessed 2/6/06). 
56 National Border Patrol Strategy (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, September 2004), 
4. 
57 National Border Patrol Strategy (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, September 2004). 
58 Chris Strohm, “Border Agency Nearly ‘Overwhelmed,’ Chief Says,” GovExec.Com, quoting 
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner discussing the 
National Border Patrol Strategy and the Arizona-Mexico border, 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0405/040505c1.htm (accessed 4/6/05). 
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inadequate infrastructure, including law enforcement and security, it is a soft 
target, unable to protect itself and similarly unable to respond to a major crisis.   
In the VI, even something as mundane as a multi-car accident 
exhausts every aspect of emergency response capability, including police, fire, 
emergency medical services and communications. On St. Thomas, there is 
sometimes only one government ambulance on duty for the entire island of 
55,000, not counting tourists. On St. John, there is always only one government 
ambulance on duty. A direct attack causing more damage than a car accident 
would have devastating economic consequences in the VI, ripple effects 
nationwide and of course, nationwide symbolic consequences.  
After Hurricane Marilyn (1995), there was widespread looting that 
was only controlled by approximately 200 federal and state law enforcement 
including FBI, U.S. Marshals, U.S. Customs Agents, Military Police and South 
Carolina Police.59 
In the VI,  
[c]ivil disorder and widespread looting have occurred in past 
disasters. VIPD has +/- 457 sworn officers, but may be 
overwhelmed and need additional resources in a large event. VI 
Port Authority has only 15 sworn officers to protect all key airport 
and port facilities. Supplemental law enforcement resources must 
be immediately available the first night post event. Abundant 
portable lighting is critical to maintaining public security.60  
Volunteers [with other jobs] perform nearly all Search and Rescue 
work (marine/land) with very limited budgets and equipment. [VIFS 
has no capabilities.]61 
For firefighting and hazardous materials, there is no search and 
rescue or EMS capability. VIFS does not have the capabilities or 
resources for multiple fire responses; could be strained by a large 
single fire; are under-equipped to deal with a high-rise fire, e.g., 
                                            
59 Will Jones, “Davila: Cops are overstressed; St. Thomas hotels are no help,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, September 23, 1995, 6.    
60 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 15. 
61 Ibid.  (material in brackets [] is from page 17). 
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hotel or public-housing complex. There are no working fire hydrants 
outside WAPA-serviced areas. Tanker trucks are used… There are 
minimal HazMat capabilities Territory-wide.62  
“The USVI does not have adequate equipment or trained staff to detect and 
decontaminate biological, chemical, radioactive or other HazMat victims.”63 
VIPD’s radio system is likely to be disrupted in a severe event. The 
network relies entirely on Innovative Communications equipment, 
which is prone to damage. VIPA [Virgin Islands Port Authority) is 
severely understaffed for the large number of critical facilities it 
needs to support. VIPA supplements security during non-disaster 
periods with +/- 30 moonlighting USVI law enforcement officers that 
will not be available in disasters.64 
“There are no USVI evacuation plans. The general perception is that the VI has 
survived major disasters without evacuations, so it is not a priority.”65  
[The Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency, 
(hereafter VITEMA)] is responsible for all disaster preparations… 
Given staffing limitations, USVI capabilities would be overtaxed by 
a severe event and significant federal support will be required.66  
ERT-A communications capability is very limited and contact with 
VITEMA, other territorial and federal agencies and responders will 
be difficult. VITEMA EOC’s on STT and STJ are vulnerable and 
communications may fail in a significant disaster. [The STT EOC is 
planning to move so this information relative to St. Thomas may 
eventually become inaccurate.] Extensive damage to air and sea 
ports could delay delivery of additional communications assets.67 
The Territory Operations Plan (VITEOP) was last updated on 30 
June 1999. Plans, training and exercises have been limited and 
new personnel will be challenged in a major disaster. 21 of 40 key 
                                            
62 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 16. 
63 Ibid., 47.  
64 Ibid., 17. 
65 Every citizen must be comfortable telling a local officer the information they have who 
WILL pass the information up to the Intelligence or Homeland Security or Terrorism coordinator in 
the department, who WILL pass it up to the Territory-wide counterpart who WILL pass it up to the 
National level. Ibid., 18. 
66 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 23. 
67 Ibid., 37. 
23 
staffing positions in VITEMA Territory ERT and ESF’s are vacant as 
of early 2004…STT/STJ EOC’s are highly vulnerable to strong 
hurricanes. None of the EOC’s is built to seismic standards. [St. 
Thomas is planning to move its EOC so this information may 
become inaccurate as to STT.] Territorial communications post-
disaster will be inadequate and could impede response operations. 
The USVI Territory Emergency Management Council (EMC), 
headed by the Governor and supported by the primary VI 
government agencies to set disaster-related policies, has not been 
meeting regularly.68 
There is no location on STT or STX that can be used as a 
Mobilization Center to support a large disaster relief effort. Smaller 
staging areas on STT and STX have been identified… VITEMA has 
no transportation plan to move, store or distribute requested 
items.69 
 
c. Geographic Vulnerability  
The VI, because it is comprised of small islands more than 1,000 
miles from the continental United States, is vulnerable to terrorism in ways the 
continental United States is not. It is doubly vulnerable. It is vulnerable to a direct 
attack and it is also subject to whatever secondary or tertiary consequences flow 
from a stateside attack, what some refer to as “second and third order effects, 
such as the impact of a port attack on shipping commerce.”70  
For example, the VI economy is tourism-based, so a tourism 
slowdown would be devastating. The World Travel and Tourism Council 
estimates that 40.3% of all jobs in the VI are related to travel and tourism. This 
represents more than 18,000 jobs or one in every 2.5 jobs. By the year 2015, 
these numbers are estimated to increase to 46.2%, 24,000 jobs or one in every 
2.2 jobs.71  
                                            
68 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 24. 
69 Ibid., 56. 
70 Markle Task Force, “Part 2: Working Group Analyses,” 47, 
http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle_Report_Part2.pdf, (accessed 2/16/06). 
71 World Travel and Tourism Council, 6, 14, http://www.wttc.org/2004tsa/frameset2a.htm 
(accessed 6/18/05). 
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Also, nearly 100% of VI food, fuel, over-the-counter medicines and 
oil used to make electricity72 and potable water are imported through ports. A 
port shutdown would thus have life-threatening consequences.  
Near total reliance on food import necessitates that ports must 
resume normalcy within 7 to 14 days after the disaster, before on-
island food supplies are depleted… Loss of electricity and resultant 
loss in refrigeration and water would intensify the needs for food, so 
would the loss of gas and electricity for cooking.73  
Most of the marine piers are not designed to withstand seismic 
activity [, they] may be damaged by tsunamis, tidal surge and/or 
floating debris [and] piers may not be accessible due to harbor 
debris.74 
 
d. Systemic Vulnerability  
The VI is vulnerable because much of the rest of the United States 
is better protected, with better infrastructure, a more connected and perhaps a 
more vigilant community and with help as near as the next town, city or state. 
A draft version of the Virgin Islands Health Department’s 
Bioterrorism Response Plan described the situation this way: 
Vulnerability of the Population  
Preparedness and sustainability in the event of an emergency due 
to a bioterrorist attack is crucial for any jurisdiction, but is even 
more so for the USVI for the following reasons:  
• The USVI is located in the Caribbean’s hurricane belt which puts its 
population, buildings and other physical structures at high risk for 
catastrophic damage from tropical storm systems.   
                                            
72 “The two problems are the islands' troubled methods of waste disposal and their addiction 
to expensive oil to produce energy.” Don Buchanan, “Decision on Energy Alternatives Slow in 
Coming,” St. John Source, October 10, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1105689462 (accessed 10/11/05). 
73 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 42. 
74 Ibid., 65. 
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• The Hovensa Oil Refinery, the largest oil refinery in the Western 
Hemisphere, is located on the island of St. Croix and offers another highly 
visible target for a terrorist attack. 
• The vibrant tourist industry with airlines and cruise ships transporting 
passengers to and from the U.S. mainland and other neighboring 
Caribbean islands is a potential target for terrorism. 
• In the event of a bioterrorist attack on the USVI, the nearest outside 
emergency response assistance is at least five hours away. In addition, 
2.5 percent of the USVI population (about 4000 people), travel daily 
between the territory’s islands. This daily commuting can potentially foster 
the spread of a bioterrorism agent and challenge efforts to contain it.  
• The USVI is a combination of islands with 40 miles of ocean separating 
the two main islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas.  Inter-island 
coordination of emergency response activities will be severely challenged 
because of this fact.75  
The final version of the Bioterrorism Response Plan, made the 
following “assumptions” for a hurricane: 
1. Few deaths and critical injuries are expected, except if accompanied 
by flooding, in which case drowning may occur. 
2. Damage to medical and health care facilities. 
3. Closed ports of entry, preventing normal evacuation and transport of 
goods. 
4. Possible epidemic following the event, due to the breakdown in 
general sanitation and infrastructure, to include potable water, sewage 
disposal and proper storage of food supplies. 
5. All four islands could be isolated for a period ranging from few to many 
hours. 
6. Tidal surge usually accompanies hurricanes; therefore, low lying and 
oceanfront areas and facilities need to be prepared for flooding — 
sandbagging, protecting equipment, etc. - and may need to be 
evacuated.”76 
 
                                            
75 The document Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan may have been a draft 
version of the Bioterrorism Response Plan but I was not able to confirm that. The quoted section 
is from Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan rev.doc, “Section II: Situations and 
Assumptions,” unnumbered pages.  
76 Department of Public Health’s Bioterrorism Response Plan, “Section II: Situations and 
Assumptions,” unnumbered pages. 
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4. Direct Attack against the Virgin Islands 
 
a. Virgin Islands’ Targets and Methods of Attack 
This section attempts to show how easy it would be to attack the 
Virgin Islands. Targets of a direct attack might include cruise ships. The St. 
Thomas-based May 5, 2005, Health Department Table Top Exercise, Module 
Two, envisioned a fishing vessel crashing into the side of a cruise ship. Modules 
One and Three involved a biological attack on a cruise ship. “A manual posted to 
a jihadist forum provides instructions for the cultivation and use of three strains of 
plague - bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic - from the Yersinia pestis microbe, 
as a biological weapon…”77  
Quoting again from the February 21, 2006, New York State Office 
of Homeland Security78 with internal footnotes at the end of the quotation, 
A large ship could ram and thus knock out bridge abutments and 
block shipping channels, or intentionally be sunk outside a key 
harbor blocking civilian and military vessels in port.34 The lengthy 
closure of a military port could hamper the military’s ability to re-
supply deployed forces. 35 … 
As a targeting strategy, a successful attack on a cruise ship could 
produce high casualties; devastate that tourist industry and garner 
significant worldwide media attention for al Qaeda. Between 1992 
and 1994 Ayman al Zawahiri and the Egyptian Islamic Group, now 
merged with al Qaeda, specifically targeted and attacked cruise 
ships along the Nile to damage Egypt’s tourist trade… 
Ferries have been long viewed by terrorists as a target capable of 
yielding high casualties. Most notably, on February 27, 2004, a 
television set filled with 8lbs of TNT was detonated onboard the 
Philippines’ Superferry 14 by Islamic terrorists killing 116… 
 
                                            
77 SITE Institute, January 24, 2006, “A Manual Instructing in the Use of Plague as a Biological 
Weapon,” 
http://www.siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications142206&Category=publications&Subcatego
ry=0, (accessed 1-26-06).  
78 Weber, “New York State Office of Homeland Security Focus Report,” 10, 11, 19. 
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There is concern al Qaeda-linked terrorists will attempt to explode a 
ship laden with explosives or flammable material in a key port, 
canal or internal waterway, to cause maximum casualties, 
infrastructure damage and economic harm. 
Internal footnotes:  
34 Fay Bowers and Peter Grier, “How Al Qaeda Might Strike the U.S. by 
Sea”, Christian Science Monitor, 5/14/03. 
 
35 Peter Goodspeed, “Piracy at Sea Reaches Record High”, National 
Post, July 24, 2003. 
 
An attack on a ship does not have to use scuba divers, a bomb or a 
plane. “Any action affecting Virgin Islands tourists [who come from all over the 
world] would create worldwide headlines.  Cruise ships could serve as incubators 
for any type of biological agent- i.e., a salad bar or buffet causing mass food 
poisoning or spreading contagious diseases that wouldn't be manifested until the 
passengers reached home, all over the world.”79 In short time, the illness would 
be traced back to its VI origin. The economic consequences would be 
devastating to the VI and to the worldwide travel industry. 
Scuba terror has already been tried in the Middle East.80 The 
Philippine military has captured a terrorist made submarine (see Figure 1 below) 
and a terrorist made suicide boat bomb (see Figure 2 below). 
Al Qaeda has been training operatives in scuba diving techniques. 
Two of the most dangerous al-Qaeda-linked groups in Southeast  
Asia are working together to train militants in scuba diving for 
seaborne terror attacks, according to the interrogation of a recently 
captured guerrilla.81  
                                            
79  Winston H. Chen, Esq., email and telephone conversation with the author, January 26, 
2006.  
80 Jason Keyser, “Israel Guns Down Hamas Scuba Terrorists on West Bank Beach,” March 
27, 2004, http://www.cdnn.info/industry/i040327a/i040327a.html (accessed 3/19/05). 
81 “Terrorists Train for Seaborne Attacks,” March 17, 08:46 PM EST, 
http://daily.webshots.com/content/ap/current/h67135745.html (accessed 3/19/05).“Terrorists Teaming to 
Launch Underwater Attacks,” March 18, 2005, 7:08 am PST, 
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/4297791/detail.html (accessed 3/19/05). 
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Abu Sayyaf terrorists in the southern Philippines have trained as 
scuba divers in preparation for attacks on shipping outside the 
country, a Philippine military report says.82  
 
 
Figure 1.   Terrorist-made submarine. 83 
 
                                            
82 Connie Levett, Herald Correspondent, Bangkok, “Shipping May be Terrorists' Next 
Target,” http://www.smh.com.au/news/Global-Terrorism/Shipping-may-be-terrorists-next-
target/2005/03/17/1110913739428.html?oneclick=true# (accessed 3/19/05). 
83 Peter Chalk, Ph.D., RAND Corporation, Sri Lanka, 2004. The sub was discovered in a 
ship yard in Phuket in southern Thailand in 2000. The yard was owned by a Tamil with Norwegian 
citizenship. It is the first case of an insurgent group (LTTE) demonstrating the capability to 




Figure 2.   Terrorist-made suicide boat bomb. 84 
 
The training scenario used by the VI Department of Health during 
its March 10, 2005, Bioterrorism Conference was an anthrax attack during 
Carnival. A full copy of the scenario is attached.85 Other potential targets include 
                                            
84 Oak Ridge Associated Universities ORAU#12 Sri Lanka Suicide Boat, FINAL Version, 
PowerPoint slides received from Commander Michael Crockett, U.S. Navy, August 1, 2005.  
85 VI Department of Health, bioterrorism training scenario, March 10, 2005. “The afternoon 
Adult Parade has an audience of 2,500.  During the ceremony a truck driving along the Lionel 
Roberts Stadium and another along the waterfront a mile upwind of the stadium and the 
Governor’s stand release an aerosol of powdered anthrax.  An invisible, odorless anthrax cloud is 
created, a third of a mile in breadth.  The wind carries the cloud into the stadium, as well as to 
business and residential neighborhoods miles away.  The truck is parked at UVI when the 
activities are over, and the drivers and their associates leave the country by aircraft.  Nobody 
detects the anthrax release.  About 5,700 persons working or living downwind of the area were 
infected.  No one has detected or observed the Anthrax release on the waterfront, but nobody 
knows that yet [sic]. 
As the drivers and their associates are on the plane they call 911 and report an attack only at 
the stadium. After the call a bystander and police officer verifies that they saw a truck passing by 
releasing something, but did not have any suspensions [sic]. WHAT IS YOUR AGENCY ROLE 
HERE” 
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Hovensa Oil86 and WAPA. “Oil powered desalination plants provide 80% of the 
drinking water in both St. Thomas and St. Croix.”87 “[H]igh profile, highly potential 
terrorist targets [include] water supply locations.”88 
Terrorists could easily use the St. Thomas/St. Croix seaplanes as a 
weapon89 because they land and take-off from Charlotte Amalie Harbor many 
times each day and there is no passenger screening. These planes fly so close 
to the cruise ships and ferry boats that a deviation from the flight path would 
crash the seaplane into a cruise ship or ferry in less than ten seconds, and the VI 
would not be able to effectively fight the resulting marine fire because “[t]he land-
based firefighters of the VI Fire Service do not have the personnel, resources or 
equipment to combat a significant marine fire.”90   
The seaplane takes off and lands less than one minute’s flight time 
away from WAPA. Destroying WAPA’s single location generating capacity would 
eliminate all power to St. Thomas and Water Island and 90% to St. John. This 
damage would take years to repair. The United States Congress has recognized 
“a disruption of concentrated infrastructure could have greatly disproportionate –
                                            
86 For more information about HOVENSA, see 
http://www.epa.gov/region02/waste/fshoven.pdf.Also, HOVENSA, “1. Located on STX, third 
largest oil refinery in the Western Hemisphere with a maximum on-site storage capacity of 30 
million barrels. 2. Largest single private employer in the U.S. VI, with 2000 direct/contract 
employees and 6000 indirect. 3. HOVENSA has a 45-60’ deep harbor, which can accommodate 
super tankers at two of the nine berths. 4. HOVENSA provides fuel directly to government agency 
and EMS vehicles during emergencies. … HOVENSA supplies all fuel to WAPA.” FEMA Disaster 
Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 11. 
87 United States Coast Guard, Coastal Area Contingency Plan for Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, Section 1000, 1-12, http://www.uscg.mil/sectorsanjuan/root/planning.html, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
88 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, Incident 
Response to Terrorist Bombings,” Performance Level, Direct/Indirect Delivery Course, Participant 
Guide, Version 01.05, prepared by New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Energetic 
Materials Research and Testing Center, 2-16. 
89 Audrey Hudson, “Private Aircraft Seen as New Terror Target,” The Washington Post, 
March 15, 2005, http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20050315-114637-3947r 
(accessed 3/16/05).Eric Lichtblau, “Government Report on U.S. Aviation Warns of Security 
Holes,” March 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/14/politics/14terror.html (accessed 
3/16/05). 
90 United States Coast Guard, “Coastal Area Contingency Plan for Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands,” Section 1000, pp. 1-29, http://www.uscg.mil/sectorsanjuan/root/planning.html, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
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and national –effects” and has initiated policies to remedy the problem. “The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) facilitates the construction of new 
liquefied natural gas import terminals in diverse ports…The Gasoline for 
America’s Security Act of 2005 (H.R. 3893) would similarly facilitate the 
construction of geographically distributed oil refineries.”91 
Another method of direct attack could be blockading VI ports by for 
example, sinking a ship in the harbor. The Territory relies on seaport-based 
shipping for nearly all of its food, fuel (including fuel that runs WAPA) and over-
the-counter medicines. If the VI ports are blocked, we will quickly run out of food, 
fuel, medicine and power/water.  
 
5. VI Water and Power Authority Vulnerabilities  
The Water and Power Authority, called WAPA, produces electricity and 
water for St. Thomas and just electricity for St. John because St. John has its 
own water plant. Another WAPA plant produces water and electricity for St. 
Croix. Most areas of the islands, however, are not serviced by WAPA water, do 
not have fire hydrants and the homes do not have “city” water. The majority of all 
of the homes collect rain water in cisterns.  
Virtually all of the electrical distribution system is an ‘over-head’ 
system with wooden poles…Over-head distribution [is] extremely 
vulnerable to wind/seismic activities. [WAPA’s] electric generation 
plants have no seismic protection, and are located in coastal areas 
prone to flooding. [These] plants rely on #2 & #6 fuel oils currently 
provided exclusively by the Hovensa refinery.92  
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets93 identifies water, power and telecommunications as the three 
most important Level 1 infrastructures. WAPA produces two of these, water and 
                                            
91 Paul W. Parfomak, “Vulnerability of Concentrated Infrastructure: Background and Policy 
Options,” CRS Report For Congress, December 21, 2005, RL33206, 1-2, (emphasis added). 
92 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 83-84. 
93 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html (accessed 3/16/06). 
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electricity. The third Level 1 sector, telecommunications, requires WAPA 
electricity to function.94 Although WAPA has more than adequate generating 
capacity, because it is a single-location generating facility, damaging it or its fuel 
storage tanks, or its ability to get more fuel (the port), would eliminate all 
generating capacity.95  
If WAPA’s production capability is damaged or destroyed there will be no 
power, and power runs everything else in the Territory. WAPA is so important, so 
much the Territory’s most critical infrastructure, that without it life as it is known 
would cease to exist. Aside from the National Strategy indicating that water and 
power are two of the three most critical sectors, it is readily apparent that every 
aspect of life in the Virgin Islands relies upon water and power. In addition to the 
tourism industry (hotels, guest houses, restaurants and those industries that 
support them, such as food wholesalers, restaurant supply and taxis), other 
sectors (hospitals, telecommunications and education) also need water and 
power to exist. In the warm climate, food and some medicine will quickly spoil 
without electricity for refrigeration. WAPA electricity also runs the Territory’s 
sewage treatment plants. 
WAPA gets all of its fuel from the Hovensa refinery on St. Croix. Hovensa 
is vulnerable from a direct attack, and also because it receives all of its crude oil 
from Venezuela, which has become increasingly anti-American.96 Further, the 
United States military is a major user of Hovensa-produced refined petroleum 
products and it is possible that in times of crisis, their needs will take precedence 
over the Virgin Islands’ needs. 
WAPA’s distribution system is another aspect of the Territory’s 
vulnerability. Because of its relatively small size, WAPA’s distribution system 
                                            
94 The telecommunications industry in the VI, like many other sectors, does have an 
alternate energy sources in the form of small generators. Usually there is no more than two 
weeks’ worth of fuel and these generators are not intended for continuous and long term use. 
95 For St. Thomas, St. John and Water Island. St. Croix has its own WAPA generating plant. 
96 Javier Corrales, ‘Hugo Boss,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2006, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3332&page=0, (accessed 1/26/06).  
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doesn’t have the stability of the larger power grids in the mainland United States 
or elsewhere. And unlike on the mainland, there is no power grid to import 
electricity from the next town, city or state. This has been noted by FEMA, above. 
It is also observable by the frequent power outages. 
Yet WAPA is not crumbling. In fact, much of their wire and protective 
devices are less than fifteen years old. Approximately 80% is less than eight 
years old.  Partly because of its relatively small size, WAPA has a higher ratio of 
‘critical nodes’ to ‘non-critical nodes’ than in larger systems. This can and is 
being fixed by changing design parameters when installing new equipment and 
by remodeling the existing arrangements. Simply stated, the system reacts 
violently to even small problems because it is small and therefore can be 
dramatically affected by disturbances that would go unnoticed in larger systems.  
And WAPA does have redundancy; it is just different from that in larger 
systems. Technically speaking, WAPA has a transmission "loop" rather than a 
radial feeder system. This means if something happens along the line, 
redundancy is accomplished by feeding the system from around the other way. 
Also, WAPA can feed all parts of the island from two or more possible feeders. 
This is in case a particular substation has to go offline. They simply tie the 
feeders end to end, so that the outaged ones would be fed from the butt-end of 
others that are still live (fed from an online substation).97 
 
D. GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE IS INADEQUATE  
The most basic role of any government is to protect its citizens. It is “the 
fundamental governmental responsibility to protect public health and safety.”98 
This section demonstrates how the Government of the Virgin Islands is in very 
                                            
97 Much of the information for the section on distribution comes from a WAPA employee who 
wishes to remain anonymous. 
98 “A Failure of  Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, “U.S. House of Representatives, February 15, 
2006, X, 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainrepo
rt.pdf (accessed 2/15/06). 
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important respects failing at that task because private, volunteer, non-
governmental entities are doing what the government should be doing.   
 
1. Private Non-Profit Organizations and Individual Citizens Fill 
Urgent Needs and Demonstrate Government Inadequacies 
On the Island of St. John, two non-profit, non-government agencies, St. 
John Rescue (Rescue) and St. John Amateur Radio Club (ARC), fulfill vital 
‘normally-government-provided-services,’ namely emergency medical/rescue 
services and emergency communications. These types of groups exist elsewhere 
in the United States, but the degree to which both Rescue and the ARC continue 
to be absolutely vital to the island’s public safety demonstrates the poor state of 
government preparedness and the weak condition of its infrastructure. 
A third group, the East End Neighborhood Watch, provides critical border 
protection observations, information gathering and analysis. The East End 
Neighborhood Watch transmits this information to federal law enforcement. 
Similar groups exist on St. Thomas, St Croix and Water Island.  
These activities not only document the inadequacy of the VI Government 
infrastructure, systems, planning, etc., but also represent the viability and 
importance of community involvement in public safety/Homeland Security. This 
section describes the activities of Rescue, ARC and the East End Neighborhood 
Watch. 
 
a. St. John Rescue and the Amateur Radio Club  
Despite full-time, paid, fire, police and Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS - the emergency medical technicians and paramedics) departments, St. 
John Rescue responds to almost as many calls as the paid responders.  The VI 
Government does recognize Rescue’s value and provides financial operating 
budgets and occasionally major project allocations to Rescue in support of its 
goals. For example, the VI Government funded a $150,000 Rescue Truck and  
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$52,000 radio system for St. John Rescue. The VI Government supports all of 
the Territory’s Rescue Squads to varying degrees, but much more financial 
support is needed. 
Rescue’s official mandate is to assist the Government’s paid EMS, 
police, fire, the National Park, VITEMA and the non-governmental American Red 
Cross. Despite its official support role, Rescue has become the island’s premier 
search and rescue agency. EMS is excellent but severely understaffed.99 There 
is only one two-person crew on duty at any time.  The consequence of this 
understaffing can be life-threatening. Because of the hilly and windy roads, it 
takes an hour without traffic to travel from one end of St. John to the other. An 
accident at the far end of the Island thus occupies the only Government 
ambulance and its crew for at least two hours. If the injured person has to go to 
the clinic on St. John and/or to the hospital on St. Thomas, the ambulance is 
occupied for at least three hours.  
To get to St. Thomas, the injured person is manually lifted over the 
transom of a boat and that boat then goes to St. Thomas where the patient is 
transferred to a St. Thomas ambulance for the trip to the hospital. On several 
occasions, persons injured on St. John in need of transport to the hospital on St. 
Thomas have not been able to go because there was no ambulance on St. 
Thomas to meet the emergency medical boat and take the injured to the hospital. 
Rescue fills in when there are two (or more) accidents at the same 
time or if an accident overwhelms the two-person crew.  Rescue is the only 
agency on the island trained and equipped for vehicle stabilization, vehicle 
extrication (Jaws of Life), low angle rescue and building collapse. They own a 
state-of-the-art rescue vehicle with state-of-the-art equipment. Furthermore, the 
full-time paid employees of the fire department and police department are not 
trained or equipped and do not provide these services. 
                                            
99  Andrea Milam, “Shortage of EMTs, 911 Woes Slow Response to Medical Emergencies,” 




Rescue responders are highly motivated and trained to at least the 
First Responder level, as well as AED, CPR and oxygen assist. Many are EMTs. 
In addition, most Rescue members, who live and work all over the island, now 
have “trauma kits” and oxygen in their personal vehicles and some have AEDs. 
Rescue initiated this decentralized approach to distributing rescue equipment to 
shorten the time for emergency equipment to arrive at a scene. 
Rescue and the ARC have taken the lead in another traditionally 
government area, public safety communications. Public safety communications in 
the VI are unreliable, with many radio dead zones, caused in part by the 
mountainous terrain. Rescue is the only agency on St. John that can 
communicate by radio from one end of the island to the other. The police cannot 
communicate across this distance and EMS loses communications a few 
minutes’ drive from their base. There is also poor cell-phone communications on 
many parts of the island. 
The line between Rescue and ARC is clear, but increased 
cooperation, the relationship between emergency services and emergency 
communication, and the fact that many Rescue members are now ARC members 
and vice versa, has blurred the distinction. Working in conjunction with the 
National Park Service radio communications director and ham radio operators 
both on-island and stateside, and drawing from existing systems already in use, 
St. John Rescue and the ARC have designed a radio system using “cross-band 
repeaters.” This system gives Rescue the first complete island-wide radio 
communications of any agency in the Territory. 
 
b. The St. John Amateur Radio Club  
The St. John Amateur Radio Club is an all-volunteer group of 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensed amateur radio operators. 
Many members of the ARC also belong to the national group known as ARES 
(Amateur Radio Emergency Service), whose primary objective is to provide back-
up radio communications when needed. Examples of ARES involvement in 
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national emergencies include activation after the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, during the 2003 East Coast power outage and during the 2003 forest 
fires in California and other western states.  
In the Virgin Islands, ARES communication support has been 
provided to the Virgin Islands Government, VITEMA and the Red Cross, as well 
as for community activities such as the 8 Tuff Miles road race and the annual 
Love City Triathlon. 
ARES members are FCC licensed to use a variety of radio 
frequencies for both short-range and long-range communications. ARES fills a 
vital need for communications following major disasters, and was the only radio 
service on St. John to work through and survive Hurricane Marilyn which 
devastated the region in 1995. ARES members provided critical government 
communications when the government’s systems failed. This included life-saving 
medical communications for the Myrah Keating Smith Clinic to arrange helicopter 
pickup for the injured, as well as priority and medical communications to Puerto 
Rico and the continental United States.  
Other ARES activities include transmitting weather fax and slow 
scan TV weather pictures to boaters and transmitting weather data to the 
National Hurricane Center in Miami. ARES has proven that it provides an 
invaluable and life-saving function to the people of the Virgin Islands. 
 
E. THE POLICE, SOCIAL ISSUES AND EXISTING TERRITORIAL 
LEADERSHIP 
Half a century ago, Albert Einstein observed, ‘The world we have 
made as a result of the level of thinking we have done thus far 
creates problems we cannot solve at the same level of thinking at 
which we created them.’ When one considers the changes wrought 
by technology in the last century since Einstein’s work, and the 
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scale of change likely this century, it is obvious that new ‘levels of 
thinking’ are urgently required today.100  
Truly successful decision making… demands more than just a 
picture of the world as it is. It demands in addition a picture of the 
world as it will (or at least may) be.101 
If 9/11 was a failure of imagination, then [Hurricane] Katrina was a 
failure of initiative. It was a failure of leadership. 102 
 
1. Existing Leadership  
The most fundamental challenges facing the VI’s efforts to improve 
Homeland Security and emergency response capabilities are political and social. 
It is generally believed there is widespread government unresponsiveness, 
mismanagement, corruption, nepotism and cronyism.103 These factors are 
compounded by racism, poverty,104 stark and increasing economic disparity and 
poor education.105 There is also a large unskilled labor pool, limited employment 
opportunities,106 and a serious hard-drug problem along with a culture that 
                                            
100 Dominic Cummings, “Wanted (ASAP): A Vision for the New Global Order,” Business Online, 
October 16, 2005,  
http://www.thebusinessonline.com/Stories.aspx?Wanted%20(ASAP):%20a%20vision%20for%20the%2
0new%20global%20order&StoryID=CE189C27-27A3-4300-8020-
F7894C2D5DDC&SectionID=1DC16DAD-79A2-4262-B487-51DC79546E35 (accessed 11/6/05).  
101 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, 11. 
102 “A Failure of  Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,“ U.S. House of Representatives, February 
15, 2006, xi, 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainr
eport.pdf (accessed 2/15/06). 
103 In January 2005, the Virgin Islands Daily News did a Special Report focusing on 
Government corruption. http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/cronies (accessed 
2/21/06). 
104 Anata Pancham, “Kids Count Says More Children Are Sinking In Poverty,” St. Thomas 
Source, Dec. 6, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131772785 (accessed 
2/19/06). 
105 During the current Governor’s first term, all public Virgin Islands schools lost 
accreditation. This was allowed to happened despite the Governor once having been 
Commissioner of Education and having a Ph.D. in Education. 
106 Anata Pancham, “Territory's Economic Future In Doubt, Says Economist,” St. Thomas 
Source, January 5, 2006, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1138079223 (accessed 1/6/06). 
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largely accepts and promotes substance abuse. Perhaps most important is the 
absence of a sense of community within and between government agencies and 
as among citizens in the community. These are the major inhibitors to improved 
quality of life, improved law enforcement and improved Homeland Security in the 
VI. 
The Governor must develop a broad unifying vision for the Territory that 
includes efficient management,107 honest, open, participatory108 and transparent 
                                            
107 “Effective and efficient management of the Virgin Islands of the United States is what 
really matters to us today. As we continue to look at what are our immediate challenges, it is clear 
that management is critical to the formula of transforming VI into what many want, but what many 
feel can never happen.” Cora Christian, “Conversations That Matter: Management,” St. Thomas 
Source, July 19, 2005, http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Op-
ed&p=1105686354 (accessed 12/13/05). 
“Editor's Note: Dr. Cora Christian was the founder of the Virgin Islands Medical Institute and 
functions as the medical director as well as the chief medical consultant at Hovensa, LLC. She is 
on the boards of the National AARP; Interfaith Coalition, St. Croix; American Cancer Society and 
the Foundation of the University of the Virgin Islands.” 
 Senator Liston Davis, unedited e-mail dated January 17, 2006, St. Thomas Source, January 
22, 2006. 
“Senator Liston Davis, member of the Committee on Education, Culture and Youth said that 
the latest revelation that our local Education Department has returned an additional $2.1 million in 
unused federal funds is further indication that the department lacks competent leadership.  
     ‘Especially in this meager guava crop when our Education Department has already had to 
forego tens of millions in badly needed funds, it is extremely disheartening to learn of another 
$2.1 million that must be placed in the category of unused and returned federal monies,’ said 
Senator Liston Davis. Just how our Department of Education measures up under the present 
Commissioner is evident by the fact that whilst on average the U.S. States and Territories 
returned $112.24 per pupil to the federal government, our local Education Department sent back 
sixty-five times as much to Washington, D.C.  
     ‘We have the dubious distinction of being evaluated among U.S. States and Territories as the 
jurisdiction which has comparatively sent back the most education funds to Washington, D.C,’ 
said Senator 
Davis.”http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local+Government&p=11380796
05#continue (accessed 1/22/06). 
108 “The Virgin Islands has an extraordinarily diverse population and broad range of talent. It 
has become increasingly evident that government officials are either unable or unwilling to tap 
into these exceptional resources. More and more we find the same officials meeting and talking 
exclusively among themselves as they seek to develop policies and programs affecting our 
community.” John deJongh, “The Community Needs to Be Consulted in Problem Solving,” St. 
Thomas Source, 22 July 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Op-ed&p=1105686492 (accessed 
12/13/05).  
“Editor's Note: John deJongh is a former Finance commissioner, was a special assistant to 
Gov. Alexander Farrelly and primary author of the Five Year Operating and Strategic Financial 
Plan written at the behest of Gov. Charles W. Turnbull.” 
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government,109 responsive government,110 economic recovery, social recovery, 
an integrated community and dramatically improved law enforcement.  
 
2. Local Police - the Synaptic Disconnect  
Law enforcement is a significant part of Homeland Security. The failure of 
the Virgin Islands Police Department to develop a rapport with the community at 
                                            
109 “In a landmark decision supporting the public’s right to know, VI Superior Court Judge 
Edgar Ross issued a ruling … that will force VI boards and commissions into greater 
transparency…” Megan Poinski, “VI Daily News Special Report: Government in the Sunshine, 
Greater transparency  in VI Meetings mandated under judge’s ruling,” Virgin Islands Daily News, 
December 21, 2005, http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11579992 
(accessed 12/22/05).  
“Government in the Sunshine cont., VI boards have history of ignoring open meeting law,” 
Tanya Mannes, Virgin Islands Daily News, December 21, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11579985 (accessed 12/22/05). 
The judge’s decision was reprinted in the Virgin Islands Daily News, December 21, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11579980 (accessed 12/22/05).  
“The Virgin Islands government, alas, does not have a reputation for transparency. It, in fact, 
frequently treats information that is public as though it were personal information – nobody's 
business but its own…..The VI operates under the VI Code, title, 1, section 254, also known as 
the Sunshine Law. It is called the sunshine law because its purpose is to allow light to shine on 
‘all records and documents of or belonging to this territory... or any department, board, council or 
committee of any such branch of government.’" “Health Commissioner Favors Darkness Over 
Sunshine,” St. John Source, December 20, 2004, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Editorials&p=1105679992 (accessed 
11/19/05).  
“The need for transparency continues and is more vital now than ever.… Transparency is 
possible right now, right here--if our elected officials would allow it. But for reasons never spoken 
and shared, there is relatively no transparency.” Cora Christian, “Conversations That Matter: 
Management,” St. Thomas Source, July 19, 2005, 
Hovensahttp://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Op-ed&p=1105686354 
(accessed 12/13/05). 
110 “The protests you hear about on St. John are the result of frustration with unresponsive 
government.” Senator Craig W. Barshinger, “Sen. Barshinger Sees Good Things Happening on St. 
John,” St. John Source, December 3, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Open+Forum&p=1131772641 
(accessed 12/5/05). 
Also, “Is our current leadership demanding answers to these and other questions? … NO! 
Nobody is leading; nobody is demanding answers, and action.” John deJongh, “John deJongh 
Says 'Together We Can!' – Solve the Gas Crisis,” St. Thomas Source, September 25, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Op-ed&p=1105688729 (accessed 
12/13/05).  
“Editor's note: John de Jongh, Jr., served as Commissioner of Finance and Executive 
Assistant to the Governor during the Administration of Alexander A. Farrelly and served as 
chairman of the Economic Recovery Task Force and co-Chairman of the Cruise Ship Task 
Force.” 
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large prevents it from being effective in both law enforcement and in turn, 
Homeland Security. The lack of rapport prevents it from learning essential 
information about criminal activity and terrorism. 
The VIPD needs Community Oriented Policing programs, committed, new 
and vibrant leadership, and the power to hire and fire at all levels to make this 
happen. It is important to note that the police unions sometimes obstruct 
progress and make this process difficult. That is an issue that must be dealt with. 
The federal government and the Department of Homeland Security must 
also dramatically increase the federal law enforcement presence, including 
Customs and Border Protection. More important, the VI Government and VIPD 
must dramatically improve their relations with the community in order to motivate 
a concerned citizenry to participate in crime prevention and terrorism prevention. 
Once upon a time, VI residents and organizations routinely reported illegal 
activity to the police as one would expect. This included illegal entry (border 
security) and common crimes.  Routine practice though has changed in the past 
decade. Most individuals no longer report anything but life threatening matters 
because the police or Immigration (Immigration and Customs Enforcement for 
illegal alien matters) will not respond in an acceptable manner. 
While the vast majority of the men and women in the VIPD are intelligent, 
hardworking, dedicated and honest, law enforcement overall suffers from the 
same general complacency as the rest of the VI Government. Law enforcement 
is inconsistent and sporadic at best. The VIPD has a terrible reputation in every 
category. “[The] V.I Department of Justice says some cases not thoroughly 
investigated or have improperly handled physical and forensic evidence.”111 The 
police are often unfriendly, sometimes hostile, and are not trusted. “I think the 
confidence in the police is at a very low level. I don’t think too many people hold 
                                            
111 Joseph Tsudulko, “Prosecutors call for improvements,” Virgin Islands Daily News, 
Saturday, February 4, 2006, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=12881887(accessed 2/5/06). 
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too high a regard for police responses…”112 Senate President Lorraine Berry, 
who has served “a record breaking 24 years - 12 consecutive terms”113  says 
"The public does not trust the Police Department." 114 Police use of deadly force 
is rampant.115 
“[T]he answer lies with more training for police and a change in 
attitude…They need to recognize that they are public servants that work with and 
for the people.”116 “VI Police Commissioner Elton Lewis said lack of staff and 
inadequate officer training are factors that pose a problem in tackling the crime 
rate.”117  “I really believe that we have to do something beyond talk about dealing 
with the criminal activities that are impacting the community. And when police are 
involved [in the criminal activity], we have to be even more concerned, because 
                                            
112 Reverend Carlyle Sampson, Pastor at St. John’s Nazareth Lutheran Church, as quoted by 
Joy Blackburn, “St. John Residents Vent About Rising Crime on St. John,” Virgin Islands Daily 
News, November 11, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=10530675 (accessed 11/11/05).  
“VIPD Needs Direction to Follow Its Road Map,” Tradewinds Staff, January 9, 
2006,http://www.stjohntradewindsnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=158&
Itemid=47 (accessed 1/13/06). The original letter from the Police Commissioner can be found at 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local+Government&p=1138078831 
(accessed 1/15/06). 
113 Megan Poinski, “Governor’s race in the making. For now many are kicking tires, but most 
are noncommittal,“ Virgin Islands Daily News, February 23, 2006, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=13592929 (accessed 2/24/06). 
114 Sen. Lorraine L. Berry as quoted by Anata Pancham, “Money, Manpower Needed to 
Improve Crime Fight,” St. Thomas Source, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1138080302 (accessed 2/5/06). 
115 The Virgin Islands Daily News did a major expose about the police use of deadly force. 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/dforce (accessed 2/21/06). 
116 Safety Zone Director Iris Kern, as quoted by Joy Blackburn, “St. John Residents Vent 
About Rising Crime on St. John,” Virgin Islands Daily News, November 11, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=10530675 (accessed 11/11/05). 
Also: Police Commissioner Elton Lewis acknowledges public’s lack of trust in the police 
department, Lynda Lohr, “Recent Crimes Casting a Pall Over St. John,” St. John Source, 
November 14, 2005, http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131771679 
(accessed 11/16/05).  
117 Merlin JnBaptiste, “VI Crime Rates Increase as Mainland Stats Go Down,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, December 28, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11741878 (accessed 12/29/05). 
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who can you trust?”118 “…the perception from the community is that officers 
demonstrate 'selective enforcement,' where some people are punished and 
others are just let go.”119 
The police culture is not aggressive or proactive. “Based on the VIPD 
statistics, only 4.7 percent of reported crimes ended in arrest in 2005; however, 
this grim statistic is an improvement upon the three percent of arrests for crimes 
reported during 2004.”120 “While law enforcement agencies nationwide reported 
a drop in the number of violent crimes reported in the first six months of 2005, the 
Virgin Islands has seen an increase in every category.”121  
Often, the police exhibit little motivation to excel. For example, I have seen 
the police go to a nighttime car accident on a dark, unlit and remote road without 
flashlights. Sometimes, and with increasing frequency, they do not go to crime or 
accident scenes at all. Armed-burglary victims have been told to come to the 
police station to file their report. The police almost never walk a beat. Police cars 
have dark tinted windows and the officers drive with the windows closed so 
sound and sight are cut off. Any prospect of interaction is avoided and minimized. 
In response to complaints from business owners that police never stop by their 
establishments, a group of officers visibly visited downtown businesses en mass 
a single time in the fall of 2005. The newest wrinkle starting in late 2005 is the 
police are doing driving patrols at night, mostly within a mile of the police station. 
The officers do the driving slowly with blue emergency lights flashing throughout 
                                            
118 Senate President Lorraine Berry as quoted by Joy Blackburn, “Bill Establishing Civilian 
Review Panel of Police to be Reintroduced,” Virgin Islands Daily News, December 28, 2005, 
(emphasis added), http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11741871 
(accessed 12/29/05). 
119 Sen. Lorraine L. Berry as quoted by Anata Pancham, “Money, Manpower Needed to 
Improve Crime Fight,” St. Thomas Source, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1138080302 (accessed 2/5/06). 
120 Andrea Milam, “With 5 Percent Arrest Rate, VIPD Cites Decrease in Crime, Increase in 
Arrests” St. John Tradewinds, November 28, 2005, 
http://www.stjohntradewindsnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=104&Itemid=3
8 (accessed 12/4/05). 
121 Merlin JnBaptiste, “VI Crime Rates Increase as Mainland Stats Go Down,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, December 28, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11741878 (accessed 12/29/05). 
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the entire patrol. They just drive around town like that. This provides a long and 
easy warning system to any criminals that the police will be arriving soon. The 
criminal element has quickly learned this routine, making the patrols virtually 
ineffective. Not a single officer I questioned about this was able to provide me 
with the reason for this new tactic other than that is what they were told to do. 
In 2005, local residents on the East End of St. John called the police to 
complain about a group of illegal aliens hiding in the bushes. The police made 
the forty-five-minute drive to the area, and without getting out of the police car, 
the passenger officer opened his tinted-opaque window two inches to say to the 
concerned citizens that they would miss shift change if they were to apprehend 
the illegals and then the police just left without doing anything.  
Thus, the VIPD is often acknowledged by VI residents to be 
unprofessional and ill-prepared to deal with criminals. This is harmful to any 
prospect of effective Homeland Security. In addition, just like the population in 
general, the police demonstrate a lack of appreciation and awareness of the 
terrorism threat. Because effective Homeland Security shares a foundation with 
effective law enforcement, the VIPD’s problems have Homeland Security 
consequences. “The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, confirmed that all 
Americans share responsibility for Homeland Security.”122 Homeland Security 
requires collaboration, information sharing, networking and integration among 
and between the entire community and its agencies. This is not the case in the 
VI, however, because just as the citizens do not report crimes or cooperate with 
criminal investigations because of their perceptions of the police force, they do 
not report border security and potential terrorism and Homeland Security 
concerns either. 
The VIPD did hire a consultant to improve their reputation and 
performance. To this extent, the VI Government has tried, with the consultant 
and the attempts at meeting with community representatives they chose, to 
                                            
122 Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: 
National Preparedness (3/31/05), 1. 
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identify problems and promote improvement.  This is true, despite the general 
opinion that it’s much too little, too late, ineffective and that wrong and 
inadequate solutions are being advanced. 
The VIPD’s problems are complex and include, like the rest of the 
government, corruption, nepotism, cronyism and lack of openness. There is also 
the problem of lack of education and illiteracy. These problems are compounded 
by the small size of the community, where the majority of the population knows or 
is related to each other. These problems can only be solved by new, high-level 
management. They are long standing problems and may not have originated at 
the top, but they are ingrained and must be dealt with from the highest levels. 
The Governor and his politically appointed Police Commissioner and politically 
appointed Police Chief lack the political will or the ability or vision to solve and 
heal these problems, instill rapport, accessibility and trust with the community.  
I refer to the problem with the police specifically and with the VI 
Government in general as a “Synaptic Disconnect.” Homeland security should 
take advantage of the wealth of potential information available from the local 
community. Virgin Islanders would love to tell someone in authority about the 
things they see. VI residents are of course worried about the common criminals 
who may come with the illegal aliens; they also worry that terrorists may arrive 
with the illegal aliens. Residents want to incorporate counterterrorism into 
policing, but very little policing actually occurs.  
Information is coming into hundreds of local eyes and ears but there is no 
place for it to go. There is only the inability to talk to the police – the Synaptic 
Disconnect. This is an information collection problem. The information is 
available and waiting to be collected by someone who will listen and act. Citizen 
observations and information do not even have the opportunity to become an 
information analysis and dissemination problem. Tremendous advantage could 
be obtained if the VIPD improved its approachability, accessibility and rapport. 
An obvious solution to those familiar with law enforcement is to instill a  
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Community Oriented Policing philosophy. Unfortunately, this has not been 
done.law enforcement is to instill a Community Oriented Policing philosophy. 
Unfortunately, this has not been done. 
 
3. U.S. Department of Justice Critical of VI Police Department 
“[T]he majority of the VIPD’s policies and procedures remain 
outdated…[and are] inconsistent with generally accepted police practices…”123 
The U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, 
began an investigation of the VIPD in March 2004. By letter dated October 5, 
2005, addressed to the Attorney General, Commissioner of Police, and the 
Police attorney, the U.S. Department of Justice listed several major deficiencies, 
including the above quotation. 
 
4. Federal Law Enforcement 
The National Park Service (NPS) operates perhaps the most effective law 
enforcement agency in the Territory. Although small and charged with protecting 
the Virgin Islands National Park and its visitors on all the islands, rather than with 
policing the urban areas, the NPS does not suffer from the VIPD’s ills. The NPS 
continuously shows what a responsive police force could do for the Territory and 
its residents. The NPS enjoys great community support and has fostered a 
private, not-for-profit organization entitled Friends of the Park. The NPS could be 
a model for law enforcement, management and Homeland Security in the 
Territory.  
Aside from the NPS, there are no Customs and Border Protection or 
Border Patrol agents to look for, chase and capture illegal aliens or their 
smugglers. Other federal law enforcement, including the FBI, ATF, DEA and ICE, 
are overworked, understaffed and not eager to handle yet another task.  Add to 
                                            
123 Shanetta Y. Cutlar (Chief, Special Litigation Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division), “Letter Re: United States Department of Justice Investigation of the Virgin Islands 
Police Department,” October 5, 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/index.html (accessed 
12/2/05). 
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this a local police department that does not view illegal entry as a priority, and it 
is easy to see why groups of thirty illegal aliens can land on St. John, walk down 
the isolated East End roads, and disappear into the bush unmolested. This 
happened almost daily for approximately one month, thirty at a time coming from 
the same catamaran. Once on-island it is easy to assimilate into the population. 
(A careful al Qaeda would use attackers who blend in too.) 
Calls to the VIPD are usually ignored and ICE may send over an agent a 
few days later to investigate. Neither the illegal nor the smuggler is apprehended 
and this can result in easy entry into the United States for terrorists. Eventually, 
after a month of this and increasingly vocal complaints, there was the successful 
federal intervention discussed in the section on the East End Neighborhood 
Watch. The daily influx of illegals slowed for a while. Also, raids of businesses to 
check for illegal aliens are almost non-existent because of resource constraints a 
lack of the will the act. 
 
5. Sense of Community 
The most fundamental problems facing the VI are social and political. 
These problems include poverty, racism, stark and growing economic disparity, 
poor education, lack of job skills and employment opportunities and the absence 
of a sense of community. The lack of sense of community exists both among 
citizens and government agencies.  
The population of the VI comes from all over the world. Most, however, 
are from other Caribbean islands and many have remained unassimilated and 
isolated; The VI is not a unified community.  Of course each island has its own 
identity. St. Thomas is different from St. Croix, which is different from St. John. 
Yet even within a single island, there is disunity. There are West Indians, 
Stateside Blacks, Continentals, Caucasians, Down Islanders, Haitians, “Santos” 
(Santo Domingo), “Dominicanos” (Dominican Republic), Dominicans (Dominica) 
St. Lucians, “light skinned,” “clear skinned,” Frenchies (from French ancestors, 
usually white), etc. People are commonly described in this racial or ethnicity-
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identifying way.124 There is much racial and ethnic division, distrust, isolation and 
discrimination. As this thesis is being written, St. John is suffering from serious 
racial discord, allegations of hate crimes, and three allegedly retaliatory 
arsons.125 Rather than a unified community, the VI is a collection of 
unassimilated and isolated groups. Each of these groups has its own meeting 
places and social circles. There is little intermingling and absolutely no unifying 
force.  
The various racial, ethnic, and nationality groups have differing 
family, household, occupational, labor force, income, and 
educational characteristics, are often residentially segregated, and 
engage in widely disparate and exclusive recreational and 
associational activities. These groups, for all intents and purposes, 
constitute separate communities and the relationship between them 
is most often colored by mutual distrust, misunderstanding, and 
hostility… 
All Eastern Caribbean immigrants [to the USVI] have been 
historically lumped together, and had associated with them, the 
                                            
124 “The territory has tried to ignore multiple problems faced by its children. The nativism, 
prejudice, and exploitation experienced by Virgin Islanders whose parents hail from other eastern 
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heard the words ‘Gasso’ and ‘Santo.’ We have heard people insult the speech patterns and 
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derogatory term "garot," suggesting that they were poor, unwashed 
and uneducated, a common stereotype of immigrant groups… 
The USVI remains, nevertheless, a largely segmented society. 
Since race, ethnicity and national origin are the major lines of 
cleavage, they tend to structure all social relationships, creating a 
fragile equilibrium that is sustained by the necessity of economic 
intercourse but continuously threatened below the surface by 
mutual suspicion, antagonism, prejudice and racism. 
Such an uneasy social equilibrium, thinly held together by the 
impersonal bonds of the marketplace, has both short-run and long-run 
consequences. It was in part the frayed community fabric and the 
absence of a widely shared history and cultural tradition (in addition to 
the severity of the destruction) that resulted in the outbreak of looting 
and violence in the wake of hurricane Hugo in September of 1989. 
Such a disaster, laid bare some of the long-standing cleavages 
festering throughout USVI society. It is this same frayed fabric that 
may prevent the successful resolution of the most critical issues facing 
the Territory in the near future. These include the issue of a future 
local constitution, greater local participation in the tourist economy and 
the future direction of this economy, the control of the business sector 
by minority communities (whites, East Indians, and Arabs), and the 
persistence of an underclass of black and Hispanic youth with little 
chance for social mobility.126 
This isolation is akin to the environmental anonymity discussed by Philip 
G. Zimbardo as a breeding ground for vandalism:127  
It is possible for certain environments to convey a sense of 
anonymity… The people living in such environments do not have a 
sense of community…That is one definition of ‘community,’ where 
people care about what happens on their turf, even to the person or 
property of strangers, with the reciprocal assumption that they 
would also care about them.128 
On a Territory-wide scale, “[t]he National Strategy for Homeland 
Security… states that the Nation must develop ‘interconnected and 
                                            
126 Klaus de Albuquerque and Jerome L. McElroy, “Correlates of Race, Ethnicity and 
National Origin in the United States Virgin Islands,” Revised February 1999, 4, 7, 13-14,  
http://www.saintmarys.edu/~jmcelroy/Race%20Ethnicity.htm (accessed 12/29/05). 
127 Phillip G. Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil,” The Social 
Psychology of Good and Evil, ed. A. Miller (New York: Guilford, 2004).  
128 Phillip G. Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil,” The Social 
Psychology of Good and Evil, ed. A. Miller (New York: Guilford, 2004), 33.  
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complementary Homeland Security systems that are reinforcing’…”129 Yet the 
same absence of a sense of community that exists in the general population also 
exists in the VI Government. Each department is isolated, with little inter-
departmental cooperation. For example, the VI Department of Justice does not 
communicate with the Department of Education. The Police Department does not 
accept Assistant Attorneys General assisting on major cases. VITEMA does not 
exchange ideas with the Rescue Squads. The VI Department of Homeland 
Security is not accessible to the population. The VI Government needs to be 
more networked, seamless and integrated. 
Terrorism-related intelligence is derived by collecting, blending, 
analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array of 
sources on a continual basis. Successful Homeland Security efforts 
require that Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector entities 
have an effective Information Sharing and Collaboration capability 
to ensure they can seamlessly collect, analyze, disseminate and 
use information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences in support of prevention, response and continuity 
efforts.130 
We must draw on the strength of our considerable network of 
assets, functioning as seamlessly as possible with state and local 
leadership, law enforcement, emergency management personnel, 
firefighters, the private sector, our international partners, and most 
certainly, the general public.  Building effective partnerships must 
be core to every mission of DHS.131  
An intelligence fusion capability, sometimes referred to as fusion center or 
a terrorism threat integration center, is where information from all sources is 
collected and reviewed with the goal of spotting patterns and identifying potential 
terrorist activity. The VI does not have a fusion center.  However, if such a 
capability existed, the lack of rapport between the police and the community, the 
isolation, the number of unassimilated groups, and the same lack of networking 
                                            
129 Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: 
National Preparedness, 3.  
130 Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: 
National Preparedness, 13.  
131 Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 13, 2005. 
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within the government would make intelligence in the VI a collection problem 
from the very beginning. Citizens are reluctant to report information to the police 
if they believe that no action will be taken.  Potentially valuable information does 
not even get to law enforcement. This information does not have the opportunity 
to become actionable intelligence because it is never “blended, analyzed and 
evaluated.”132 
 
6. Born Here 
Related to the isolation and absence of a sense of community is, for lack 
of better words, the “Born Here” syndrome. This is not unique to the Virgin 
Islands. It does exist elsewhere. It manifests itself in the perception of some of 
those who were born in the Virgin Islands that they are entitled to things those 
who were not born here are not entitled to. (In the British Virgin Islands, 
“Belonger Status” entitles one to own real estate.) The importance of this point 
rests on an analogy of this attitude - ideas that were not born here will not be 
acted on or considered. Homeland Security is too important to the VI to fall victim 
to this.  
The lack of community does not mean people are unapproachable. The 
local culture is strong. By far, the vast majority of those who live in the VI are 
wonderful, caring and big-hearted people. It is a place where people say good 
morning and really mean it. “Good Morning,” “Good Afternoon” and “Good Night” 
is said in greeting, to open a conversation or just in passing as a common 
courtesy. To say “Good Night” even a half hour early will likely bring a terse 
“Afternoon” in reply. It is expected that one will greet anyone they pass on the 
street. This is so ingrained, even a menacing group of men hanging on a dark 
street corner will bring a begrudging “Good Night” in reply to yours.  
Sometimes it is impossible to walk in public without repeatedly being 
stopped and “chatted up” by those you know. Certainly it is impossible to have 
                                            
132 Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: 
National Preparedness, 13.  
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this walk without many people saying good morning or good afternoon. 




II. EXISTING PREPAREDNESS AND ASSESSMENTS: WHAT 
PLANS ALREADY EXIST AND HOW SHOULD THEY BE 
EVALUATED? 
Much Virgin Islands planning has already been done and several of the 
planning documents are reviewed below. All of the plans, however, with the 
exception of the Economic Recovery Task Force’s Five Year Operating and 
Strategic Financial Plan133 and the Law Enforcement Planning Commission FY 
2004 Strategy, reviewed below, are operational in nature. There is otherwise no 
formal Strategic Level planning, yet I suggest that the Department of Health’s 
ESF #8 and Bioterrorism Response Plan, both reviewed below, have much of 
what would be properly classified as Strategic Level planning. 
A review of the planning documents available for academic review 
indicates planning in and for the Virgin Islands is mixed. Some are well-thought-
out and meaningful. Good examples are the Lucinda Millin Home (for the aged) 
Emergency Evacuation Plan and Property and Procurement’s 
Disaster/Emergency Preparedness Plan. Other planning documents are 
incomplete, based on inaccurate information and wrongly optimistic; there are 
more hazards than listed and the hazards are more severe than reported. Some 
of the plans do make excellent points yet many assume an infrastructure that 
does not exist. 
 
A. HOW TO JUDGE PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE? 
The National Preparedness Goal (HSPD 8) teaches that effective planning 
must respond to the broadest range of likely scenarios. The most comprehensive 
list of these is found in HSPD 8, encompassing the National Planning Scenarios. 
These lead to development of the Universal Task List and that leads to the  
 
                                            
133 Economic Recovery Task Force, U.S. Virgin Islands, Government of the U.S. Virgin 
Islands Five Year Operating and Strategic Financial Plan, 
http://www.usvi.org/oit/5yrplan/,(accessed 3/16/06).   
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Target Capabilities List. VI planning should be judged against the Target 
Capabilities List. (More information about the National Planning Scenarios can be 
found in Appendix A). 
 
B. TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST  
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) provides guidance on the specific 
capabilities and levels of capability that federal, state, local and tribal entities will 
be expected to develop and maintain. The TCL currently identifies thirty-six 
capabilities.134 It is important to note that no single jurisdiction is expected to 
meet all thirty-six and interagency cooperation as well as regionalization will 
suffice. This means, for example, that any one or a number of the thirty-six 
capabilities can be satisfied if the next city, town, county, state, etc., has that 
capability in sufficient capacity and readiness to assist. 
The Virgin Islands, however, does not have a next city, town or state so in 
this respect, the Virgin Islands must be better prepared to handle, on its, own, a 
larger share of these capabilities than a stateside locale. We must also recognize 
that because the VI’s First Responders will suffer the same consequences as the 
population and facilities they are to protect, some, many, most or even all of them 
may be incapacitated and unable to help! 
                                            
134 Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: 
National Preparedness, 7. More information about some of these capabilities can be found in the 
section entitled “Overarching Priorities,” which begins on page 10.  
Also, see May 31, 2005, Version 1.1 of the TCL at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TCL1_1.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06).   
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Figure 3.   Target Capabilities List.  
 
C. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEFICIENCIES AS TO THE TCL 
The Virgin Islands is deficient at best and completely incapable of many of 
the required Target Capabilities. For example, commenting on only the first 
twelve: 
1. Animal Health Emergency Support. There is some capability but 
certainly not adequate for any large scale disaster. 
2. Citizen Preparedness and Participation. Because of the hurricane 
threat, hurricane preparedness is generally good. However, because of 
the other social and political problems discussed above, participation is 
very limited. 
3. Citizen Protection. Evacuation and/or In Place Protection. There are no 
evacuation plans.135 
4. Critical Infrastructure Protection. With few exceptions, the Virgin 
Islands infrastructure is in poor condition.  
5. Emergency Public Information and Warning. Nothing other than private 
radio stations and ARES communications. 
                                            
135 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 18. 
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6. Firefighting Operations/Support. Found by FEMA to be inadequate.136  
7. Information Collection and Threat Recognition. Non-existent. 
8. Information Sharing and Collaboration. Non-existent. 
9. Intelligence Fusion and Analysis. Non-existent. 
10. Interoperable Communications. Found by FEMA to be inadequate.137 
11. Medical Surge. There are plainly not enough medical and support staff, 
facilities, supplies and equipment. There is no planning for Mass Care. 
12. Search and Rescue. Completely volunteer, as found by FEMA.138 
 
Another useful method to explain the TCL is to use the National Planning 
Scenarios, organized according to Mission Areas. The ‘Respond Mission Area 
target capabilities of Public Safety,’ are illustrative and the VI does not meet the 
objectives. For example, the Capability Description is to “reduce the impact and 
consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area in 
coordination with HAZMAT, fire/rescue and law enforcement disciplines.”139 As 
documented above, the VI is weak in all of these areas. A copy of the Respond 
Mission Area - Target Capabilities is reproduced in Appendix B. 
Also, several of the TCL items that the VI is stated to have some capability 
to perform may be exaggerated, because the person filling the capability is likely 
to be fulfilling other TCL roles that would be impossible to fulfill simultaneously.  
                                            
136 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 16. 
137 Ibid., 17, 37. 
138 Ibid., 15-17. 
139 “Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, May 23, 2005, 66, 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/getfile.cfm/Target%20Capabilities%20List%201%2E1%5F
FINAL%2Epdf?id=13112 also http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TCL1_1.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06). 
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D. VIRGIN ISLANDS TERRITORIAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
AGENCY (VITEMA) PLANS  
 
1. The Virgin Islands of the United States Territorial Emergency 
Operations Plan (VI-TEOP), June 1, 1999 
Preliminary Note:  Throughout this paper and especially in this section, 
references to St. John Rescue are included because, as past president, I have 
personal knowledge of the issues discussed. These references are merely to 
demonstrate VITEMA’s interaction with the population and should not be 
construed in any other way.  
VI-TEOP could have been much more of a planning starting point than it 
was had there been proper promulgation of the document encouraging people to 
review and discuss the proposed plan. Unfortunately, this never happened. The 
VI-TEOP remains largely unknown and has not been discussed, trained with or 
adhered to since its creation, despite the clear mandate otherwise.140 Contrary to 
VITEOP’s Governor’s Letter of Promulgation,141 there was never a training 
                                            
140 “The audience of the VI-TEOP will include all Departments and Agencies of the Virgin 
Islands government, all Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government, all voluntary and 
private non profit organizations operating in the Territory, all community organizations and will be 
available the for review by the residents of the Territory through the Public Libraries.” VI-TEOP, 
19. 
141 The Governor’s Letter of Promulgation (VI-TEOP, 12) states: “In accordance with Act 
5233 of Title 23 Chapter 17, 18 and 19 of the Virgin Islands Code, each department or agency 
shall appoint emergency services coordinators who will assist in developing emergency plans, 
coordinate emergency preparedness efforts, response and recovery. 
Each department or agency will prepare and disseminate to their employees 
detailed instructions and procedures for the following: 
To protect personnel, equipment, supplies and important public records from 
effects of disasters. 
To continue those essential services that may be needed during and after 
disasters. 
To carry out those assignments addressed in the Territorial Emergency 
Operations Plan. 
The Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency shall be 
responsible for the preparation and continuous updating of the emergency 
operations plan and will ensure all departments are adequately prepared to 
execute their mandate through continuous training and exercise. 
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session or meeting. I did not “assist in developing emergency plans, coordinate 
emergency preparedness efforts, response and recovery,” for example, during 
the years 1999 through 2005 when I was the Emergency Services Coordinator 
for St. John. In seven years as a VI Government employee, neither my agency 
nor any other agency that I am aware of did “disseminate to their employees 
detailed instructions and procedures…” 
The Preface on page 14 says:  
The primary goal of VITEMA is to involve the entire community 
(private and public sectors), in the coordinated effort to protect 
people and property from the effects of those hazards (manmade, 
natural and technological) to which the U.S. Virgin Islands is 
vulnerable. 
Page 16 states:  
It is important that every member of the community have a clear 
understanding of the types of hazard that threatens the Virgin 
Islands and fully understands the significance of warnings that 
public officials may issue. 
This is grand sentiment, but very far from reality. VITEMA has a limited 
relationship with the citizenry and has involved very few citizens in limited 
activities (i.e., CERT Trainings), and only then with the concerted assistance, 
including financial assistance, of the Rescue Squads. VITEMA has repeatedly 
alienated the Rescue Squads (St. Thomas, St. Croix and St. John), and has 
made no effort since 1999 to ensure “that every member of the community have 
a clear understanding of the types of hazard that threatens the Virgin Islands.” 
This despite the fact that “In 2002 Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS/FEMA) awarded USVI $145,000 under the Citizen Corps program to 
enhance the preparedness and security on the islands, especially to train the first 
responders in the Incident Command System.”142 Only some first responders 
have received this training and most of those who received the training online 
received it with no contribution (or expense) from VITEMA. 
                                            
142 Marie E. González (Hurricane/Earthquake/Dam Safety Program Manager, Caribbean 
Division, Department of Homeland Security), email to the author, October 25, 2005. 
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VITEMA does have some interaction with the citizenry.  They visit schools 
to teach about tsunamis and hurricanes, they have literature located in public 
places (the U.S. Post Office), they set up tables of information in the park during 
hurricane preparedness week, and they do an occasional seminar. VITEMA 
schedules other public awareness activities as well. For example, in 2005 on St. 
John, they bussed senior citizens to VITEMA Headquarters during one of the 
government sponsored ‘awareness’ weeks, and provided food, etc. while they 
assured them that during an emergency they would be taken care of. A 
particularly good part of this effort was that VITEMA invited Rescue members too 
so the seniors could know that they would also be helping in an emergency. 
There is also the occasional public TV advertisement on the fact that we live in a 
hurricane zone and we should be prepared.   
Despite its shortcomings, the VI-TEOP presents an excellent list of 

















Public health disasters (epidemics) 
Civil disturbance (strikes, industrial disputes)
 
 
“Hurricanes and Earthquake are the primary hazards and carry the highest 
level of risk for catastrophic impact on the Territory” (page 17). With the 
exception of tropical storms, hurricanes, and perhaps floods, the Virgin Islands is 
not prepared to meet any of the rest of these hazards. For example, only 
members of some Rescue Squads have training in building collapse and there is 
absolutely no public or first responder training for earthquakes. An aviation 
accident would be made more catastrophic by the lack of ambulances, trained 
EMTs, and physicians, not to mention there being only one hospital on each of 
the two islands that have airports. St. John Rescue and St. Thomas Rescue, 
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through their respective presidents, have independently and unknown to each 
other, twice each volunteered their agency to assist the Port Authority Fire 
Department in any way possible, should there be a plane crash. In addition to 
more personnel, both Rescue agencies have fire gear, extrication equipment and 
medical training. The Port Authority Fire Department has never responded to 
these offers.  
 
2. Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan 
This large and detailed document is thorough in what it does discuss, yet 
important material has not been explored and there are several serious 
inaccuracies. The consequence of the omissions and inaccuracies is that the 
Hazard Mitigation Plan portrays a seriously flawed assessment. It is overly 
optimistic; there are more hazards than listed and the hazards are more severe 
than reported.  
According to Section 2 of VITEMA’ Hazard Mitigation Plan, “All of the 
agencies that participated in the Hazard Mitigation Committee meetings had a 
stake and a vote in identifying and prioritizing hazard mitigation actions at the 
Territorial-level as well as for each major Island.”143 This statement of inclusion is 
not correct. Pages 2-7 list all of the public sector, private sector and non-profit 
sector entities invited to participate. St. Croix Rescue was not invited, yet they 
are so qualified that the U.S. Department of Defense hires them to teach rescue-
related courses to the military and law enforcement of other nations in the 
Caribbean. Neither St. Thomas Rescue nor St. John Rescue was invited, 
although St. John Rescue did learn of the meetings and three of its members 
attended. The consensus of those three attending members was that there was 
nothing notable, nothing to contribute, nothing to vote on and they were not 
tasked with anything.144 It was not participatory. Further, “the St. John Public 
                                            
143 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, April 2005, 2-17. 
144 Martin Alperen and two other members of St. John Rescue each attended one meeting.  
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Information Workshop…was conducted at the Marriott Hotel [on St. Thomas].”145 
By definition this workshop was not inclusive because to get from St. John to the 
Marriot Hotel on St. Thomas requires a ferry-boat ride from St. John to St. 
Thomas with car or taxis required at both ends of the trip. Because this was 
about St. John and because there are hotels and conference facilities on St. 
John, it should have been held on St. John. Having the St. John Public 
Information Workshop on St. Thomas was certainly not inclusive. 
Chapter IV of the Hazard Mitigation Plan entitled “Risk Assessment,” 
states, “The following natural Hazards have been documented for the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and have been assessed as risks for the purpose of this study. They are 
not listed in any particular order: Hurricane Winds, Riverine Flooding, 
Earthquake, Coastal flooding, Tsunami, and Landslide.”146  Despite the listing of 
six vulnerabilities of concern in Chapter IV, the Capability Assessment in Chapter 
III is exclusively limited to the Comprehensive Land and Water Use Plan, 
Floodplain Management, Coastal Zone Management and Land Use (zoning). 
This is good information, yet there is no mention of the capabilities of the other 
areas of concern.  
Further, even though there are six vulnerabilities of concern, the Risk 
Assessment was limited to earthquake and tsunami; what about hurricane wind 
hazard, riverine flood, coastal flooding and landslide? 
More important, the document’s table 3.3, citing “Regulatory compliance 
with DMA 2000 [Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000],” regarding the Virgin Islands 
capabilities to address hazard mitigation lists twenty-one capabilities in three 
categories. Of the sixty-three entries, forty-seven of the capabilities listed 
received a rating of 1 (“Potential exists to support activity but is not fully 
developed”), fifteen were ratings of 0 (“No potential relationship”), and only one  
 
                                            
145 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2-15. 
146 Ibid., 4-2, 4-7. 
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received a rating of 2 (“Supports activity to full potential of the plan, program or 
policy”), which was for the Emergency Management Council’s capabilities related 
to Post Disaster Hazard Mitigation.147 
 
a. St. John 
An example of flawed data is the Mitigation Plan’s Table 4.31, 
Coastal Flooding risk for St. John and also Appendix I.  For the category 
Hospital/Medical Clinic, the Table and Appendix list two facilities at “Very Low” 
risk for coastal flooding. Only one, however, the Myra Keating Smith Clinic, which 
is one of the best constructed buildings on the Island and is at a high elevation, is 
accurately assessed as very low risk for coastal flooding. The other facility is the 
Morris DeCastro Clinic in Cruz Bay. Cruz Bay is the westernmost area of St. 
John and is closest to St. Thomas. It is where the passenger and car ferry boats 
from St. Thomas arrive and depart. It is the “downtown” of St. John.  
The DeCastro Clinic is only seventy-five feet from Cruz Bay Harbor 
and is at sea level and is thus very vulnerable to a hurricane storm surge.  It is 
listed as very low risk for tsunami but a tsunami wave will travel far inland over 
the flat Cruz Bay. The Morris DeCastro Clinic is also a few hundred feet from the 
piers, which, according to Appendix I, have a “Very High” vulnerability to 
Tsunami. The DeCastro Clinic is so open and unprotected that it received a “Very 
High” for Hurricane. Since it is not on stable ground, it also received a “Very 
High” for Earthquake. The indication in Table 4.31 and Appendix I of VITEMA’s 
Hazard Mitigation Plan that the De Castro Clinic is at “Very Low” risk for coastal 
flooding is plainly contradicted by other information. Further indication that the 
DeCastro Clinic is vulnerable to Coastal Flooding can be found in the Mitigation 
Plan’s Appendix J because many of the buildings near the DeCastro Clinic are 
listed in Appendix J as “High Risk” for Tsunami. They include the WAPA Power 
Station, the Julius Sprauve School, the National Park Service Building and the 
WAPA Desalinization Plant. 
                                            
147 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 3-29. 
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Table 4.45 also has significant errors. St. John does not have two 
police stations.148 The Sewage Treatment Plant is listed as “Very Low” risk for 
Tsunami, yet it is at sea level, adjacent to a port and according to Appendix I, at 
“High Risk” for Earthquake Damage, “High Risk” for River Flood and at “Very 
High Risk” for Coastal Flood. For these reasons, because it is next to a port and 
at “High Risk” for Flooding, it is also at “High Risk” from a Hurricane Storm Surge 
and contrary to the Table, the Sewage Treatment Plant is at “High Risk” for 
Tsunami.  
For the category Hospital/Medical Clinic, the Table again lists two 
facilities at “Very Low” risk, the Myra Keating Smith Clinic and the Morris 
DeCastro Clinic. The DeCastro Clinic is at “High Risk” for Tsunami for the same 
reasons it is at “High Risk” for Coastal Flooding, as discussed above. 
In fact, if the vulnerabilities in the Mitigation Plan’s Appendices I 
and J are correct, then much more of the information contained in Tables 4.31 
and 4.45 is incorrect, and much more of St. John is vulnerable to Tsunami. The 
Tables are misleading. The Police Station in Cruz Bay is across the street from 
the Julius Sprauve School yet the police station is listed as very low risk for 
tsunami while the school across the street is at very high risk for tsunami. In fact, 
the area encompassed by the buildings listed in Appendices I and J indicates 
that all of Cruz Bay is at “Very High” risk from Tsunami and Flooding.  
 
b. St. Thomas 
For St. Thomas, Table 4.15, “Hurricane Exposure and 
Vulnerability,” says the airport is at low risk for hurricanes. Further, Appendix I 
says the airport is at low risk for hurricane and very low risk for coastal flood and 
tsunami. The airport, however, is at sea level, it borders the open ocean and the 
runway extends into the sea. Stating it is at low risk simply does not make sense. 
                                            
148 The Coral Bay Police Station opened in August 2005. It is not staffed regularly or 
consistently. It is incorrect to say there are two police stations.  The Coral Bay Police Station is 
correctly listed as “Very High” risk for Tsunami in Table 4.45, but it is not even listed in Appendix 
I. 
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Section Five, “Mitigation Strategy,” deals mostly with Land Use and 
Coastal Zone Management and makes an important point about this focus on 
Land Use, Zoning and Coastal Zone issues:  
The recovery ranking was presented in Section 4.7 on an island-by-
island basis. The earthquake hazard is the best example of a 
hazard that ranks higher in the recovery time ranking than the dollar 
loss ranking. It is, in most cases, prohibitively expensive to retrofit 
critical facilities; however, it is very cost effective in the long term to 
improve the quality of disaster-resistant construction by improving 
building codes, development and site plan review, and 
comprehensive land use planning.149 
 
c. St. John Mitigation Actions 
Section 5.3.3 is a well-thought-out listing of the mitigation actions 
applicable to the Territory as a whole, and also “Prioritized mitigation actions for 
each of the islands.” The St. John Mitigation Actions are repeated in this paper 
because only one of them has been accomplished (STJ-4) and the other (STJ-6) 
is critical, potentially life-threatening, but has not been addressed. 
5.3.3 St. John Mitigation Actions 
GOAL 1: REDUCE THE IMPACTS OF NATURAL HAZARDS ON 
RESIDENTS AND PROPERTY  
Objective 1.1 Protect Existing Development from Future Disaster 
Events  
STJ-1 Pursue Public/Private Sector initiative to resolve localized 
flooding problem on Westin Hotel property and adjacent public 
road. Several new, properly-sized culverts are required.   
STJ-2 Construct drainage improvements to eliminate localized 
flooding at Voyagers Restaurant where natural storm flows in the 
catchment area have been altered by construction and improper 
siting of structures. 
 
                                            
149 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 5-7. 
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GOAL 3: RAPIDLY RESTORE ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE, 
WITH UNINTERRUPTED OPERATION OF CRITICAL FACILITIES 
AND CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES FOLLOWING 
A NATURAL DISASTER 
Objective 3.2 Reduce the vulnerability of essential infrastructure 
and critical facilities 
STJ-3 Construct drainage improvements to eliminate localized 
flooding along Emmaus Gut that causes localized flooding 
problems at the Fire Station and Guy Benjamin School; both 
designated critical facilities.  
STJ-4 Provide Alternate Transmission Feeder to St. John 
Substation. Installation and termination of an underground 
transmission system with approximately three miles of duct banks 
and underground 35kV, 750 Kcmil underground power cables from 
the East End Substation to alternate submarine cable at Red Hook. 
Loop underground transmission feed for St. John. Benefits include 
the rapid restoration to normal services and economic recovery for 
all public services and critical facilities on St. John.  
(This was completed in December 2004.150) 
Resolve localized flooding at WAPA building and treatment plant, 
while addressing potential secondary impacts to wetlands. 
This refers to the wastewater treatment area. WAPA has a small 
generator across the street. Flooding in this area has been bad, 
closing down all traffic going to and from South Shore road. 
STJ-6 Pursue joint Federal Highways/DPW mitigation project to 
eliminate slope failures along Centerline Road that periodically 
close road during major storm events. 
The importance of STJ-6 cannot be overstated because the failure 
to complete STJ-6 can have life-threatening consequences. Minor rockslides are 
common and substantial road closing slides are, as stated, periodic. It is 
important to note that depending on where the road is closed, the fastest growing 
area of St. John, Coral Bay, and its thousands of inhabitants and visitors could 
be completely cut-off from access to medical care, law enforcement, emergency 
                                            
150 Telephone conversation with Mr. Glenn Rothgeb, WAPA, December 5, 2005. 
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evacuation, etc. For at least part of the way, there is only one road to Coral Bay. 
If Centerline Road is closed in other places it could be an hour-long drive around 
the obstruction (assuming the only alternative, North Shore Road, portions of 
which are along the shore, is also not flooded or obstructed.). 
In the past two years, landslides caused by heavy rains have buried 
automobiles and much other personal property, closed roads, required the 
extraction of private individuals, collapsed retaining walls and undermined the 
safety of paved roadways. While these were considered ‘isolated’ incidents, they 
are clear indicators of potential disasters waiting to happen.  
Private individuals and volunteer Rescue personnel both requested 
the Department of Public Works to position backhoes on the east side (far side) 
of the island during times of heavy /long duration rains in anticipate of landslides 
to more quickly open up the sole east/west roadway on St. John. That proved to 
be a good thing, because the next time landslides happened, the road was 
opened in record time. 
STJ-7  Construct drainage improvements to eliminate localized 
flooding along Route 107 southbound at Coral Bay. A hydrological 
study of the catchment area is necessary to determine technically 
feasible and cost effective structural solutions to the flooding 
problem. 
E. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) PLANNING 
FEMA publishes an indispensable resource for locals and non-locals alike 
who would respond to a disaster. It is a rich and detailed guide of who’s who, 
what is where and how to find it, all geared to disaster response and mitigation. 
The Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, by FEMA 
(“the Guide”) includes sections on the VI’s geography, demographics, political 
status and key players, major employers, public safety statistics and 
commentary, the available response capabilities, critical infrastructure and 
vulnerabilities, shelter and re-housing and media.  (Abbreviations used in the 
guide are: STT (St. Thomas), WI (Water Island), STJ (St. John) and STX (St. 
Croix)). 
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Despite the tremendous amount of useful information, the Guide includes 
inaccurate information regarding several important areas. For example, the VI 
Department of Education (DOE) is said to have “187,500 lbs. of food, sufficient to 
feed 20,000 people for 3 days, stored in 3 sites: 1 each on STX, STT and 
STJ.”151 A more accurate description of the available DOE food supply would 
indicate that such stores of food are not always available because the supplies 
are rotated in and out of the school lunch program. The food is consumed and 
eventually replenished. As of November 15, 2005, it was estimated that although 
St. Croix had its full allotment, St. Thomas and St. John were at approximately 
one-half of the stated amount.152 This date was still within the confines of the 
2005 hurricane season and hurricanes continued well past the ‘official’ end on 
November 30.153 
Although the VI DOE is still a resource for food, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has taken over this function.154 A major vulnerability is that all 
of the USDA food is stored in one warehouse on St. Thomas. If this one location 
is damaged or destroyed, then all the USDA food may be lost. 
Further, the Guide states, “[t]he American Red Cross (Red Cross) will 
position food in 12 primary shelters: (5 STT, 3 STX, 4 STJ) 24 hours prior to a 
hurricane landfall. ARC aim[s] to have 2 days’ supply of food for approx. 2,400 
people.”155 This is not entirely accurate for several reasons. As of November 15, 
2005, one of St. Croix’s three shelters had not yet been approved as a shelter. In 
addition, the availability of food stocks can vary because the Red Cross will 
                                            
151 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 39. 
152 Telephone interview with School Lunch Program, November 15, 2005. 
153 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Atlantic_hurricane_season, (accessed 
3/16/06). 
154 Telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Young, Director of Emergency Services for the ARC 
in St. Thomas, November 15, 2005. 
155 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 39. 
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purchase the food from local stores.156 Logic suggests that the Red Cross will 
then be competing with the local population for this limited supply of food.  
The Guide lists other pre-positioned resources as follows:157  
 
STT: (at FEMA bunker) - Tarps: 759 rolls (20’x100’)  
                                         - Water: 2463 liters for 
responders 
   - MREs: 126 for responders 
WI: (in FEMA trailer mid-Island) - Tarps: 112 rolls (20’x100’) 
STJ: (in FEMA trailer at STJ EOC)  - Tarps: 304 rolls 
(20’x100’) 
STX: (in FEMA trailer at STX EOC) - Tarps: 280 rolls 
(20’x100’) 
Puerto Rico: Following is a partial listing of the resources stored at the 
CAO warehouse. In the event of a disaster in both Puerto Rico and the USVI, 
[FEMA] Region II will determine distribution priorities. 
- Generators: 112 (5kw – 500 kw) 
- Tarps: 5608 rolls (20’x100’) 
- MREs: 807 for responders 
- Water: 4590 liters for responders 
Even a cursory review of this information indicates that FEMA does not 
have adequate pre-positioned supplies. There may be enough tarps, but only 
STT has water and MREs, and these are allocated to responders. Similarly, the 
material stored in Puerto Rico is woefully inadequate for both jurisdictions (the 
population of Puerto Rico on April 1, 2000, was 3,808,610158) and there are 
occasions when the same disaster strikes both the VI and Puerto Rico, as with 
                                            
156 Telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Young, Director of Emergency Services for the ARC 
in St. Thomas, November 15, 2005. 
157 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 35. 
158 United States Census 2000, http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/pr.html (accessed 
11/25/05). 
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Hurricane Marilyn in 1995 and Hurricane Georges in 1998. FEMA miscalculates 
when it says that in Puerto Rico, they have, for BOTH the VI and Puerto Rico, 
“supplies/materials for at least five days, which is the timeframe for the 
arrangements and physical arrival of a barge from the mainland.”159 “Barging to 
the U.S. Virgin Islands from Port Elizabeth, NJ will take five days; from 
Jacksonville, FL, will take four days.”160 This is plainly not adequate if the 
sending or receiving port is closed for more than five days as discussed above 
and does not include the time to assemble the goods before shipping. 
 
F. LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING COMMISSION (LEPC), FY 2004 
STRATEGY 
I was privileged to obtain a copy of this FY 2004 Strategy. The 2006 
version is currently under development.161 The Introduction states: 
This document will serve as the continuing Territorial Homeland 
Security Strategy (THSS) for the Virgin Islands. The purpose of this 
strategy is to define the ongoing strategic direction for enhancing 
regional capability and capacity to prevent and reduce the 
vulnerability of the Virgin Islands from WMD/terrorism incidents. 
This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordination, 
cooperation and focused effort from the entire region – citizens, 
local, state, and federal government, as well as the private and 
non-profit sectors. 
This is an excellent paragraph that discusses the complexity of the 
problems and the broad scope of the Homeland Security endeavor. It also 
represents long- range strategic planning. It is an excellent beginning, has 
excellent goals, yet like much of the Virgin Islands’ planning, it assumes a 
physical, equipment, personnel, and training infrastructure which does not exist. 
Further, paragraph two states, “All populated portions of the Territory and 
municipal agencies within each Territorial jurisdiction were given an opportunity 
                                            
159 Marie Gonzalez (Puerto Rico FEMA/DHS), email to the author, November 16, 2005,   
(Marie.Gonzalez1@dhs.gov).  
160 Miguel Pagan (Puerto Rico FEMA/DHS), email to the author, October 25, 2005, 
(Miguel.Pagan@dhs.gov). 
161 Mel D. Vanterpool (Director, VIOHS), email to the author, February 16, 2006. 
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to participate in the assessment process.” This is simply not accurate and 
planning was not inclusive or representative. 
On page 2, under the heading, “Territorial Vision,” it states, 
The Virgin Islands goal is to be able to effectively work in a multi-
disciplinary environment to detect, mitigate, prepare for, respond to 
and recover from a WMD terrorism incident. As well as to enhance 
capabilities through planning, training, and exercises that will 
include all disciplines. 
This too is excellent and up-to-the-minute theory for Homeland Security. 
To effectively prevent and respond to terrorism (or natural disasters) is without 
question a multidisciplinary activity.  Further, it requires networking and 
cooperation on levels never before seen.  
Unfortunately, not much has been accomplished towards reaching the 
excellent goals. For example, from page 2,  
 
GOAL 1: (Prevention/Planning) Develop and institute an 
aggressive Infrastructure Protection Plan 
  
1.1 Request Technical Assistance to provide support for an 
Infrastructure Physical Security Site Survey to be completed 
as part of the development of an overall Infrastructure 
Security Enhancement Planning effort. 
 
1.2 Develop a perimeter and access control system to protect 
critical assets, such as, the Legislature Building, the 
Government House, Department of Finance, and Water and 
Power Authority (WAPA) on St. Thomas and those 
potentially identified through the Infrastructure Physical 
Security Site Survey. 
 
1.3 Develop a perimeter and access control system to protect 
critical assets, such as, the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands, VIPD and WAPA on St. Croix and those potentially 





Implementation Plan: Design, Develop and Institute a perimeter 
and access control security system for identified critical 
infrastructure. Milestone for completion to be June 2004. Funding 
for this process will be continued from FY 2003 and anticipated FY 
2004 DHS funding. 
As of the date of this thesis, well into FY 2006, none of these has been 
accomplished. 
Another example is found on page 5: 
GOAL 5. (Preparedness/Response) Continue to improve the 
interoperability of territorial communications functions for WMD 
response providing for interoperable capability among all first 
responder agencies in a multi-disciplinary environment and the 
enhancement of the Territories 911 system.    
5.1 Continue acquisition of state of the art communication 
equipment that will ensure a reliable and interoperable 
primary communication system that is user friendly. 
5.1a Re-establish territory-wide early warning systems by 
September 2004.                                            
5.1b Establish a written policy (MOU) with privately owned 
communication providers (including HAM) to disseminate 
information by March 2004.   
5.2 Complete the territorial emergency communication network. 
5.2a Develop a mass communication plan to sufficiently 
inform the general populous in the event of a WMD 
incident by December 2004. 
 
5.2b Evaluate the existing 911 system to determine 
necessary equipment and training needs to comply with 
current OSHA and Homeland Security standards by 
December 2004. 
5.3 Continue development of and implementation of the 
Interoperable Communications Plan 
5.4 Continue improving mass communication  
5.4a. private communication 
5.4b. off-island communication 
5.4c. early warning signs 
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Implementation Plan: Implementation of this Goal began during FY 
2003, and will continue to progress during FY2004 as additional 
equipment and training are identified. VITEMA is continuing the 
development of the Island-wide communication plan and 
anticipates completion by December 2004. Technical Assistance is 
required and will be requested to meet that commitment. 
Government communications remains abominable! Only St. John Rescue 
has the ability to communicate from one end of the island to the other with few 
radio dead zones.  
There is no early warning system. There are no MOUs with HAM (FCC 
licensed radio operators such as those discussed above for the St. John Amateur 
Radio Club and ARES). There is no mass communication plan and this is 
particularly unfortunate because an informed, alert, responsive, non-panicked 
population is essential.  
The 911 system is also terrible. The local press is full of complaints about 
the police sometimes hanging up on callers; there are very few streets that have 
names, fewer still that have signs designating those names, and the houses have 
no numbers. It is an everyday occurrence that emergency responders cannot find 
the emergency. This is why St. John Rescue and the ARC are working with the 
University of the Virgin Islands to develop a geographic information system 
(GIS). Most troubling, it was anticipated in this goal that these would be 
completed by December 2004! (More information about the GIS System is in 
Chapter IV.) 
The Border Security discussed in Goal 7 remains, as described above, 
non-existent.  
Goal 8 on page seven states in part, “The VIPD is in the process of 
developing an intelligence unit to establish the first local law enforcement 
intelligence capability in support of the VI Homeland Security Council.” This is an 
outstanding goal but as discussed above, is absolutely meaningless until the 
public trusts the police. With the current level of mistrust and suspicion, few 
people will tell the police anything. Also, Goal 8 should recognize that the police 
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are not the only receivers of intelligence. Clancy Richardson on St. John’s East 
End, founder of the East End Neighborhood Watch is a perfect example. 
Included in the list of information gatherers should be the fire department, EMS, 
teachers, public works, school and public bus drivers and the general population.  
We are all in this together. This would begin to represent the 
“coordination, cooperation and focused effort from the entire region” discussed in 
the LEPC Introduction. All of this also needs to be integrated real time and 
networked between all agencies.  
Networked means that when the fire department observes something, 
almost instantaneously the police know, the Intelligence Unit is evaluating it, and 
all necessary responders know all of the facts to enable them to safely and 
effectively respond. It would be improper for Central Dispatch to send all first 
responders to the scene of a bioterrorism attack, which is what happened in this 
exercise. The Anthrax tabletop exercise is described in endnote 90. 
 
G. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (BIOTERRORISM) 
I obtained several useful documents. The Territorial Emergency Services 
Function #8, Health and Medical Services Annex, the Final Public Health 
Emergency Response Plan and the Bioterrorism Response Plan. After receiving 
the plans, however, it was no longer possible to obtain responses to questions. 
There is no mental health or psychological first aid plan.  
 
1. Territorial Emergency Service Function #8 Health and Medical 
Services Annex 
The descriptions in “Section III, SITUATION, A. Disaster Condition and B. 
Planning Assumptions” are excellent because they are realistic and recognize 
that no one will know the extent of damage until after an event and that there are 
a myriad of events that can cause damage. A full copy is set forth in Appendix C.  
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Several of the most critical statements from the Annex are presented here 
because they support the conclusion that the VI is not capable of responding to a 
major event. 
III. SITUATION 
A. Disaster Condition 
The sudden onset of such a large number of victims would 
stress the territory’s medical system necessitating time-critical 
assistance from the Federal government. 
B. Planning Assumptions 
1. The Health sector resources within the affected disaster area 
of the Territory will be inadequate to clear casualties from 
the scene or treat them in local hospitals.   
2. Damage to chemical and industrial plants, sewer lines, and 
water distribution systems and secondary hazards such as 
fires will result in toxic environmental and public health 
hazards to the surviving population and response personnel 
including exposure to hazardous chemicals, and 
contaminated water supplies, crops, livestock, and food 
products. 
3. The damage and destruction of a catastrophic natural 
disaster will produce urgent needs for mental health crisis 
counseling for disaster victims and response personnel.  
4. Assistance in maintaining the continuity of health and 
medical services will be required. 
5. Disruption of sanitation services and facilities, loss of power, 
and massing of people in shelters may increase the potential 
for disease and injuries.162 
This is a good plan with some excellent goals, but other parts of the Plan 
were problematic, mostly because the VI does not have enough people with the 
training, skill, equipment, resources, motivation, etc., to successfully implement 
the Plan. In addition, the people and organizations affected must conduct a Plan 
                                            
162 Territorial Emergency Services Function #8, Health and Medical Services Annex, 3-4. 
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exercise and this has not been done. The Plan drifts from being operational to 
being “the way things should be.”  Either the planning needs to be brought in line 
with the available resources, or more resources need to be brought to it.  
 
a. Specific Comments about the Plan 
The volunteer Rescue Squads are a vital and necessary part of the 
VI’s emergency response, yet they receive minimal mention in the Plan. In 
particular, the Island Response Structure on page five does not state that the 
Rescue Squads routinely assist EMS in all areas. St. John Rescue is often at a 
scene even before EMS. 
The Health Surveillance objective listed on page six is an excellent 
goal, but the VI does not have the resources to do anything like what is 
proposed. There is no one to do this work. 
Section IV (D)(1)(a)(2)  Health Surveillance 
ESF #8 will establish surveillance systems to monitor the general 
population and special high-risk population segments; carry out 
field studies and investigations; monitor injury and disease patterns 
and potential disease outbreaks; and provide technical assistance 
and consultations on disease and injury control measures and 
precautions.  
Similarly, the Activation of Health/Medical Response Teams cited 
on page nine does not reflect the lack of resources. These teams do not exist! 
The VI has absolutely no “Medical Surge” capability.  
Section IV (D)(2)(b) Activation of Health/Medical Response Teams 
Under the direction of ESF #8, teams of health officials will be 
deployed as needed and appropriate medical and public health 
(including environmental health) assistance will be provided.  
In Section V. RESPONSIBILITIES on page 11, Health is tasked at 
number 4 to “Provide leadership in directing, coordinating, and integrating the 
overall territorial response …..” The problem, however, is that this is a massive 
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undertaking and there is no one qualified to provide this service. Task 7 is to 
“Coordinate the evacuation of patients…” There is no evacuation plan!  
Regarding WMD cited on page 12:  
The VI Department of Health (DOH) is hereby designated the 
territorial response agency for all health issues related the 
response to an act of terrorism employing WMD.  DOH will activate 
technical operations to support the territorial response to acts of 
terrorism.  DOH may coordinate with individual agencies identified 
in the territorial plan and with federal agencies as deemed 
necessary.  DOH [is responsible for] 
• Epidemiological Investigations 
• Agent Identification 
• Threat Assessment 
• Consultation 
• Decontamination 
• Hazard Detection & Reduction 
• Public Health/Medical Support 
• Pharmaceutical Support Operations 
• WMD Support and Consultation 
• Write and annually maintain the WMD Appendix for Radiological 
and Biological Weapons in concert with VIFS and DPNR. 
The VI Department of Health does not have the capability to do this. 
On page 13, the Plan gives too much responsibility to the American 
Red Cross (RC). The RC is vital but does not have the local resources needed to 
do what is asked of them.  
American Red Cross 
1. Provide emergency first aid, supportive counseling, health care for 
minor illnesses and injuries to disaster victims in Mass Care 
shelters, recovery centers, distribution centers and other sites 
deemed necessary by ESF #8. 
2. Provide supportive counseling for the family members of the injured 
or dead. 
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3. Acquaint families with available health resources and services and 
make appropriate referrals. 
4. At the request of ESF #8, provide blood and blood products through 
the Regional Blood Center in Puerto Rico. 
5. Provide coordination for uploading of appropriate casualty/patient 
information from ESF #8 into the DWI system within ESF #6. 
Section VI, RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS on page 15. 
A. Assets Critical for Initial 12 hours 
The most critical requirements during the initial 12 hours of a major 
disaster will be medical response personnel, necessary medical 
supplies and equipment, transportation, logistical and 
administrative support, and communications systems support.  The 
principal requirements will be: 
1. The alerting and deployment of emergency support coordinators, 
ESF #8 ERT, the Territorial ESF #8 emergency response structure, 
and other necessary ESF #8 personnel. 
2. The alerting and deployment of medical units to assist in the 
delivery of patient care to victims of the disaster and the provision 
of mortuary services as required.  Patient care will probably be 
rendered under austere field conditions for casualty clearing, 
casualty staging, and during transportation. 
3. Medical supplies (including pharmaceutical and biologic products) 
and equipment necessary to replace those damaged or destroyed 
by the disaster.  
4. Transportation support to include: 
a. Aircraft for transport of incoming medical response 
personnel, supplies, and equipment; 
b. Ground transportation for deployment of incoming 
assets within the disaster area; 
c. Ground transportation and rotary wing aircraft for 
movement of casualties within the affected area; 
d. Fixed wing short, medium, and long-range aircraft for 
patient evacuation from the disaster area; 
e. Ground transportation and air transportation for 
patient transport; and 
f. Transport of medical response personnel and 
equipment following deactivation. 
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5. Logistics and administrative support including: 
a. One or more representatives of each ESF #8 
lead/support agency to be located at or to be 
immediately available via telecommunications. 
b. One or more representatives of the lead agency to be 
located at the TCC [Territory Command Center]; 
c. One or more representatives of the lead agency to be 
located with FEMA; 
d. Qualified personnel to establish, maintain, and 
operate communications systems; 
e. Clerical support personnel at island EOC and 
territory--level TCC; 
f. Reference material including plans, directories, maps, 
etcetera, necessary for coordination of medical and 
public health response; and 
g. Accommodation adequate for the operation of ESF #8 
on a 24-hour basis. 
6. Communications Support Services. 
 
This list proposes a tremendous amount of work. This plan has not 
been practiced. All of these resources (“medical response personnel, necessary 
medical supplies and equipment, transportation, logistical and administrative 
support, and communications systems support”) could not come together from 
the VI -- they do not exist here! Further, in the event of a VI or stateside port 
shutdown, the DOH will have great difficulty in obtaining the fuel needed for all of 
this transportation. In 2005, a single barge that transports vehicle gasoline to St. 
John was forced out of service by the Coast Guard for several weeks. The result 
was the immediate closing of all but one gasoline station on St. John, which 
offered limited gas for limited hours for everyone, including government and 
emergency service personnel. People stayed home, work slowed down, the 
economy suffered. People paid $50.00 to take a barge ride to St. Thomas just to 
get gasoline.  
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2. Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan163 
Like the other documents, the Final Public Health Emergency Response 
Plan has many excellent parts. The “Situation and Assumptions” section at 
“Situations” states:  
The USVI comprise 100 islands and cays, including the inhabited 
islands of St. Croix, St. John, St. Thomas and Water Island. The 
islands are in close proximity to the British Virgin Islands as well as 
surrounding eastern Caribbean islands and therefore may be 
affected if an act of terrorism, whether biological, chemical or of 
other origin, results in a mass casualty incident or widespread 
disease. These populations are under different jurisdictions and 
government. Coordinated response plans with these jurisdictions 
will be needed.  
This is the only discussion in any plan I have seen that mentions the risk 
from nearby islands and the need for coordination with these other islands. 
However, one must remember that these neighboring islands are either 
independent countries or possessions of other countries. 
The section entitled “Vulnerability of the Population,” quoted earlier in this 
paper from the Virgin Islands Health Department’s Bioterrorism Response Plan, 
is excellent because it provides a realistic assessment of the situation. 
 
3. Bioterrorism Response Plan 
Section III. EMERGENCY MANGEMENT discusses Special Needs 
Shelters and Disaster First Aid Centers, yet in seven years of emergency 
response on the island of St. John, I have never heard of these centers. I am 
similarly unaware of a Communicable Disease Investigation Team.  
Section VI. ACTIVATION states:  
Only official alert by the National Weather Bureau out of Puerto 
Rico will result in activation of Emergency Operations by the  
 
 
                                            
163 The document Final Public Health Emergency Response Plan is presumed to have been 
a draft for the Bioterrorism Response Plan, but I was not able to confirm that. 
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Department of Health in conjunction with VITEMA. The chief source 
of information at that point in time will come from VITEMA through 
the Office of the Commissioner. 
Hurricane Katrina teaches us that sometimes bureaucracies have to act 
on their own without “formal notice” being received. In response to the Hurricane 
Katrina emergency, U.S. Army General Honore ordered the First Army to activate 
as a “training exercise” because the Army can train as needed but is not allowed 
to self-deploy. Initially NORTHCOM criticized First Army, but after the scope of 
the disaster became clear and it became apparent that neither the city nor the 
state had made the correct requests, NORTHCOM approved further DOD 
activation. There may be a situation where Emergency Operations should be 
activated even though the NWB or VITEMA have not given the order.  
The failure of initiative [exhibited by the local, state and federal 
governments in Katrina] was also a failure of agility. Response 
plans at all levels of government lacked flexibility and adaptability. 
Inflexible procedures often delayed the response…We again 
encountered the risk-averse culture …164 
The Department of Health should consider self-activation under certain 
circumstances. There may be a time when the Department of Health is not able 
to contact or be contacted by VITEMA. Just as General Honore took action on 
his own, there must be flexibility that allows the DOH to do the same.  
The section entitled “STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE (SNS)” at “2.  
Description,” states (emphasis added)  
In the event of a major natural disaster, technological accident, or 
act of terrorism using a weapon of mass destruction, the protection 
of lives affected or potentially affected will depend largely upon the 
availability of, and ability to provide medical treatment 
(pharmaceutical supplies, prophylactic medicines, etc.), to all 
emergency responders, health care professionals, and the general 
                                            
164 “A Failure of  Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, “U.S. House of Representatives, February 15, 
2006, 1-2. 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainrepo
rt.pdf (accessed 02/15/06). 
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community in a timely manner. Accomplishing this task 
necessitates the establishment and coordination of strategically 
placed stockpiles of essential medication and medical supplies 
throughout the territory to be used preceding and in conjunction 
with the CDC’s National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program.  This 
national program is comprised of highly skilled staff and large 
quantities of medical materiel and equipment, and is anticipated to 
arrive to the territory from the U.S. mainland within twelve hours or 
less of its activation.  Coordination of the SNS program, both at the 
local and national level, requires the development of a 
comprehensive plan for receiving, storing, staging, distributing, 
dispensing, apportioning, replenishing, and recovering the 
stockpile. 
This is an excellent idea but these stockpiles do not exist. Neither is there 
a “plan for receiving, storing, staging, distributing, dispensing, apportioning, 
replenishing, and recovering the stockpile.”  
Section VI entitled “Notification” states:  
Simultaneously to the notification of all DOH BT staff, the 
Bioterrorism staff will also notify Clinic Administrators, Hospital 
Administrators, EMS, RESCUE, Airport & Airline Administrators 
along with other agencies with whom mutual aid agreements have 
been established. 
I was unable to obtain information about any such agreements. The 
Rescue Squads do have an agreement stating that they are primarily responsible 
for vehicle extrication. This was prepared so the Rescue Squads would qualify to 
receive U.S. Department of Transportation funds for vehicle related equipment. 
 
H. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS RESPONSE PLAN 
There is no such plan, yet there should be such planning for the entire 
population - children, adolescents and adults. Developing a Crisis Response 
Plan is a laudable goal because there is plenty of opportunity for crisis. The 
Territory, however, does not have sufficient trained personnel to implement any 




need for a Crisis Response Plan even more critical because the psychological 
situation will be made worse when basic safety and immediate needs cannot be 
met. 
With the problems and limitations discussed throughout this thesis in 
mind, devising a plan that could not be put into practice because there are not 
enough resources is futile. The VI must negotiate agreements with the private 
practitioners in the territory to assist the Department of Health. It must also pre-
arrange for off-island assistance to arrive as soon as it is safe. The VI cannot do 
it alone -- help is not simply the next city, town or state away. More detailed 
information can be found in Appendix E. 
 
I. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The Director of the VI Department of Homeland Security initially declined, 
in November and December 2005, to provide any information for this thesis165 
although on February 16, 2006, he did provide the Law Enforcement Planning 
Commission FY 2004 Strategy, which is reviewed above. 
 
J. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY AND 
PROCUREMENT 
The Department of Property and Procurement provided its 
“Disaster/Emergency Preparedness Plan” dated August 15, 2005, and its 
“Transportation Emergency Plan” (undated). 
The Disaster/Emergency Preparedness Plan for the Department of 
Property and Procurement” is excellent. It clearly indicates responsibility for 
Transportation and Resource Management, ESF’s 1 and 7, respectively.  
Its objective under ESF-1 is “To coordinate and provide instantaneous 
access to the government’s vehicular fleet in cases of emergency or any 
                                            
165 Lynda Lohr, “Alperen Says Ferry Dock Fence is Completely Ineffective,” St. John Source, 
December 1, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131772569(accessed 12/2/05). 
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declared disaster; to provide fuel prior and after a declared emergency.”  Among 
other things, this plan indicates that “All emergency vehicles have been identified 
and listed,” the “Transportation Emergency Plan has been updated,” it identifies 
specific fueling stations, whether they have gas and or diesel, and it names the 
fuel truckers. The only criticism of this plan is that it does not mention the island 
of St. John.   
Its objective pursuant to ESF-7 is “To provide storage area for critical and 
expendable supplies for the Governor Juan F. Luis Hospital, the Roy L. 
Schneider Regional Medical Center, the Department of Health, and other 
government agencies.” 
This section is also well presented but raises serious questions. It lists two 
warehouse locations, one on St. Thomas and one on St. Croix. The obvious 
limitation of only one on each island is that all the supplies will be in one place. 
The Hazard Mitigation Plan, Appendix I, For St. Thomas, Critical Facilities 
Summary – Vulnerability lists, under “Government Buildings,” “Property 
Procurement” a 25,200 square-foot facility that is presumably the warehouse (it is 
the only Property & Procurement in the list). It is listed at Very High Risk for 
Earthquake, Hurricane, River Flood and Tsunami. Is this a good place to store 
supplies for a disaster? 
I was unable to determine from Appendix I for St. Croix whether the single 
Property & Procurement facility is vulnerable because some data were missing 
and because there is more than one Property & Procurement listing. St. John is 
not listed at all.  
Good points in the Resource Management function are that “Warehouse 
emergency staffing plans are complete. Post storm drive-in/drive-out 
warehousing space has been identified,” and there are agreements with other 
agencies to use two additional facilities, but these are both on St. Croix. In 
addition, pre-approved contracts are in place for “Debris Site Management and  
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Chipping, Emergency Roofing, Inspectors, Debris Cleaning and Removal from 
Territorial Roads and Public Grounds, Federal Roads Debris Removal, and 
Emergency Roadside Cleaning.” 
The Transportation Emergency Plan is thorough, detailed and well-
thought-out. It includes plans to coordinate with other agencies if more help is 
needed, for example, the Department of Public Works, VITRAN (public busses) 
and the Virgin Islands Taxi Association. The plan also notes its limitations by 
stating they do not have the trained personnel to “drive or move any elderly, 
disabled or special needs persons.” Again, St. John is not listed at all.  
 
K. VIRGIN ISLANDS HOUSING AUTHORITY 
The Virgin Islands Housing Authority provided the Lucinda Millin Home 
Emergency Evacuation Plan Implementation. It is well-prepared, well-thought-
out, thorough, provides for redundancy, is comprehensive and easily 
understandable. The VI Housing Authority calls it a “living” document and 
recognizes the need for revisions.  
 
L. VIRGIN ISLANDS NATIONAL GUARD (VING) 
Requests for information from VING were referred to other agencies, 
though a newspaper reported that VING has received HAZMAT training from 
NORTHCOM.166 
 
M. VIRGIN ISLANDS PORT AUTHORITY 
The Port Authority, through its Executive Director, denied access to all 
requested planning documents on the basis that the Port Authority information 
was classified as Sensitive Security Information (SSI). However, the Port 
Authority did permit me to speak with the Federal Programs Coordinator, who 
answered questions as long as they did not breach the SSI rules. 
 
                                            
166 Lett, “VI Guardsmen Get Training in Terrorist Attack Scenarios.” 
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N. UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL 
The National Border Patrol Strategy167 has [f]ive overarching objectives. 
[The first three are]:   
Objective 1. Establish substantial probability of apprehending 
terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to illegally enter the 
United States between ports of entry …  
Objective 2.  Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement …  
Objective 3. Apprehend and deter smugglers of humans, drugs and 
other contraband…168  
… The core concepts for the Coastal Border are [to] … gain, 
maintain, and expand shallow and deep-water control in the areas 
of responsibility; in support of the priority anti-terrorism mission. A 
key strategy to accomplishing this mission is partnership and 
integration with other law enforcement agency efforts… requires 
clear, coordinated, federal, state and local law enforcement 
activities.169 
Considering the activities of the East End Neighborhood Watch, and 
because of the woefully inadequate Customs and Border Protection and Border 
Patrol resources devoted to the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the limited abilities of the 
VIPD, the Border Patrol has failed in meeting its objectives.170 
 
O. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (USCG)  
The USCG has an immense responsibility for Homeland Security as well 
as Homeland Defense and does an admirable job. However, some aspects of 
their work, in this case Homeland Security – port security Rules and Regulations, 
are less than effective. In the example that follows, the problem is partly the 
Rules’ “one-size-fits-all” solution.  
                                            
167 National Border Patrol Strategy, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, September 2004. 
168 Ibid., 7-9. 
169 National Border Patrol Strategy, 19. 
170 Legislation to establish a Border Patrol Unit for the Virgin Islands passed the U.S. House of 
Representatives Homeland Security Committee. Merlin JnBaptiste, “Border Patrol Legislation 
Progresses Out of Committee,” Virgin Islands Daily News, November 18, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=10724208 (accessed 11/19/05).   
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The origin of this “one-size-fits-all” approach is the National Maritime 
Security Plan (NMSP) of September 1, 2004. Calling itself the “Capstone of the 
MTSA [Maritime Transportation Security Act] Planning System,” it lists three 
NMSP functions. Number three states, “The NMSP must also set a standard for 
consistency in security assessments and mitigation measures within the MTSA 
system of plans, from region to region.”  In the case of the fence on St. John 
discussed below, this is an example that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of 
little minds.”171 Aside from the fence simply being ineffective, it makes no sense 
whatsoever to mandate consistency, in other words to advertise our security 
precautions. Terrorists will take comfort in knowing what to expect, consistently, 
from one possible target to the next. This makes no more sense than any 
security or police patrol following an immutable schedule. 
Unclassified CIA reports (and common sense) state that variable security 
measures are vital. Each port should not be the same as the next. 
The sole reason for the fence is the Port Authority and the VI 
Government’s insistence on a fence when one is not required. There is no 









                                            
171 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self Reliance,”  The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third 
Edition, ed. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2002), http://www.bartleby.com/59/3/foolishconsi.html (accessed 12/25/05). 
172 Personal correspondence from F.J. Sturm (Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of 
Port and Vessel Security), December 29, 2005. 
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Before The Fence 173 After The Fence.174 
 
How easy it is to walk around the fence175 
 
Figure 4.   Pictures of the Fence.  
 
1. The Fence  
On July 1, 2004, and pursuant to the Maritime Security Act, the VI 
Government Port Authority installed a chain link and barbed wire fence 
approximately one-third of the way out the passenger ferry dock on St. John. The 
fence prevents people from walking from the land onto the ferry boats that take 
them to and from St. Thomas. (Locals refer to it as “The Fence” and it spawned  
 
 
                                            
173 Yahoo, Japan, www.geocities.jp 
174 http://barnako.typepad.com/news_of_st_john_usvi/images/fence.html 
175 http://www.sweetplantains-stjohn.com/generalinfo.htm (accessed 3/16/06). 
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the bumper sticker, “St. John – A Gated Community.”) Before The Fence, free 
access to the boats and the ability to sit on the dock of the bay had been the 
tradition for generations. 
Given the geography of the Virgin Islands and the current state of both 
federal and local law enforcement, any effort towards non-suspicion based, non-
pinpoint inspection is useless. The Fence is completely ineffective, wasteful of 
resources and a public relations disaster. It should be removed.  
 
a. Background   
Since The Fence was installed, ferryboat tickets are taken at The 
Fence gate instead of further down the dock at the actual boats. New “Security 
Guards” have new jobs, but do not do anything except sometimes open and  
 
close the gate. The guards do not search anyone or anything. They do not look in 
bags, boxes or containers. They do, however, enforce the ferry boat regulations 
against eating on board.  
Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations establishes their duties. 
At the lowest alert level, called MARSEC 1, they are supposed to “screen 
persons, baggage, personal effects and check identification or examine 
passenger tickets.”176 They do not. There is absolutely no meaningful scrutiny. 
 
b. Why the Fence Does Not Work 
The Fence is ineffective for many reasons. The 85-degree 
Caribbean water is less than two feet deep at this point, and one only has to walk 
through warm, clean water no more than four to five feet deep, and climb back on 
the pier on the other side of the fence. Islanders and visitors regularly wear only 
shorts and flip-flops and have sand on their feet, so one would not even look out 
of place after having done this. This can be done easily unseen by the security 
guards. 
                                            
176 33 CFR 105.255(e). 
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Because The Fence was not well designed or implemented, 
another way around it is to climb out the unscreened window in the waiting-
seating area and walk along the two-foot wide ledge to the other side of the fence 
and then back on the pier. Or, one could simply purchase a ticket ($5.00 or 
$11.50, depending on the destination).  
Driving and taking the car ferry between St. Thomas and St. John 
can avoid The Fence entirely. Every day, several hundred vehicles come and go 
a block away at the car ferry dock without any inspection. No security is 
mandated at the car ferry because both the car ferry and the car ferry dock are 
exempt from the statute. They are not a “Passenger vessel certificated to carry 
more than 150 passengers,” (33 CFR 104.105(a)(6)) and the dock is not a 
“Facility that receives vessels certificated to carry more than 150 passengers…” 
(33 CFR 105.105(a)(2)).  
Private boats (pleasure craft) are also uninspected. Perhaps one 
thousand private boats are anchored or moored around St. John on any given 
day and hundreds come and go daily, uninspected. There is a dinghy dock 
accessible from this same dock just a few yards before the Fence. This is used 
by almost anyone coming to Cruz Bay from a boat anchored in the bay or a 
nearby bay. So, it is not even necessary to get one’s feet wet to get around the 
Fence. The ferry boats are not under constant surveillance, and it would be an 
easy matter to access a boat from a dinghy.   
Unofficial estimates indicate that of the legitimate, non-contraband, 
non-smuggling traffic, 70% of the people coming to St. John arrive by passenger 
ferry from St. Thomas. This includes the tourists and their baggage. Another 25% 
come with the cars and trucks on the uninspected car ferries, and the remaining 
5% on the uninspected private boats.  Approximately 95% of the goods and 
merchandise come to St. John on the uninspected car ferries with the remaining 
5% coming on the uninspected private boats. The end result is that 70% of the 
legitimate people must pass through a meaningless inspection process, while 
100% of the legitimate goods and merchandise and the remaining 30% of 
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legitimate people are uninspected. Given these numbers, spending government 
money on The Fence is useless because criminals and terrorists will utilize one 
of the unlimited numbers of uninspected or illegitimate entry points. 
 
c. The Reality of the Situation  
Passenger ferries are the island equivalent of a cross-town bus and 
holding them to the mandated level of security is purely cosmetic and a waste of 
resources. Every day, thousands of residents, day workers (many of them known 
illegal aliens), tourists, business owners, shop keepers, students of all ages, etc., 
come and go from the larger island of St. Thomas to St. John as if they were 
taking a city bus. It is a twenty- or forty-five-minute ride depending on which boat 
is taken. As a nation, we have not implemented security inspections on inter-city 
buses and subways. Also, the uninspected car ferries and private boats remain 
an issue. 
If the purpose of the inspections is to prevent a terrorist from 
commandeering or blowing up a passenger ferry or using the passenger ferry as 
a weapon against a cruise ship, then the authorities must conduct more thorough 
inspections. Although an improved inspection process could have some effect, it 
ignores the seaplane that flies in and out of Charlotte Amalie Harbor many times 
a day, in close proximity to the cruise ships, passenger ferries and WAPA, 
without any passenger screening whatsoever. It ignores car barges, which can 
and do carry combustibles and pass closely and regularly to cruise ships just off 
shore. If the purpose is to prevent terrorists from smuggling themselves and or 
weapons onto the island, then the cursory 70% of the passenger-only inspections 
are useless.  
Meaningful security is logical. However, anything approaching 
meaningful security on the level of inspecting baggage, parcels and identification, 
the requirements of MARSEC 1, is only possible on St. John if the car ferries are 
inspected too. If car ferries were included in inspections, then approximately 95% 
of people and goods departing St. John would be inspected. Inspections would 
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also have to occur at the Charlotte Amalie dock on St. Thomas and the Virgin 
Island National Park dock on St. Thomas, along with the already-fenced Red 
Hook St. Thomas dock to even approach the same statistic for arriving people on 
St. John. Anything or anyone else would enter or leave with the thousand or so 
boats coming and going to the thousand or so beaches, coves, bays, harbors, 
etc.  
Searching the car ferry is plainly not practical because it would add 
hours to a forty-five-minute trip and would stifle inter-island commerce. It would 
be the equivalent of inspecting cars and trucks traveling between any two 
stateside towns or cities. Because St. John is an island, everything is brought 
there from St. Thomas by a truck on the car ferry or a container on a truck on the 
car ferry. Businesses on St. John would be crippled by this sort of inspection. 
(The VI could, at least in theory, implement the same sort of preferred shipper 
pre-approved security lists utilized by the USCG.) 
 
d. Consequences  
If implemented, meaningful inspection of the passenger and car 
ferries would logically steer illegal activity to the remaining 5% of private boats 
discussed above, or to uncounted criminals and terrorists. The thousand or so 
beaches, coves, bays, harbors, etc., are already used by drug, gun and people 
smugglers with impunity. “[The Caribbean is a] fertile breeding ground for 
growing involvement in drug abuse and in drug trafficking. The Caribbean has 
become a principal transshipment area in the South America-North 
America/Europe drug trade.”177  At least we would be fairly certain the bad guys 
would enter via the uninspected route and we could find the weak link. Only a  
 
                                            
177 Norman Girvan, “Societies at risk? the Caribbean and global change,” Revised version of 
a paper presented at the Caribbean Regional Consultation on the Management of Social 
Transformations (MOST) Programme of UNESCO, Kingston, Jamaica, February 1997, 
http://www.unesco.org/most/girvan.htm#caribbean (accessed 02/19/06). Norman Girvan is a 
Professor of the Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of the West Indies, 
Mona, Jamaica (email ngirvan@uwimona.edu.jm). 
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drastically increased federal border protection presence combined with a 
drastically improved local police department can adequately address this 
vulnerability. Neither of these is happening. 
 
e. Alternatives  
The solution is much easier to describe than to implement. It 
requires a dramatically increased federal border patrol presence (highly mobile 
teams on each island with land, near-shore and far-shore marine and helicopter 
and surveillance capability) combined with timely intelligence and dramatically 
improved local law enforcement. It would include: 
THE NEW VIPD. Caring, involved and highly-motivated officers 
who have an excellent rapport with all segments of the community. And it would 
involve: 
THE NEW VIPD TERRORISM FUSION CENTER. The Fusion 
Center would include intelligence officers who are proficient in the several 
languages representing the many groups who live in the Territory. These officers 
would work closely with all federal agencies and organized local groups, and 
would regularly relay information about real-time alien, potential terrorist, border 
and transportation security to the CBP Task Force Teams, who, with the willing 
and motivated assistance of the new VIPD, would intercept and arrest. In the 
alternative, the VI Government, Port Authority and VI Department of Homeland 
Security can recognize the fence as ‘unnecessary in light of the nature or 
operating conditions’ of the area and revise its security plan. 
 
f. Conclusion  
Given the futility of passenger ferry inspection alone, the 
impracticality of adding car ferry inspection and the complete lack of scrutiny of 
the remaining 5% of entrants it is wasteful and impractical to even conduct the 
passenger ferry inspections and to have The Fence. The VI Government should 
revise the security plan, remove The Fence and put the security guard money to 
better use. 
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NOTE: The information in this section about the Homeland Security fence was 
formally submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard and Virgin Islands authorities in 
October 2005. It received widespread media attention on St. John in November 
2005.178  When asked about the situation by a news reporter, “[the Director of the 
VI] Homeland Security office said he would not comment on the matter. He also 
said he refused to provide information to Alperen for his thesis.”179 Subsequently, 
the screening of passengers coming and going to St. John was increased by 
random baggage inspection.180 Screening was increased yet again a few weeks 
later. “The random security screenings for ferry passenger will become more 
noticeable in the new year…”181 
Rather than address the uselessness of the entire security plan, the 
authorities have simply increased the level of absurdity. The seaplane still flies in 
and out of Charlotte Amalie Harbor many times a day, in close proximity to the cruise 
ships, passenger ferries and WAPA, without any passenger screening whatsoever. 
                                            
178 Martin Alperen, “Poor Use of Homeland Security Money?” Special to St. John 
Tradewinds, November 14-20, 2005. 
Frank Barnako, “Attorney Scoffs at Ferry Fence,” News of St. John, November 29, 2005,        
http://barnako.typepad.com/news_of_st_john_usvi/2005/11/vi_attorney_sco.html#trackback, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
179 Lynda Lohr, “Alperen Says Ferry Dock Fence is Completely Ineffective,” St. John Source, 
December 1, 2005, http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131772569 
(accessed 12/10/05). 




Frank Barnako, “Ferry Companies to Screen Baggage,” News of St. John, December 14, 
2005, http://barnako.typepad.com/news_of_st_john_usvi/2005/12/ferry_companies.html (accessed 
12/14/05). The above link is no longer available. See Frank Barnako, “Bag Search on St. John 
Ferry,” News of St. John, December 15, 2005, 
http://barnako.typepad.com/news_of_st_john_usvi/2005/12/bag_search_on_s.html (accessed 
12/25/05). 
Jaime Elliot, “Ferry Companies Conducting Random Bag Searches,” St. John Tradewinds, 19 
December 2005, 
http://www.stjohntradewindsnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=131&Itemid=3
8 (accessed 12/25/05). 
181 Merlin JnBaptiste, “Ferries Will Do More Passenger Security Screenings,” Virgin Islands 
Daily News, December 24, 2005, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=11651489 (accessed 12/25/05).   
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Also, The Fence has been “upgraded.” The chain link and barbed 
wire have been replaced with a more attractive fence consisting of vertical metal 
tubes in the shape of an inverted letter “J.” The problem with this upgrade is that 
the “J” is backwards, with the open side facing the pier, as if the objective was to 
keep people from climbing from the pier onto the shore when in fact the opposite 
is true.182 It is still possible to simply climb out the large opening in the seating 
area and bypass The Fence by walking along the two-foot wide ledge. 
 
2. Other Coast Guard Planning 
The Coast Guard’s Coastal Area Contingency Plan for Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the companion document U.S. Virgin Islands 
Sensitive Areas and Protection Strategies represent thorough and detailed 
environmental response plans. The Hurricane Plan is a similarly detailed and 
thorough plan for hurricanes.183 
 
P. UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND (NORTHCOM) 
Because it is their official role, any military food and subsistence support 
will most likely be coordinated through the Defense Logistics Agency,184 in 
particular the Defense Supply Center Pennsylvania (DSCP), “which supplies 
subsistence items including food and clothing….DSCP also supports U.S. 
humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.”185 However, their August 14, 2005, 
response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request indicated no records 
regarding the following request: 
 
                                            
182 As of 27 February 2006 the wrong direction J Poles have been corrected but I am unable 
to determine when this was done. 
183 These documents are available at http://www.uscg.mil/sectorsanjuan/root/planning.html, 
accessed 3/16/06). 
184 Valerie Bailey Grass, “Department of Defense Food Procurement: Background and 
Status,” CRS Report for Congress, July 12, 2005, Order code RS22190, CRS 07 14 05 1.pdf, 2 
and footnote 2. The Defense Logistics Agency website is www.dla.mil, (accessed 3/16/06). 
185 Grass, “Department of Defense Food Procurement,” 2 and footnote 2. 
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Relating to natural disasters (hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, etc.) 
and for the U.S. Virgin Islands and or the Caribbean in general… 
information about risk assessments, contingency plans or any plans 
for responding to mass casualty and for delivering food, fuel, 
medicine, etc. to the population of the U.S. Virgin Islands.  
 
Q. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The Northcom request quoted immediately above was forwarded to the 
Defense Energy Support Center, which by letter dated September 8, 2005, 
responded that they too have no records responsive to the request. The request 
was forwarded again to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, on August 31, 2005. By letter 
dated December 23, 2005, they responded that there are no records. This makes 
no sense because such plans do in fact exist and have been reviewed in this 
paper. I have no explanation as to why DHS would deny the existence of these 
plans. 
 
R. PLANS THAT AGENCIES REFUSED TO PRODUCE 
The following plans exist but the agencies refused to produce them:  
• The Virgin Islands Police Department’s Hurricane Plan, Standard 
Operating Procedures 
• Virgin Islands Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures for 
Hurricane Deployment 
• Virgin Islands Port Authority Plans and Risk Assessments (refusal 
based on Homeland Security secrecy rules) 
• Tourism Department Airline Evacuation Contingency Plan 
• The Education Department refused to provide any information 
 
S. PLANS THAT CANNOT BE LOCATED  
The following plans are referenced in other documents but could not be 
located: 
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• [Food] Distribution Plan for the U.S. Virgin Islands186 
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE): Hurricane Evacuation 
Study for the USVI (1994)187  
• USACE Transportation Analysis Hurricane Evacuation Studies for 
St. Thomas (1997)188 
• USACE St. Croix (1992) (Dealing mainly with intra-island traffic 
movement issues.)189 
• VITEMA’s Evacuation Plan190 
 
T. FEDERAL CAPABILITIES AND SIMULTANEOUS DISASTERS  
Hurricane Katrina had potential consequences for the Virgin Islands if a 
major hurricane or other disaster had occurred at the same time. Any hope for a 
massive response, like that which occurred in Katrina, would not have been 
possible because most of the resources were being utilized for Katrina. It is clear 
from a review of the planning that the VI must have a major influx of resources 
from outside the Territory and those resources may not be available. 
Don't look to the federal government to send much help should the 
Virgin Islands get blasted with a hurricane, was the word from VI 
Territorial Emergency Management Agency officials … plans 
worked out with the federal agencies for this hurricane season are 
‘out the door’ given the magnitude of the unprecedented disaster 
caused by Hurricane Katrina. Red Cross representative Carol 
McGuinness said that her agency wasn't ‘looking at getting a lot of 
help from the states because of New Orleans.’ Additionally,  
                                            
186 DHS, FEMA Region II, email sent October 25, 2005 stated “On June 7, 2005, the 
Department of Property and Procurement prepared a [food] Distribution Plan for the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. No such plan could be located.”  
187 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 20, says USACE 
prepared a Hurricane Evacuation Study for the USVI (1994) focusing on the impacts of ocean 
surges, and Transportation Analysis Hurricane Evacuation Studies for St. Thomas (1997) and St. 
Croix (1992) dealing mainly with intra-island traffic movement issues but the USACE is unable to 
locate them per emails dated November 29, 2005 and December 5, 2005. 
188 Ibid.  
189 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 20, says USACE 
prepared a Hurricane Evacuation Study for the USVI (1994) focusing on the impacts of ocean 
surges, and Transportation Analysis Hurricane Evacuation Studies for St. Thomas (1997) and St. 
Croix (1992) dealing mainly with intra-island traffic movement issues but the USACE is unable to 
locate them per emails dated November 29, 2005 and December 5, 2005. 
190 DHS/FEMA Region II, email sent November 15, 2005. 
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[VITEMA Deputy Director Steve] Parris and others said St. John 
must stand on its own feet in the event a hurricane hits because of 
its location away from the St. Thomas hub.191  
                                            
191 Lynda Lohr, “Don't Look North for Help if Disaster Strikes VI,” St. John Source, 
September 2, 2005, http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1105687796 
(accessed 9/2/05). Sept. 1, 2005 –– Don't look to the federal government to send much help 
should the Virgin Islands get blasted with a hurricane, was the word from VI Territorial Emergency 
Management Agency officials as people from various St. John agencies met Thursday to fine 
tune the island's hurricane response plans. Steve Parris, VITEMA's deputy director on St. 
Thomas, said plans worked out with the federal agencies for this hurricane season are "out the 
door" given the magnitude of the unprecedented disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. Red 
Cross representative Carol McGuinness said that her agency wasn't "looking at getting a lot of 
help from the states because of New Orleans."  
     Additionally, Parris and others said St. John must stand on its own feet in the event a 
hurricane hits because of its location away from the St. Thomas hub. "When it comes to a 
disaster, it's like every place else is a thousand miles away," St. John's deputy director, Alvis 
Christian, said.  
     He said that St. John's residents and emergency responders always step up to the plate when 
a disaster strikes. Ira Wade, deputy Public Works director, said the island must be prepared to 
stand alone for at least four or five days until relief comes across Pillsbury Sound from St. 
Thomas.  
     Many St. John agencies face the same hurdle –– some, and in some cases, most of their staff 
lives on St. Thomas. This means it may be impossible for them to get to work.      Deputy Fire 
Chief Brian Chapman said 66 percent of his staff calls St. Thomas home.  
     However, agency representatives said they are all prepared to work together to keep the 
island afloat.  
     Agencies also face difficulty getting fuel for their vehicles because the only fuel supplier with a 
government contract, the Texaco Station, hasn't been paid. "Sergeant Hendricks put gas in the 
car and paid for it himself, "Police Officer Bridget Conow said. Wade said that Public Works faces 
the gas snafu every five or six weeks because the Property and Procurement Department 
submits the paperwork late. "Every five or six weeks we have to go through the misery of not 
knowing whether we'll have fuel, and I can't pick up garbage if I don't have fuel," he said.  
     Lt. Gov. Vargrave Richards, who attended the meeting, said he contacted the Finance 
Department to find out what's holding up the payment.  
     Christian said that VITEMA has pre-positioned supplies at Bordeaux, Fish Bay, Mandahl, and 
the East End so residents in those areas will get help should the roads be impassable when a 
storm hits.  
     "There will be too many people affected if something happens to Centerline Road," Christian 
said.  
     St. John has two main roads, Centerline Road and the North Shore Road. However, the North 
Shore Road intersects with Centerline Road near Coral Bay, leaving Centerline Road as the only 
main artery to the fast-growing eastern end of the island.  
     Wade said that access is available through Bordeaux Road, but the road remains unpaved for 
about a mile with some very bumpy sections.  
     The Red Cross has recently trained people to be shelter managers. Christian said that 
Emmaus Moravian Church, Bethany Moravian Church and the Methodist Church will serve as 
primary shelters. Should those structures experience damage, the John's Folly Learning Institute, 
the St. John School on Gifft Hill and the Clarice Thomas Annex of Julius E. Sprauve School will 
serve as back-up shelters.  
     Christian said that the Westin Resort and Villas is lined up to serve as an emergency medical 
center in case something happens to Myrah Keating Smith Community Health Center.  
     "And their large freezers could be used as morgues," he said of the Westin.  
     Starfish Market manager Lenyse Shomo said the store has stocked up on canned goods.  
     McGuinness said that St. John is sending one person at a time to volunteer at the Hurricane 
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The U.S. military stood up Joint Task Force Katrina on August 31, 2005, to 
provide support for FEMA and local authorities. NORTHCOM was already 
providing active duty personnel and military equipment, including helicopters and 
swift-water rescue teams. Disaster equipment was transported to the region by 
the Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group. A hospital ship, a Navy salvage 
vessel and many more military assets responded. 192  
When First Army was activated as Joint Task Force Katrina, with General 
Honore as the Commander, he immediately formed a joint staff of Army, Navy, 
Air Force and Marine Corps planners (including Joint Task Force - Civil 
Support) and operators to begin further developing the DOD support for 
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.  The first priority was to support life saving efforts 
for the victims of the storm who had essentially become refugees.  
Simultaneously, they moved forward with planning for life sustaining efforts.  
There were no large-scale disaster relief plans in place before Hurricane 
Katrina, yet First Army is very experienced at making plans.  
Since 9/11, on at least 20 occasions we've activated Defense 
Coordinating Officers/Elements (DCO/E) (teams of about 15 
people), along with other types of DOD support - primarily 
                                            
Katrina disaster. She said only one will be gone because they may be needed on St. John should 
a hurricane hit.  
     Parris said he attended the recent National Hurricane Conference held in New Orleans.  
     "New Orleans got caught with its pants down," he said, implying that St. John doesn't want to 
find itself in the same position. 
192 Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, “Military Providing Full-Scale Response to 
Hurricane Relief Effort,” August 31, 2005, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2005/20050831_2576.html (accessed 9/1/05). 
Also: Elizabeth Williamson and Ann Scott Tyson, “Storm Cleanup May Be Biggest in U.S. 
History,” Washington Post, August 31, 2005, 
http://www.chds.us/courses/file.php/11/moddata/forum/356/1623/Storm_Cleanup_May_Be_Biggest_i
n_U._S._History_Williamson.doc (accessed 9/1/05).    
Ann Scott Tyson, “Strain of Iraq War Means the Relief Burden Will Have to be Shared,” 
Washington Post, August 31, 2005, 
http://www.chds.us/courses/file.php/11/moddata/forum/356/1624/Strain_Of_Iraq_War_Means_Th
e_Relief_Burden_Will_Have_To_Be_Shared_tyson.doc (accessed 9/1/05). 
Eric Lipton and Eric Schmitt, “Navy Ships and Maritime Rescue Teams are Sent to Region,” 
New York Times, August 31, 2005, 
http://www.chds.us/courses/file.php/11/moddata/forum/356/1625/Navy_Ships_And_Maritime_Res
cue_Teams_Are_Sent_to_Region_lipton.doc (accessed 9/1/05). 
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transportation, engineer, and medical - in support of other federal, 
state, and local agencies/communities for both manmade and 
natural disasters, as well as National Special Security Events.  
We've also activated Joint Regional Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer (EPLO) Teams (12-14 person teams) along with the 
other federal Emergency Support Functions (ESF) at the FEMA 
Regional Readiness Coordination Centers (RRCC), and Joint State 
EPLO Teams (6-8 personnel) at the state emergency operation 
centers or National Guard joint force headquarters.193 
All of this magnificent support would not be available to the VI in the event 
of more than one Incident of National Significance at the same time. This further 




                                            
193 Donald Reed, student at CHDS, 0403, and director of a senior staff in the 
DOD Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities planning for the twenty-seven 
states and three territories that comprise FEMA Regions I-V (essentially all of the contiguous 
United States east of the Mississippi River, plus Minnesota, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 


























Mismanagement in its broadest sense includes poor judgment, ‘one size 
fits all’ based solutions, wasteful and unnecessary spending or spending just 
because you can, and of course corruption, cronyism, nepotism and simple 
incompetence. Mismanagement affects policy decision-making and policy 
implementation, fiscal matters and operations. 
The VI is not alone with this problem. Mismanagement occurs 
everywhere. Most of the examples listed below are from the USVI simply 
because I am not privy to those from other places. I have tried to find verifiable 
examples from other jurisdictions but that is challenging because information is 
not readily available. Some of my classmates have provided me with suggestions 
from other places.194 
 
A. EXAMPLES OF MISMANAGEMENT 
The Cruz Bay Dock fence is an excellent example of poor management 
and wasted money. Although described in the section for the U.S. Coast Guard, 
the VI Port Authority had and has ultimate responsibility for the fence because, 
as explained earlier, a fence is not mandated. 
 
B. FURNITURE FOR NON-EXISTENT BUILDING 
It is not just planning and preparedness that can be mismanaged. I was 
informed that limited Homeland Security funding will be used for equipment and 
furnishings for a building the VI does not have the money to construct.  At a 
meeting about designing and building an Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC)195 the plan was announced to use FEMA money currently available to 
purchase furniture and equipment for an EOC, even though there is no EOC and 
                                            
194 It is only fair to note that the Territory has experienced extremely rapid growth and 
expansion in a very short time. What used to be sleepy, slow-paced islands has in less than a 
generation been thrust into the internet age and the war on terror. 
195 An EOC is a physically sound structure from which disaster response is coordinated. 
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no money to build one. The idea of contacting FEMA and telling them it would be 
a better use of limited financial resources to use this money to build the much-
needed EOC rather than purchase furniture and equipment for a non-existent 
building was rejected.196 
 
C. 2.7 MILLION WORTH OF LARGELY UNUSABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
EQUIPMENT 
VITEMA now has nine new state-of-the-art $300,000 mobile 
communications vehicles. The total value is almost 3 million dollars.  They are so 
complicated that they are of limited use, and for St. John, there are only two 
people qualified, partially trained and authorized to use them.  Those two are not 
VI Government employees but are rather volunteer members of ARES and St. 
John Rescue. The vehicles are allocated four for St. Thomas, four for St. Croix 
and one for St. John. They were purchased with federal money. They can serve 
as an important command and control function and provide radio interoperability.  
However, a major problem is in getting individual vehicle systems up and 
running.  They arrived from the vendor(s) late 2005 in a mostly un-useable 
condition and have not been fixed satisfactorily so that they could be put into 
service, if needed.  Even after over a year of being handed over to St. John, that 
vehicle still has original vendor repair issues that never seem to get done. 
This complex equipment includes different kinds of radios operating on 
different bands (frequencies) including the amateur bands, the business 
(commercial)  band, a satellite phone,  a satellite dish for digital satellite 
communications, a  LAN and a WLAN for local networking, with the ability to 
send video images, charts and graphs to and from nearby laptops.  All of this is 
integrated with a sizable computer and server. 
The FEMA communications vehicle contains a phenomenal cross-band, 
mostly software-driven repeater system which permits interoperability between 
                                            
196 I heard this and I am the one who suggested FEMA be contacted about using the money 
for the building instead of the furniture. I do not know if this furniture has actually been purchased. 
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and among almost any type of radio from CB to satellite service.  A large portion 
of training involves learning how to use it, particularly with integrating radio 
frequencies that are not already programmed into the computer system. 
Therefore, a technically sophisticated and trained person is needed to 
operate it.  One problem seems to be with non-trained users trying to self-teach 
and instead putting the computer/server system out of service. Since repair and 
maintenance of these valuable assets are being mostly ignored/postponed, the 
systems are not kept operational from day to day so that persons cannot even be 
trained on them let alone use the vehicles during an incident. 
Also, until recently, every emergency service agency in the St. Thomas 
and St. John District of the US Virgin Islands used VHF radios. There was thus 
no interoperability problem that could not be remedied by simply programming 
every agency’s VHF frequency into every existing VHF radio, or to program in 
one mutual aid VHF channel into every radio. 
It was recommended at the communication vehicle training that the 
vehicle be operated and all of its components be used at least once a week, and 
that the person doing the communicating have high-level Incident Command 
System training. The only ones trained on this vehicle for St. John are the two 
volunteers. They do not have ICS training. At least one Law Enforcement Ranger 
for the Virgin Islands National Park on St. John has the necessary ICS training 
but not the radio communication training or experience. In addition, the two 
volunteers are just that, volunteers for ARES and Rescue and cannot be 
expected to operate the vehicle weekly, test everything and maintain it. 
Lastly, to put the purchase of the communications trucks into better 
perspective, not only can we not use them, we have too many.  “[T]he Los 
Angeles Police Department and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department are currently 
contracting … to purchase two [of these communications vehicles]…. They plan  
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on purchasing three to five additional units….”197 If Los Angeles thus purchases 
all of the units contemplated that would bring their total to seven. The Virgin 
Islands has nine! 
 
D. ST. JOHN’S EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS VEHICLE 
There was no secure place to park St. John’s emergency communications 
vehicle on St. John and VITEMA chose to keep it in an abandoned and 
completely isolated unsecured building. This was an unlocked garage in a 
dilapidated structure that could not even be seen from the road. Police reported 
vandalism of Public Works vehicles at their locked and not isolated repair facility, 
next door. I personally complained to FEMA about this and the vehicle was 
eventually removed from the abandoned building. 
Except for the two trained volunteers, there is no one on St. John qualified 
to operate this vehicle. In fact, reports are that there are fewer well trained 
persons in all of the VI than there are vehicles and I believe there is not a single 
person on any of the US Virgin Islands who is a paid member of a public service 
agency with the knowledge, experience and training to operate the remaining 
eight vehicles.  Volunteers cannot be expected to help maintain the vehicle or 
equipment since their time is their own.  An infrastructure with a maintenance 
schedule for "exercising" the communications/computer equipment must be 
established if any of these vehicles is ever to be used when needed.  
If and when the St. John vehicle can be brought up to operational status, 
the two volunteers are willing to train other operators.  The priority list should first 
be VITEMA personnel, then Rescue, National Park, Fire Service and Police.  St. 
John needs at least 4 trained persons in each emergency service to cover issues 
of illness, vacation time, training time, etc.  Right now there are none trained for 
any service.  
                                            
197 Allen et al., “Port Security: Applied Policy Project,” 59. 
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On December 15, 2004, St John Rescue and ARES (the only ones trained 
to operate the vehicle) were told they were not permitted to be trained on or 
allowed to use any of FEMA/VITEMA communications vehicles. This decree has 
subsequently been rescinded so the two volunteers are now permitted to use and 
train others how to use the communication vehicles.  It was demoralizing to those 
affected who wanted to learn and be useful in on- and off-Island communications 
during time of need.  In addition, over a year's training time has been lost. 
 
E. THE 800 MHZ RADIO FIASCO 
The Department of Health/EMS just switched over to an 800 Mhz digital 
trunking system which effectively isolates them from every other emergency 
service.  For at least the next several ye ars, there are no plans for other 
emergency services to switch to the digital trunking system.  Even though EMS 
retains the ability to "drop down" to their old analog VHF frequency and talk to 
other agencies, in practice, this is not happening so that valuable support 
services such as St. John Rescue are not getting alerted.  The Island 
communications network thus now has a major hole in it. 
Published information about an 800 system says to get the same 
geographical coverage as with a conventional VHF repeater system, you have to 
have more complex towers.  These create additional expense, additional service 
requirements, more complexity of equipment, etc. 
Presumably, the DOH is trying to respond to DHS directives to install a 
secure digital system that no one else can listen to.  They have done it and now 
the EMS ambulance on St. John will not have, among other things, the support of 
St. John Rescue members on scene, no one to ride in the ambulance to help 
with CPR, etc.198 This is because no agency can monitor the frequency and 
Rescue has to call 911 when they hear a siren to find out what is going on (and 
                                            
198 The ambulance on St. John is frequently staffed by 2 female EMTs (or Paramedics). 
Their medical qualifications are superb yet in the past, they have benefited from the additional 
lifting capacity provided by St. John Rescue. The same is true even when the EMTs happen to be 
male. 
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911 often does not know and often will not tell them if they do know).  When EMS 
travels without using its siren, Rescue knows nothing. 
On February 19, 2006, there was an incident where EMS was on scene 
before anyone knew there was an incident.  The Police knew nothing.  Rescue 
followed the lights and got there to help.  DOH with the only 800 MHz system in 
use and their refusal to use their existing analog radios to notify others for help is 
a very poor way to serve the community. Rescue has provided lifesaving 
assistance on hundreds of occasions but is now being hampered more than ever 
because they cannot monitor the DOH radio. 
The individual who promoted this plan for the DOH again has been 
"released." In terms of radio capabilities, the DOH is now back to about what they 
had before Hurricane Marilyn in 1995 when that failing 800 MHz system was 
mercifully damaged and ARES took over handling DOH’s hospital-to-clinic 
communications on VHF. ARES can fill in again, but why it is that failed history is 
being repeated?   
 
F. OTHER EXAMPLES 
 
1. VITEMA Reimbursement 
A slightly different kind of mismanagement involved reimbursement for 
personal expenses.  VITEMA owned an amateur radio band repeater that was 
sometimes operated by the volunteer ham radio operators. When it needed 
repair, VITEMA asked the volunteers to see to that and promised reimbursement. 
Repairs cost $300 and for more than three years, the money was not repaid.  
 
2. New Hampshire ATV  
New Hampshire Governor Craig Benson complained about an All-Terrain 
Vehicle purchased with Homeland Security money by an urban city in his state. 
Presumably, a car or SUV would have served the law enforcement purpose just 
as well or even better, but that would not have been paid for with federal funds. 
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He courageously said his state will not accept any more homeland security 
money unless the funds are needed. Benson is not so much looking a gift horse 
in the mouth as telling the giver to deliver it to someone who needs it more. “If 
every governor in the country [and the Territory] did the same, imagine how 
much lower our taxes could be…Money flowing to New Hampshire from the 
Department of Homeland Security has not been put to the best use…I am not 
going to waste any more homeland security money…”199  
 
3. Federal Level 
There is no Customs and Border Patrol presence to seek out illegal aliens 
in the U.S. Virgin Islands yet there is a serious and well-documented problem. 
The VI is a wide open back door to the U.S. mainland. 
 
G. CONSEQUENCES OF MISMANAGEMENT 
The FEMA Grant money for furniture for the non-existent building and the 
useless communication equipment are barren victories. “[N]othing is more 
common in war than strategically barren victory—meaning military achievements 
that, however impressive in their own terms, nevertheless fail to alter the political 
context in which they occur.”200 That is precisely what has happened here. The 
VI has state-of-the-art communications equipment and no one to operate it.   
 
                                            
199“Funding security; Benson's honorable frugality.” New Hampshire Sunday News 
(Manchester, NH), July 18, 2004, 
http://www.theunionleader.com/search.html?row=181&DateFrom=&DateTo=&Category=&Author=&
Headline=&Body=%22homeland%20security%22. 
See Daniel Barrick, “New Hampshire Governor Craig Benson said his state had “wasted 
much of its federal homeland security money.” Concord Monitor Online, July 15, 2004. 
http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040715/REPOSITORY/407150338&S
earchID=73193440029332, (accessed 9/18/05). 
See Norma Love, Union Leader, The/New Hampshire Sunday News (Manchester, NH), July 
16, 2004, “Anti-terror spending gets a look,” Associated Press, 
http://www.theunionleader.com/search.html?row=181&DateFrom=&DateTo=&Category=&Author=&
Headline=&Body=%22homeland%20security%22, (accessed 9/18/05). 
200 Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military History, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  
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They are no better off than if they never had it in the first place. They spent 
money and are not any safer. The same is already or soon will be true of the 
furniture. 
Mismanagement has both symbolic and concrete importance in Homeland 
Security. To both common citizens and Homeland Security practitioners alike, 
mismanagement is dispiriting, discouraging, depressing and disheartening. It 
leads to a sense of hopelessness and it inhibits and restrains progress. When 
citizens perceive mismanagement, they feel less secure. Mismanagement 
causes people to withdraw from participation. It is simply uninspiring and the 
community suffers from the lack of involvement. Because Homeland Security has 
a finite budget, fiscal mismanagement diverts limited resources from more 
necessary or useful places. 
For example, the consequence of there not being any Border Patrol in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands (a federal issue) is not just that illegal aliens come here with 
impunity, but also that other critical resources are pulled away to meet the Border 
Patrol need. For example, when the east end of the St. John community became 
particularly concerned after a dramatic increase in the number of illegal alien 
arrivals and armed robberies, because there is no Border Patrol, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Inspectors went from St. Thomas to St. John to take 
reports of where the aliens have been coming ashore. This, however, is not ICE’s 
normal job. The ICE Investigators were pulled away from their regular duties to 
do what the Border Patrol should do. Two functions were thus poorly served. The 
regular ICE investigations were not attended to and the ICE agents, arriving days 
after the aliens came ashore, did not apprehend any illegal aliens or their 
smugglers. 
Equally as important as the Fence’s ineffectiveness is that it and the 
potato-chip-confiscating201 security guards alienate people. Citizens see the 
                                            
201 This happened to me. The security guard prohibited me from bringing a bag of potato chips 
on to the ferry from St. Thomas to St. John. A week later, a different security guard prohibited me 
from bringing a plastic bottle of water. 
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ineffective fence and believe their tax dollars are being wasted.202 They lose 
confidence. Whether the mere perception of security is a valid measure of 
success as opposed to actual security is an open question, but this fence does 
not even provide the mere perception of security. 
The result of non-payment of the $300.00 to the amateur radio operator 
was that he refused to undertake another task requested by the agency. They 
asked for his help and he said no.203 
The consequence of DOH/EMS switching to an extremely complex 
trunking system that no other agency can listen to is severely diminished 
capacity for medical first response. People will either have more serious injuries 
than they would otherwise have if more help was available, or they will die. 
 
H. HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERS 
The St. John Security Fence, furniture for a non-existent building,  
communications equipment that no one can use, and switching EMS to an 800 
MHz radio system all represent wasted money or resources that would be better 
spent in another way. This mismanagement violates the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security Principles that “require responsibility and accountability…” 
mandate that we “allocate resources judiciously” and attempt to “constrain 
government spending.”204 
Why does the DOH/EMS have to have secret communication in the first 
place when the police do not? Even police in major metropolitan cities do not 
have secure communications. If security is needed, they use a land line 
telephone. 
                                            
202 Bob Pfriender, “Ferry Luggage Screening Is an Inconvenience,” Open Forum [letter to the 
editor] St. John Source, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=Commentary:Open+Forum&p=1131772938 
(accesed 12/25/05). 
203 Conversation with this person November 27, 2004. 
204 National Strategy for Homeland Security, “Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets,” Principles 1, 3, and 8 (see pp 3-4). Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
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Why does mismanagement happen?  One reason is lack of effective 
oversight.  It cannot be simply lack of knowledge because most if not all of the 
examples here are unambiguous and one does not have to be an expert in any 
particular field to see the errors. Common sense tells us this. Another 
explanation is lack of courageous leaders. VITEMA could have simply not taken 
the communications vehicles or at least taken only three, one for each island 
rather than nine. The same reasoning applies to the furniture for the non-existent 
building. A courageous leader should have told FEMA that we don’t care that 
communications vehicles and furniture are on the menu this year. We need an 
EOC. 
Courageous leadership might have drawn on the ‘dual-use principle’ 
discussed in the Homeland Security literature and this paper. It is common 
knowledge that all of the emergency services in the U.S. Virgin Islands suffer 
poor radio communications with antiquated equipment and many radio dead 
zones. Using the money from the communications vehicles and 800 MHz system 
and spending it to improve police, fire and EMS radio communications would 
have the dual use of helping emergency response every single day and also for 
natural disasters and terrorism. What good is a $300,000 radio interoperability 
vehicle when the basic infrastructure is fragile and won’t operate? There will be 
nothing to interoperate! 
A courageous leader would have told DHS that having the Department of 
Health and EMS as the only public safety agency on a secure radio would 
undermine public safety.  
In addition to lack of courage, another explanation for mismanagement is 
failure to see the larger picture and lack of familiarity with the jurisdiction. The St. 
John fence and furniture for the non-existent building provide good examples. 
Even a meager understanding of life on St. John would indicate the fence is 
useless because it is so easily circumvented. An understanding of the sense of 
community on St. John and knowledge that many wealthy and philanthropic 
individuals have homes here suggests that furniture for the as yet unbuilt EOC 
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was not a concern because it would have been easily donated. St. John Rescue 
and ARES felt confident enough in this concept that it was incorporated in St. 
John Rescue and ARES’s design of the EOC. We need money for the building. 
The furniture will happen on its own. 
Another example of not knowing the community comes from the local 
Office of Domestic Preparedness. ODP funds training but will not make training 
available to the local rescue squads. Do the individuals who make the decision 
not to train the rescue squads know that on all of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the 
volunteer rescue squads are the primary first responders? St. Croix Rescue is so 
well qualified that the DOD contracts with them to teach emergency services to 
other nations throughout the Caribbean. On St. John, whenever there is an 
island-wide drill, the scenario does not begin with “the police were notified of…” 
or “Fire was notified…” The scenarios always begin with “St. John Rescue is 
notified of….”  
 
I. LEADERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL 
Homeland Security leaders must know and understand their jurisdiction 
and community. They also need a broad and thorough understanding of 
Homeland Security facts, and principles so they can see both a specific 
jurisdictional problem (treetop view) and also see this same problem as part of a 
larger effort (30,000 foot view). One solution to mismanagement is to develop 
and choose wise and well-educated Homeland Security leaders. They must have 
both the breadth and depth of understanding such as that provided by the Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), sponsors of this program. Another 
option is credentialed Homeland Security practitioners, an idea spawned by the 
Strategy Paper topic of a fellow classmate.205 
                                            
205 “My strategy memo proposes the development of a national Homeland Security 
accreditation or certification program. Its purpose is to establish an independent, peer-review 
process to assess national preparedness (including HSPD-8's National Preparedness Goal 
capabilities) to improve risk- and needs-based Homeland Security funding allocation and 
preparedness efforts.” Darren Chen, CHDS website, NS3180, 01/03/05.” 
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The leader must have common sense and the courage to implement 
policy in the manner most effective for his or her jurisdiction without losing sight 
of that jurisdiction’s place in the national strategy.  
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IV. HOW TO FOSTER CHANGE 
As leaders we are each faced with making changes in our behavior 
to be more effective at influencing others, leading teams and 
implementing change in our organization.206 
The classic hero myth begins with the kingdom in trouble. Crops 
are not growing. Babies are not being born. Sickness, alienation, 
and despair are rampant. Life is vanishing from the land. Some 
people claim that it is the fault of a sinful and despotic king. Others 
blame a dragon that roams the countryside destroying everything in 
its path. The elders meet to decide what to do, but their ideas have 
been heard before and no longer have any power. Hope is 
disappearing from the kingdom. Into this slough of despondency 
comes the hero, the man or woman who takes on the task of 
bringing new life to a dying land.207 
 
A. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO 
From the Homeland Security perspective, doing nothing is a recipe for 
disaster, both locally and for the nation. The VI is an unprotected backdoor for 
terrorists to enter the United States and is thus a major weakness in our nation’s 
border security. On the local level, the VI Government lacks the resources, 
motivation, interest and political will to prevent illegal entry. The federal agencies 
in the VI are perhaps overextended, but plainly do not respond to real-time 
reports of groups of illegal aliens (as large as thirty) that have been seen coming 
ashore.  
From the perspective of natural disasters, the Territory’s infrastructure and 
the other issues addressed in this thesis will only exacerbate whatever problems 
arise. Instead of no injuries or deaths, there will be more injuries or they will be 
more severe and there will be more deaths. Because of the concept of dual use, 
                                            
206 John Cronkite, Dirigo Consulting Group, “The Change Ability Challenge: What 
Differentiates Successful Leaders Today?” Introduction to January 2005 Issue, 
http://www.dirigoconsulting.com, (accessed 3/16/06). 
207 Christopher Bellavita, “The Public Administrator as Hero,” Administration and Society 23, 
no. 2 (August 1991), 155. 
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most of the solutions will help whether the disaster is natural or man-made. 
There is no excuse for maintaining the status quo.  
 
B. PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE 
SUCCESSFULLY CREATED POSITIVE CHANGE 
 
1. University of the Virgin Islands Professor Establishes 
Geographic Information System  
A significant public safety problem is that many streets in the VI have no 
names, and if they do have names, they are unlikely to have signs. Just finding 
the exact location of an emergency is a challenge. This should be a government 
concern, but it receives absolutely no attention.  
Related to this, police and the ambulance EMTs from St. Thomas who are 
often assigned to St. John do not know where they are going. They do not know 
the island because it is not mandatory that they learn their way and the initiative 
to do so on their own often does not exist. (St. John Rescue has had to lead the 
way on several occasions.) St. John has hundreds of thousands of visitors a 
year. It is a disgrace that the streets are not named, the houses not numbered, 
and many of the government’s paid responders do not know how to find the 
location of emergencies. It is widely believed that the pizza delivery folks and 
private mail services (UPS, FedEx) can do a better job. 
A University of the Virgin Islands professor, using what is called 
geographic information system (GIS) technology has initiated a program to 
identify every structure on St. John so that rescuers can find someone in an 
emergency. This GIS System will be similar to Enhanced 911 systems, except it 
will be sponsored by a private agency. Mapping has begun without any outside 
funding. St. John Rescue is assisting. 
 
2. Designing Emergency Operations System  
Rescue and the ARC are leading their largest joint effort to date - to 
design and construct a building on St. John to house VITEMA’s Emergency 
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Operations Center (EOC). They obtained consensus between VITEMA, the 
Federal Department of Homeland Security, the Red Cross, Rescue, ARES and 
the Virgin Islands Department of Property and Procurement regarding the plan. 
All of these groups and agencies are now working together toward this common 
goal. 
 
3. Private Citizen Creates East End Neighborhood Watch: A St. 
John Case Study 
Private citizen, homeowner and carpenter Clancy Richardson208 has 
become the leading Homeland Security organizer, detective and community 
voice on the East End of St. John, if not for the entire island. The information in 
this section is from numerous interviews with Mr. Richardson and the quotations 
are his.  He has defined how community input can help with Homeland Security 
through his involvement with the East End Neighborhood Watch (EENW). Clancy 
moved to the then-desolate, sleepy East End two decades ago.  Back then, he 
says, there were no illegal aliens. There was no crime. There were only four 
burglaries on the East End between 1989 and 2004. In the past year, there has 
been a dramatic increase in violent crime, including armed robberies and home 
invasions. “There are many reasons why this happens,” Clancy says.  
Historically, this has been a hospitable area for smugglers and sea 
traders. The extraordinary building boom on St. John drives the 
need for cheap labor and there is thus an increase in people 
smuggling and illegal alien workers. Along with this development, 
come criminals. We are concerned that dangerous terrorists may 
come ashore along with the economically driven illegal aliens. All 
this is helped by the (at best) lackadaisical attitude by people who 
call themselves law enforcement professionals. The police are 
completely unresponsive. They simply do not show up when called.  
For example, last November (2004), my neighborhood watch 
correctly determined that someone had broken into and was living 
in a guest house that had been closed for the season. The suspect 
was inside. St. John Rescue responded and after more than an 
hour waiting for the police, assisted the neighborhood watch in 
                                            
208 This is a pseudonym. 
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making a citizen’s arrest. The police showed up two and one half 
hours later to collect the already cuffed suspect.  
In April 2005 a similar situation happened again but the EENW did not go 
inside to make an arrest. Instead, “We waited two and one half hours for the 
police before giving up. They did not show up and we left.” 
Clancy says that Federal law enforcement is equally poor in dealing with 
the illegal immigrant issue, but for very different reasons. “We have extremely 
porous borders, with no Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to 
apprehend the illegals. ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] which has a 
different role from CBP here is under-funded, under-staffed and under-equipped.” 
Clancy recounts that  
last year, after a large group of illegal aliens were spotted running 
up from the beach, a concerned citizen gave me a still wet wallet 
and bank book from the Dominican Republic. What a treasure trove 
of information, I thought. ICE was, no pun intended, cool to the 
prospect of examining the wallet and bank book and would not be 
able to come from St. Thomas to St. John to collect it.  So, I gave it 
to a friend who took it to St. Thomas and a few days later, they 
picked it up. Although I did not receive any feedback about the 
results of the bank book investigation, I did receive a very important 
thank you.  
The largest problem is the lack of law enforcement on St. John. The VIPD 
is unresponsive to a myriad of issues, not just illegal aliens. The EENW efforts to 
involve federal law enforcement have had some good results but they are very 
short staffed. After repeatedly calling and complaining, ICE agents came over 
from St. Thomas a few times. Clancy took them on a tour of the area and showed 
them the drop-off points and smuggling routes.  
This led to a federal law enforcement operation that included the Coast 
Guard. With ongoing information from the EENW, five large smuggling boats 
were intercepted. Smuggling, at least on the East End, stopped for a while but 
has since resumed. 
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Aside from that one-time operation, the EENW has not been able to get a 
full-time CBP presence in the Virgin Islands and smuggling has resumed. 
Recently, however, a new National Park Service Enforcement Ranger has taken 
an interest in the subject. Clancy has again provided a tour of the drop-off points 
and smuggling routes. 
The obstacle is inadequate law enforcement at both the federal and local 
level. Some apprehensions are made and at least on St. John, those are done by 
the local VIPD, but it is sporadic and only a small percentage is caught. Clancy is 
powerless to directly effect change in this area, yet he continues to register 
complaints and voice his concerns. Recent, unrelated events may change this 
situation. 
The federal intervention that netted five smuggling boats was an obvious 
success and demonstrated that local information from the EENW, combined with 
adequately supported law enforcement, can produce results. In addition, a recent 
alleged hate crime has resulted in an increased police presence on St. John in 
general and the East End in particular.  
Clancy is quick to point out that he is “just” one member of the EENW and 
that without all the others, little would be accomplished. The only reason there is 
an EENW, however, is because organizers developed allies with other area 
residents. Their successes have also been noted in other parts of the island. 
There are now plans to implement the use of air-horn blasts to signal trouble, 
phone trees, watchful eyes and neighborhood back-up. For example, for the 
citizen’s arrest of the burglar in 2004, there were two other men from the 
neighborhood and two more from Rescue who came to assist. Clancy solicits 
help from his contacts within both the Territorial and federal government for 




Clancy has expanded operations under the guise of a new hobby. The 
aliens leave discarded personal items and clothing at the landing points--Clancy 
now collects these. On August 14, 2005, he found a passport from Guyana. He 
says he  
Googled the name and it came back as Indonesian meaning ‘He 
who gazes at the sea.’ The NPS Ranger I gave it to subsequently 
told me that the passport was fraudulent. So who is coming to St. 
John using a fraudulent Guyana passport? Could this be Al Qaeda? 
There is still no one interested or able to follow-up on the immediate 
“aliens in progress” calls, or to investigate the origins of these illegal aliens. This 
may change with the new National Park Ranger interested in this and with the 
increased VIPD presence. Only time will tell. Clancy, however, is fast becoming 
an expert on illegal immigration on St. John.  
 
C. FIRST STEPS TOWARD A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY: A 
TERRORISM AND NATURAL DISASTERS PLANNING GROUP 
In a time of drastic change, it is the learners who inherit the future. 
The learned find themselves equipped to live in a world that no 
longer exists.209 
Truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; she is the proper and 
sufficient antagonist to error; and has nothing to fear from the 
conflict unless disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and 
debate.210 
The best collective decisions are the product of disagreement and 
contest, not consensus or compromise. 211 
The growth of knowledge depends entirely on disagreement.212 
                                            
 209 Eric Hoffer, quoted by Warren Bennis in On Becoming a Leader (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1989). Originally, Eric Hoffer (1902–1983), U.S. philosopher. Reflections on the Human 
Condition, aph. 32 (1932, repr. 1973). This passage was used as the epigraph in A.E. Hotchner, 
Papa Hemingway (1955). 
210 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in the State of 
Virginia (1786). http://www.geocities.com/Athens/7842/rfindex.htm, (accessed 3/16/06) also 
http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts/lynch/religious-freedom.html, (accessed 3/16/06). 
211 Surowiecki, Wisdom of Crowds, XIX.   
212 Believed to be attributed to Karl Popper (1902–1944). 
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This thesis illustrates that much of the planning for the Virgin Islands is 
incomplete, inaccurate and wrongly optimistic. Some of the plans do make 
excellent points, yet there is much to be done. Many of the plans assume an 
infrastructure or access to resources and capabilities that do not exist. 
The Virgin Islands should establish a Terrorism and Natural Disasters 
Planning Group composed of subject matter experts and intellectual capital from 
many disciplines throughout the Territory.  
 
1. Planning Group Goals 
The goal of the Planning Group is to thoroughly investigate the VI’s 
vulnerabilities and to recommend policy options to “prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from incidents of national significance,” including natural 
disasters, the consequences of either local or mainland terrorism or a WAPA 
shutdown. 
Its goal will be to correct the factual mistakes included in the existing 
plans, and provide the Governor and other elected officials and leaders the facts, 
insights and options needed for them to better prepare for the challenges they 
must address. 
 
2. Planning Group Charge 
The 9/11 Commission Report criticized the U.S. Government for a “failure 
of imagination” in anticipating the 9/11 attacks. Protecting the Territory’s 
vulnerabilities is thus limited only by our collective will and imagination in 
identifying them.  
The Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group will be charged as 
follows. 
Explore all possible permutations to the problems/vulnerabilities and 
solutions to those problems. After a plenary session, the Planning Group will 
break into functional units (for example, Energy or Agriculture) and search for, 
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propose, examine and vigorously challenge all possible risks and vulnerabilities 
that could arise following a port shutdown, WAPA shutdown, hurricane, 
earthquake, terrorism, etc. These functional units will prioritize the risks and 
vulnerabilities and propose, examine and vigorously challenge all possible 
solutions. Are the solutions practical? Can we do it? Is there another way? 
Finally, each functional unit will prepare a report describing its efforts, listing the 
problems and proposing solutions. 
When completed, the end product of the Planning Group will be well-
thought-out recommendations to the Governor, Senate, VI Department of 
Homeland Security and other leaders.213 
An important question to ask is why a Planning Group will do a better job 
than the agencies responsible for running the VI Government and those initially 
responsible for designing the flawed plans. If numerous government agencies 
(Virgin Islands Police Department, Fire Department, Port Authority and Tourism 
Department) refused to provide me with information for a U.S. Government 
Department of Homeland Security-sponsored Thesis, what reason do we have to 
believe a Planning Group will do a better job at obtaining this information? To 
some extent there is no reason to believe things will change, unless there is a 
change in leadership. Small mindedness, pettiness, turf battles, personal 
resentments and jealousies exist everywhere and hinder Homeland Security in 
many places, although not to the degree encountered in the Virgin Islands. 
One answer lies in the design and formation of the Planning Group.   
 
3. Planning Group Participants 
Participants in the Planning Group should include subject matter experts 
from the Department of Agriculture; VI Farmers Cooperative, University of the 
                                            
213 In one sense, what is needed for the VI is reminiscent of the business concept of 
reengineering and “one way to ensure that reengineering has a cross-functional perspective is to 
assemble a team that represents the functional units involved in the process being 
reengineered…” Michael Hammer, “Reengineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate,” Harvard 
Business Review (July–August 1990), 108.  
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Virgin Islands (UVI) Agricultural Station, UVI economists, business professors, 
engineers, physicists, ecologists, political scientists and historians; the VI 
Government’s Economic Recovery Task Force; Hovensa Oil; WAPA; Licensing 
and Consumer Affairs (because of its familiarity with the petroleum distribution 
system); VITEMA; Virgin Islands Energy Office; VI Port Authority; Seaplane 
operators; VI Government executive, legislative and judicial branches; 
Department of Health; VIPD; VIFD; U.S. and VI Department of Homeland 
Security; FBI; WICO; United States Coast Guard; volunteer Rescue Squads; 
Amateur Radio Emergency Services; American Red Cross; National Park 
Service and the Department of the Interior; private business sector; cruise ship 
industry; interested residents; representatives from all the U.S. islands and the 
media. Also, because they are experienced and have prepared excellent and 
well-thought-out plans already, the Virgin Islands Housing Authority and 
Department of Property and Procurement should also be invited.  
The Planning Group will be unprecedented in many ways. It will have a 
broad range of experts instead of just political appointees. It will be open and 
participatory while the VI Government has historically operated in secrecy and 
recycles its “leaders.” A person with no vision in one job will be unlikely to have 
vision in a new one. They also tend to be risk averse and unwilling to speak out, 
make waves, or challenge the status quo. The media will be present to inform the 
public about what transpires and historians will be invited to document the event. 
Such openness and participation has never happened before in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. 
One example of the subject matter expertise would be the Department of 
Energy. A representative from this department along with scientists and 
economists will be the best equipped to answer questions about decreasing 
reliance on imported oil from an increasingly unfriendly country,  that is used to 
produce electricity in a vulnerable single location generating facility, with 
vulnerable single-location fuel storage and a featherweight distribution system. 
WAPA should be invited, but they are part of the problem because they have 
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presided over this dilemma. It is against their interest to explore solar and wind 
energy for the sake of emergency preparedness and Homeland Security, 
although they have reluctantly made some progress in the sole interest of saving 
money. 
Another example involves how to increase local food production. The 
existing powers have not made any effort to increase local agriculture. We do not 
have enough food stores for major disasters and the Department of Education 
food storage facility is in one warehouse. That is another vulnerability. Experts 
from the Department of Agriculture, the VI Farmers Cooperative and the 
University of the Virgin Islands Agricultural Station would be the proper folk to 
review and make recommendations in this area. 
 
4. Planning Group Questions 
In addition to questions Planning Group members develop on their own, 
they will examine the following questions to assist in developing sound policy 
recommendations.  
1. How much food, fuel, water and other resources do we 
consume and thus need to stockpile and import? What is our 
“ecological footprint?”214 
2. How long a reserve do we have from the usual, normal-
course-of-business stockpiles, i.e., how much food is in the 
food store warehouse and how much fuel is in the WAPA 
fuel storage tanks? Should the VI Government stockpile food 
and supplies?  
3.  What happens if there is hoarding or price gouging?  
4.  Is a military airlift feasible? Will the U.S. Navy participate? 
Who will coordinate such an air or sea lift? 
5.  How will air or sea-lifted food and medicine be distributed 
when there is no fuel? How will we get uncontaminated 
drinking water without fuel for desalinization?  
                                            
214 Barry Ray, Ph.D. (Professor, University of the Virgin Islands), conversations with the 
author in November and December 2004, January 14 and March 30, 2005. 
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6.  Can we increase local food production?  
7.  Can we increase local energy production from such things 
as solar and wind power? Should the VI pursue and support 
joining the Caribbean Electric Power Network?215 
8.  Can we reduce electric power vulnerability by what is called 
a “distributed network,” i.e., decentralized energy 
production?  
9.  As a short term solution to fuel shortages, can Hovensa Oil 
products from St. Croix be shipped directly to St. Thomas 
and St. John, rather than through Puerto Rico middlemen?  
10.  Since the military is a major user of Hovensa-produced 
refined petroleum products, if there is another attack, will the 
U.S. military then take a larger percentage of that product to 
keep its forces operating?  
11.  Is the supply of crude oil to Hovensa from Venezuela secure, 
politically and otherwise? What alternatives have been 
examined? 
12.  Can we diversify the economy away from tourism, for 
example, along the lines of the technology park envisioned 
for St. Croix?  
13.  How will we harden and build redundancy into WAPA?  
14.  What resources, if any, will the resorts, as community 
members, be willing to provide? Food, lodging, refrigeration 
for food, refrigeration for morgues? Are there agreements in 
place for these? 
15.  Legal considerations: In the event of terrorism, who has 
Emergency Powers? What are they? What are the 
requirements before they can be implemented? What is their 
scope? What are their limitations? For example, who has 
authority to open or close local ports, the VI Port Authority, 
U.S. Coast Guard, police, fire, VI Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Health? Who has authority to order 
quarantine and who would enforce it? 
                                            
215 Ananta Panchan, “WAPA Considers 'Plugging In' to Florida Power Supply,” St. Thomas 
Source, December 16, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131773123 (accessed 
12/17/05).   
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This question takes on special significance in the VI because if a sick 
person with a contagious, terrorist-related illness walks into the only hospital on 
St. Thomas, or the only hospital on St. Croix or the only clinic on St. John, that 
entire facility may be contaminated. Where then do the rest of the citizens go? 
Who can mandate that a local hotel accept overflow hospital patients? Who will 
pay for that? 
Because we cannot protect everything, the VI must prioritize its 
vulnerabilities. The most efficient and accurate way to do this is a mathematical 
approach called “Scale Free Network Theory.”216 This theory emphasizes 
applying Critical Node/Critical Link analysis to Critical Infrastructure Protection. It 
will help to prioritize the most critical links and nodes, i.e., where money is best 
spent. It will work for WAPA’s distribution system once it is mapped and for 
highways and roads now because they are already mapped. It will also work for 
shipping and transportation and the Territory’s communications networks.  Next, 
Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) should be used. 
MBVA is a process that zeroes in on vulnerabilities of critical nodes 
[and links] for the purpose of quantitatively evaluating the 
vulnerability of a sector. MBVA combines network analysis with 
fault analysis tools used by reliability engineers to analyze faults in 
complex systems… [Following this would be] risk assessment and 
resource allocation. Taken together, these tools provide a complete 
process for identification of sector weaknesses, estimating 
vulnerabilities, computing risk, and then allocating funds to improve 
the security of the sector’s critical nodes.217 
                                            
216 Ted Lewis, Ph.D, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a 
Network Nation” (textbook manuscript, 2004), 2, citing Albert-Laslow Barabasi’s “Linked: How 
Everything Is Connected To Everything Else and What it Means for Business, Science, and 
Everyday Life” (New York, New York: PLUME, 2003). 
217 Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security,” Chapter 5:2. 
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5. Additional Benefits of a Planning Group 
 
a. Hurricanes, Earthquakes, Tsunamis and Multi-Use 
Some people fear that a hurricane, earthquake or tsunami218 is 
more likely than terrorism. Hurricane Hugo devastated St. Croix in 1989 and 
Hurricane Marilyn did the same to St. Thomas in 1995. Approximately 80 percent 
of all homes were damaged or destroyed by these hurricanes. Economically, 
9/11 negatively affected all of the islands. There have been other natural 
disasters. Groundwater contamination lead to a Super Fund cleanup of the Tutu 
region of St. Thomas and in 2001 there was a “massive sulfuric acid spill at St. 
Croix Alumina” on St. Croix.219 
The USVI has experienced a series of hurricanes: Hugo (1989), 
Marilyn (1995), Bertha (1996), Georges (1998), and Lenny (1999), 
after nearly half a century of little activity…The USVI is also 
susceptible to earthquakes, tsunamis and other seismic hazards. It 
is located near the North American and Caribbean tectonic plates, 
and is classified as Zone 4 in terms of quake hazard (similar to 
California).220  
Due to the historical record of earthquakes in the region, it is 
considered reasonable to expect that tsunamis would be generated 
as well and the historic record bears this out…221 
It is impossible to know if a port attack is more likely than another 
kind of attack, and it is similarly impossible to predict that a hurricane, earthquake 
or tsunami strike is more likely than terrorism. Thus, the concept of “multi-use” is 
                                            
218 According to Roy Watlington, Ph.D., a tsunami with the strength of the one that struck the 
VI in 1867 would destroy all infrastructure lower than 21 feet above sea level up to ¼ mile inland, 
http://faculty.uvi.edu/users/rwatlin, (accessed 3/16/06).   
Also: Mauri Elbel, “Much More Damage Likely Today than in 1867 Tsunami,” St. John 
Tradewinds, April 4-10, 2005. 
219 “St. Croix Alumina Acid Spill Contained,” St. Croix Source, November 20, 2001, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stcroixvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=45197 (accessed 02/24/06). 
220 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 2. 
Also, the U.S. Virgin Islands is actually considered as earthquake-prone as many areas of 
California,” United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, April 2005, 4-10.  
221 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 4-14. 
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valuable in evaluating how to allocate limited resources. VI ports could be closed 
by a nationwide port shutdown, a VI port shutdown or a hurricane, earthquake or 
tsunami. “An earthquake generating a tsunami can impact vulnerable facilities, 
particularly the VIPA port facilities, St. John’s single lifeline to St. Thomas.”222 
“Sunken vessels can block STT Harbor. Primary emphasis must be 
given to clearing the harbor, both for bringing in disaster relief supplies and 
restoration of the cruise industry.”223 Under each scenario, the result is the same, 
thus planning for a port shutdown will help in the case of terrorism or a natural 
disaster. WAPA could be damaged by terrorism or a natural disaster. Again, the 
end result is the same, so planning to develop alternatives, decentralize 
production and build redundancy will help no matter what the cause.  
Because all of the Planning Group’s planning will address 
calamities regardless of cause, it is truly multi-use planning.  
It is also expected that the Planning Group’s conclusions will apply 
to other island states, U.S. territories and freely associated states in the 
Pacific.224  
 
6. EXPECTED CONCLUSIONS 
 
a. Expected Planning Group Findings 
Preliminary investigation suggests the following Planning Group 
findings. These are just ideas to initiate discussion. After the facts are identified 
the Planning Group will endeavor to find solutions. 
                                            
222 United States Virgin Islands Territorial Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2-16. 
223 FEMA Disaster Management Guide, U.S. Virgin Islands, 2004 Edition, 7. 
224 “The Pacific territories, possessions, and freely associated states that are included in the 
U.S. homeland are: Guam, American Samoa, and Jarvis Island; the Commonwealth of Northern 
Mariana Islands; the Freely Associated States under the compacts of Free Association, which 
include the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the 
Republic of Palau; and the following U.S. possessions: Wake Island, Midway Islands, Johnston 
Island, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, Jarvis Island and Kingman Reef.” Strategy 
for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Department of Defense, June 2005, fn. #2, 8. 
127 
A military airlift and sealift will work and should be coordinated by a 
VI government agency, perhaps the VI Department of Homeland Security or 
VITEMA. The food and commodities should be distributed to the normal food and 
pharmacy wholesalers for distribution to the normal food and pharmacy retailers. 
This will disperse the product and prevent chaos, but might be problematic 
because there will be no fuel to transport citizens to markets to shop. 
Since less than 3% of the land is cultivated yet almost 12% of the 
land is suitable for agriculture, there is the potential for increased local 
agricultural production. However, this increased production is unlikely to occur in 
sufficient capacity to feed the local population. It will at any rate require 
government funding and support.225 The concept of Victory Gardens could be 
explored. There are no statistics about the potential for increasing local fishing, 
and Fish and Wildlife regulations may have to be changed to allow for fishing in 
traditionally closed or off limits fishing areas during an emergency.  
Although we can increase local energy production from such things 
as solar and wind power, and we can reduce electric power vulnerability by 
decentralized energy production, both of these will require significant investment 
in infrastructure.226 
Hovensa Oil products from St. Croix can be shipped directly to St. 
Thomas and St. John rather than through Puerto Rico middlemen, yet it is likely 
that supplies will be limited because the military is a major user of Hovensa-
produced refined petroleum products and will take a larger percentage. Further, 
given political uncertainties, Hovensa’s supply of crude oil is not guaranteed 
because Venezuela has become openly hostile toward the United States and has 
started to sell large amounts of its crude to other countries, for example China.  
                                            
225 Lynda Lohr, “Serious Money' Needed for Sustainable Agriculture,” St. Thomas Source, 
Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.onepaper.com/stthomasvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1139375431 
(accessed 2/23/06). 
226 WAPA finally received bids for alternative energy production such as waste to oil, wind 
power, etc. Dan Buchanan, “WAPA to Choose Between Wind, Waste, Coal or Oil,” St. John 
Source, November 30, 2005, 
http://www.onepaper.com/stjohnvi/?v=d&i=&s=News:Local&p=1131772490 (accessed 11/30/05). 
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The public sector must be an active participant in these initiatives 
because many of them will flourish only if there are tax incentives to provide the 
necessary impetus. 
 
b. Expected Planning Group Structure 
Love of country, community and humanity are the motivating 
factors for the Planning Group. Membership will be voluntary and it is anticipated 
that for members who have other jobs, the Planning Group will become an 
acknowledged part of that person’s official job responsibility. In this sense, the 
Planning Group will be funded by the members’ employers. 
The Planning Group will need a secretary, basic office supplies and 
access to computers, phone, fax, copier, etc. At least two people will be needed 
to organize and run the Planning Group. One person will assume the duties of 
Director; the other will serve as Assistant Director. The Director will be 
responsible for all coordination and organization. There will be two Facilitators 
who could be the same Director and Assistant Director. Their task would be to 
assist the Planning Group members as needed.  Funding will be required for 
conference room space and meals. 
The Planning Group will not have subpoena, arrest or emergency 
powers. Whether it will follow the confidentiality provisions adopted by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security227 will have to be determined. Whenever 
possible, it is the goal of the Planning Group to conduct all business in public and 
all meetings are open to the public. There will be an initial “meeting of the whole” 
and then meetings of the whole only as needed.  
The Planning Group will break into Subcommittees, with each 
Subcommittee representing substantive areas of expertise. The Subcommittees 
will focus on their respective tasks, yet take advantage of other areas of 
knowledge as needed.  
                                            
227 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=92&content=3756 (accessed 3/31/05). 
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For example, the VI Energy Office will probably be assigned the 
question of whether it is wise to diversify and decentralize energy production, and 
if so, how to do that. These questions will require the expertise of other Planning 
Group members, such as WAPA, physicists, ecologists and economists. The 
Planning Group will complete its business within nine months to one year and will 
issue a final report three months later. The report will be a compilation and 
synthesis of the individual Subcommittee reports. After issuing a final report, the 
Planning Group will be disbanded.  
Business will be conducted in a large conference room, possibly at 
a hotel. The Planning Group has no power to enforce adoption of any initiatives 
or to ensure compliance. The Director will coordinate with the State Department 
for communication and coordination with other countries, including the British 
Virgin Islands. 
 
7. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
The following questions need to be resolved:  
• Who will design and staff the Planning Group?228  
• The list of participants is large. Is it too large? Can some of the 
participants with similar perspectives be combined? 
• Will Planning Group members from the private sector be 
compensated? If so, who will fund them? 
• What are the Planning Group funding requirements? Prepare a 
budget. 
• Where will the Planning Group conduct its business? Will there be 
a permanent office? 
• How often will the Planning Group meet? 
• Who or what agency will be ultimately responsible for the Planning 
Group and conducting meetings? 
• Who will monitor compliance with any of the adopted initiatives? 
                                            
228 Invaluable help and ideas for this section came from John Bowman, Rescue Chief and 
Immediate Past Vice President, St. John Rescue, and Master Sergeant, United States Air Force 
Security Police, Retired. 
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• What duties and responsibilities will Planning Group members have 
toward official VI agencies and with other agencies outside of the 
VI? 
• Who will coordinate with the State Department for communication 
and coordination with other countries?  
• Since many agencies would not assist me in this thesis, how do we 
avoid creating another level of non-cooperation?  
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V. ACTION PLAN: WHAT WE CAN DO NOW 
Several of these recommendations can be implemented with little or no 
cost to the VI Government.  
 
A. THE GOVERNOR’S UNIFYING VISION 
The task of initiating change rests with the Territory’s Chief Executive. The 
most important contribution to improving any and all aspects of life in the VI, law 
enforcement and Homeland Security, is for the Governor to develop a unifying 
vision. Not just a vision of economic recovery, but also of social recovery aimed 
at uniting the community and a New VIPD.  
All levels of government and all levels of government employees will have 
a role in implementing this vision. The police, however, are paramount. The New 
VIPD will endeavor to foster not just appreciation of the individual cultures, but 
also a sense of belonging to a larger group. This will not happen by itself or in a 
vacuum. The Governor must appoint new police leadership and the Legislature 
must provide necessary funding to successfully create the New VIPD. 
The Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group and the critical 
changes needed will not happen on their own. It will require vigorous promotion 
by persistent and determined individuals because it challenges the status quo.  
The problems that exist in 2006 were not all created during the current 
Governor’s two terms. Many of the problems predate him but they still exist, and 
that is a problem. If it remains clear that the Virgin Islands cannot reform itself, 
and this is a major unanswered question because such reform would alienate 
some people in power, then the Homeland Security imperative may cause the 
federal government to take over more local functions. A successful model for this 
federal supervision exists in the District of Columbia. 
There are, however, many leaders in industry, the private sector and 
government who understand the complexities of the problems presented. These 
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people recognize that there are brilliant, dedicated and caring men and women 
living and working in the Territory who would love to contribute. Thus, these 
leaders must be enlisted as sponsors. At the same time, the many talented, 
motivated and caring citizens who share these same understandings must be 
involved in the process. 
Who could lead this endeavor? The Champion must be the Chief 
Executive, the Governor. It will require vision and top-down leadership. The task 
must be embraced with open arms and an open mind.  Drawing from the Public 
Administrator as Hero, quoted above, the Governor will have the incredible 
opportunity to foster meaningful change on an unprecedented level — “to bring 
new life to a dying land.” 
 
B. IMPROVE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT - THE NEW VIPD 
Local law enforcement needs immediate overhaul. Absent the Synaptic 
Disconnect, the VIPD could be an effective law enforcement agency and the 
premier intelligence fusion agency in the Caribbean. It is important that the Virgin 
Islands welcome information from every level down through fire and police and 
local citizenry. Every citizen must be confident that information they relay to a 
local police officer, firefighter, teacher, WAPA employee, Public Works employee, 
etc., will be forwarded up the chain: from that person to that agency’s Intelligence 
Coordinator or Homeland Security Representative, then up to the New VIPD 
Homeland Security or Intelligence Division and the VI Department of Homeland 
Security and finally to the national level. Everybody has a role to play. The New 
VIPD will be networked with other agencies. There will be seamless information 
sharing and cooperation up and down the chains of command and from agency 
to agency. 
The atmosphere in which this can occur requires new leadership in the 
VIPD with the power and will to fire low-performing officers and command staff 
who will not progress, a Governor-inspired unifying vision, and funding. A major 
federal intervention is needed to inspire the local government to pay more 
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attention to border issues, to provide the VIPD with modern police training and to 
promote the major change, which is community policing.  
Although they are currently not capable, the ideal Homeland Security 
strategy for the VI would have the New VIPD at the center of information 
collection. Caring, involved and highly motivated Community Oriented Policing 
officers, who have an excellent rapport with all segments of the community, 
gladly refer all citizen information to the New VIPD Intelligence Division and 
Terrorism Fusion Center, where a team of analysts turn the raw data 
(information) into intelligence. In the New VIPD, intelligence travels in all 
directions to those who need it. They do not ask who needs to know, but who 
else needs to know.  
The New VIPD Fusion Center has its own multi-lingual intelligence 
officers, who represent the many groups who live in the Territory. The Fusion 
Center thus incorporates human intelligence sources, as well as open sources 
and citizen input. Because of the VIPD’s successful interaction and involvement 
with the community, the local ham radio operators even provide signals 
intelligence. 
The Fusion Center works closely with all the federal agencies, other 
Caribbean islands and organized private sector groups, including the volunteer 
Rescue Squads. It regularly relays information about real-time alien, potential 
terrorist, border and transportation security to the CBP Task Force Teams, who, 
with the willing and highly motivated assistance of the New VIPD, intercept and 
arrest.  
Because “there is a lack of structured and formal oversight of VIPD 
officers by command staff”229 for both Homeland Security and regular old law 
enforcement, the New VIPD must represent a major reorganization, leadership 
and attitude change.  
                                            
229 Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, Special Litigation Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, “Letter Re: United States Department of Justice Investigation of the Virgin Islands Police 
Department,” October 5, 2005, 22, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/index.html (accessed 12/2/05). 
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At all layers, police must be in a ‘hunter’ not a ‘fisherman’ mindset: 
They must actively seek out, observe, and track their ‘prey.’ They 
must not stand idly by or simply wait passively until something 
happens to attract their attention or until someone does something 
demonstrably threatening. The senior commanders overseeing and 
orchestrating the [officers’] deployment must closely supervise and 
control the environment, making adjustments and changes as 
necessary.230 
 
C. INCREASE FEDERAL BORDER PATROL PRESENCE 
Establishing a Border Patrol presence in the VI is an absolute imperative. 
Such a presence should utilize highly mobile teams on each island, with land, 
near-shore and far-shore marine and helicopter capability available to quickly 
track and intercept both the smugglers and the smuggled.  
At the same time, the VI Government needs federal resources to increase 
the awareness of and response to border protection issues.  
 
D. ENACT THE TERRORISM AND NATURAL DISASTERS PLANNING 
GROUP 
The existing plans must be corrected so the Governor and other elected 
officials and leaders have the facts, insights and options needed for them to 
better prepare for the challenges they must address. Homeland Security 
encompasses all aspects of society and it will take participation from all aspects 
of society to learn, grow and make the VI safer.  
 
E. PROPERLY FUND THE VOLUNTEER RESCUE SQUADS 
St. Thomas Rescue, St. Croix Rescue, St. John Rescue and Water Island 
Search and Rescue (Rescue Squads) collectively save the Government of the 
Virgin Islands millions of dollars per year because they do what is traditionally a 
Government function. The Rescue Squads are completely volunteer – 100 
percent of all funding goes toward operations, equipment, training, supplies, etc. 
                                            
230 Hoffman et al., “Preparing for Suicide Terrorism,” 25.  
135 
Collectively throughout the Territory and individually on each island, there are 
more trained medical first responders in the Rescue Squads than there are in the 
police and fire departments. There are also more licensed EMTs on the Rescue 
Squads than are on the Government payroll. These men and women are on call 
any time of the day or night and in any weather. They do nothing but help people. 
Yet the Rescue Squads are severely under-funded. They have bake 
sales, raffles and various fundraisers to raise money. They seek private 
donations and do receive some funding from the VI Government although it is 
inconsistent, and never to the proper level. Frequently members spend their 
personal money for supplies.  
Each Rescue Squad has submitted budgets. Immediately, the 
Government should fund these requests in full for equipment, supplies and 
training and thereby increase the Territory’s life-saving capabilities. 
 
F. PROPERLY FUND THE VOLUNTEER ARES 
The same need for funding as for the Rescue Squads is true of the 
amateur radio operators. Keeping in mind that after Hurricane Marilyn, they were 
the only group with operational radio communications and they provided life-
saving communications to the VI Government and its citizens. They have been 
using their own equipment forever. ARES has designed and given to VITEMA 
detailed plans for needed communications. This should be funded. 
It has been a long time since ARES was the key player in Hurricane 
Marilyn so it is appropriate to remind our decision makers that ARES was very 
active in Florida and Alabama this past hurricane season. Any of those storms 
could have struck the VI. This footnote contains a statement from the ARRL, 
American Radio Relay League recognizing their contribution.231 
                                            
231: ARRL Web site <memberlist@www.arrl.org> wrote: 
 Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2006 03:34:22 -0500 
 Subject: ARES E-Letter for February 15, 2006 
 From: "ARRL Web site" <memberlist@www.arrl.org>  
 The ARES E-Letter 
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G. PROPERLY FUND A GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM. 
                                            
February 15, 2006 
=================    
  
Rick Palm, K1CE, Editor 
 
+ The View from Flagler County 
  
Orlando, Florida, February 11, 2006 - In the past, the Orlando Hamcation was a national-scale 
event; not quite Dayton, but big. It still is, judging by Saturday's crowd. The ARES Forum was 
"Standing  
Room Only." A notable guest was John Fleming, WD4FFX, of the Florida Division of Emergency 
Management staff. Without his support, it is likely there would be little or no Amateur Radio 
involvement with the state's EOC and its operations. 
  
It was Fleming, along with Northern Florida Section Manager Rudy Hubbard, WA4PUP, and 
former SEC George Thurston, W4MLE (SK), that set the stage for the modern relationship with 
the state. Before Hurricane Andrew in 1992, relations could be summed up by the state's "Don't 
call us, we'll call you" policy. But after Andrew, the Governor and FEMA patently needed new 
planning.  Thurston called Hubbard about a meeting to be held at Tallahassee.  FEMA reps, the 
Governor's staff, and several amateurs attended, including Thurston, Hubbard, and John Hills, 
KC4N, current State Government Liaison. 
  
The Governor replaced the staff at the state EOC with professionals from South Carolina, 
veterans who had managed the Hurricane Hugo disaster there in 1989. Hubbard gave the new 
staffers a copy of the Northern Florida ARES Plan. They asked if ARES could provide the 
communication service depicted in the plan. They were assured ARES could, and the next 
meeting with ARES and the SEOC reflected a new relationship between the two entities, one that 
has worked exceptionally well since the mid-1990's. Fleming has been the point man. 
 
Fleming lauded amateurs involved in last year's incredible hurricane season, passed out State 
Certificates of Recognition, a special achievement award for Hubbard, and emphasized the 
importance of the role of Amateur Radio and ARES at the state EOC. He noted the state's 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program had resulted in the large Brevard County Amateur Radio 
Emergency Service van parked on display outside the building. Fleming emphasized training and 
preparation for the upcoming hurricane season, and informed the group of two conferences: the 
Governor's Hurricane Conference in Ft.  Lauderdale in May, and the National Hurricane 
Conference in Orlando in April.  Amateur Radio  essions will be held at each event. 
 
DEC KO4TT--Steve Richbourg's, professional presentation of the Northern Florida ARES Plan 
was well received.  Hubbard discussed the state's "tracker" system for matching emergency 
communication needs with assets, and emphasized that his ARES organization embraces all 
modes as tools for communication, including "two coffee cans and string, if necessary." The 
Northern Florida SEC Joe Bushel, W2DWR, emotionally expressed his appreciation for hurricane 
efforts. I said that the excellent response of the field organization was matched by  ARRL HQ 
staff members who took unprecedented steps to support its  field's efforts. Alabama Section 
Manager Greg Sarratt, W4OZK, spoke of his appreciation for the ARES effort as well. 
  
"Orlando" was an opportunity to put faces to call signs, and I was especially pleased to meet 
Greg, Hillsborough County RACES Officer and EC Gary Sessums, KC5QCN, who was another 
key player in the Katrina response, and Harold Kramer, WJ1B, the League's Chief Operating 
Officer (a former Emergency Coordinator).  Harold is a great guy and supporter of the ARES 
program. This ARES E-Letter was his idea originally.  
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This system, described above, works and it will save lives. It is relatively 
inexpensive. Almost the entire Coral Bay region of St. John has been mapped 
and all with volunteer effort. The current planning is for St. John Rescue to 
purchase small laptop computers to be mounted inside of its rescue vehicles. 
They will then be able to find a location by occupant or owner name, phone 
number, house name, etc.  
The next step would be for these laptops to be added to the police cars, 
ambulances and fire trucks. 
 
H. IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS  
Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) are written procedures to follow in the 
case of a specific emergency. They are basic planning documents but do not 
exist in the VI public sector. Attached at Appendix D are several EAPs designed 
by St. John Rescue. They are included here as a starting point only. They should 
be evaluated and improved.  Making them better will cost nothing. Then they 
should be given to the Police Department’s Central Dispatch so proper resources 
can be brought to the emergency. For example, if there is an earthquake, Central 
Dispatch would look to the EAP for Earthquakes and have a list of whom to 
contact and what resources should be deployed.  
 
I. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING 
WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR IMMEDIATE OFF-ISLAND 
ASSISTANCE 
Because the VI’s first responders may be injured and unable to respond 
and because there is no help available from the next town, city or state, planning 
should begin immediately to automatically bring in outside rescue personnel. 
Planning without these provisions is simply inadequate. Designing these is 




J. EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF MEMORANDUMS OF 
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS FOR 
IMMEDIATE OFF-ISLAND ASSISTANCE 
Several of the British Virgin Islands are closer to St. Thomas and St. John 
than St. Croix, and VISAR (Virgin Island Search and Rescue, British based 
ocean rescue) is exemplary. The VI Government should immediately begin 
negotiation with the British Virgin Islands and with the help of the VI Department 
of Justice and perhaps the State Department, draft Mutual Aid agreements. 
Again, this is essentially cost- free. 
To some extent, this type of cooperation has already begun. On February 
24, 2006, it was reported that the FBI is scheduled to provide the British Virgin 
Islands with a weeklong training in Weapons of Mass Destruction.232 
 
K. NEGOTIATE MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING WITH THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Planning for disasters must involve the private sector. For example, as 
demonstrated above, there is not enough VI Government-controlled food for a 
major disaster. Therefore, the VI Government must negotiate agreements with 
the food and beverage wholesalers to make their inventories available in an 
emergency.  
At the same time, because of the potential for looting, discussed above, 
the police or the Virgin Islands National Guard must be in place to preserve order 
at all of these locations. This needs to be negotiated beforehand too.  
These agreements do not guarantee there will be enough supplies and 
off-island help will still be needed. For example, if the disaster were to happen 
during hurricane season, which is typically the slowest tourist season, these 
suppliers will not have the same amount of supplies in their warehouses that they 
have during peak tourist season.  
                                            
232 Angela Burns-Piper, “BVI officials to receive FBI training in weapons of mass destruction,” 
Virgin Islands Daily News, Feb. 24, 2006, 
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/index.pl/article_home?id=13634829 (accessed 2/25/06). 
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Another example is the Mental Health Crisis Intervention planning 
discussed above and also in Appendix E. Because there is insufficient staff in the 
Division of Mental Health to meet our needs, the Government must contract with 
private sector psychiatrists, psychologists and counselors before the crisis hits. 
All of these can be accomplished at little or no cost. 
 
L. THE VI DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CAN ANSWER THE LEGAL 
QUESTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE 
These include, who has Emergency Powers? What are they? What are 
the requirements before they can be implemented? What is their scope? What 
are their limitations? Who has authority to open or close local ports? Who has 
authority to order quarantine and who would enforce it? There is no need to wait 
for a catastrophe. An after-the-fact, crisis-driven response can and should be 
avoided. We should endeavor to answer these questions in a way that does not 
trample the cherished principles of liberal democracy. This too is essentially cost 
free. 
 
M. CONCLUSION: WHAT WOULD PREPAREDNESS LOOK LIKE IN THE 
VIRGIN ISLANDS? 
Our government leaders and the population must first recognize the 
problem. In Al Qaeda, Islamic extremists and others, we are facing cunning and 
ruthless enemies. We must recognize America is at risk, seaports are risk and 
the VI is at risk from them. 
We have other enemies too. Change and true preparedness can not take 
place until the social issues have also been addressed.  
Poverty, unemployment and inequality undermine the kind of social 
cohesion needed to manage change effectively and this is 
especially so where the lines of exclusion coincide with deep rooted 
ethnic and social divisions. They occur in the context of the intense 
exposure of the region's population, especially the youth, to affluent 
metropolitan life styles through the presence of a large tourist 
population and to a relentless diet of the cult of individualist 
consumerism, sex and violence, through satellite TV and other new 
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technologies. This may undermine disciplined attitudes to study and 
work and contribute to the legitimization of antisocial behaviour.233 
We must eliminate government unresponsiveness, mismanagement, 
corruption, nepotism and cronyism, and the social issues including racism, 
economic disparity, poor education, lack of job skills, limited employment 
opportunities, poor police relations and the absence of a sense of community. 
These are vital to growth, prosperity, Homeland Security and survival. 
The federal government and the Department of Homeland Security must 
also dramatically increase the federal law enforcement presence, including 
Customs and Border Protection. Because community participation is essential to 
effective law enforcement and effective Homeland Security, the federal 
government should  
immediately take steps to support the development of Community Oriented 
Policing in the VI, and to grow the New VIPD. The Governor must develop a 
unifying vision. Not just a vision of economic recovery, but also of social 
recovery, an integrated community and a New VIPD.  
The Virgin Islands must accept that it cannot reach the same level of 
preparedness as the mainland United States because we are isolated and 
cannot take advantage of Regionalization. Because of this, the Virgin Islands 
need a greater share of Homeland Security Funding so it can achieve more of 
the TCL capabilities. That money must be well spent and is meaningless unless 
there are adequate physical and personnel resources to operate or utilize those 
resources. Further, we must face the sober fact that our first responders may at 
the least be overwhelmed and perhaps not even able to respond. This means 
planning for the Virgin Islands, and perhaps all island states, must include off-
                                            
233 Girvan, “Societies at risk?” 
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island resources. We must find a way for “…federal assets to quickly supplement 
or, if necessary, supplant first responders.” 234 
A Terrorism and Natural Disasters Planning Group will help in this process 
by bringing together the Territory’s untapped talent. The end product of the 
Planning Group will be well thought out recommendations based on accurate 
information, to the Governor, Senate, VI Department of Homeland Security, 
VITEMA and other leaders. 
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: I invite anyone with comments or suggestions to 
contact me at malperen@chds-alumni.org. Thank you. 
                                            
234 “A Failure of  Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,“ U.S. House of Representatives, February 15, 
2006, 1, 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15feb20061230/www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainr
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APPENDIX A   NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS 
National Planning Scenarios  
The Federal interagency community has developed fifteen all-
hazards planning scenarios (the National Planning Scenarios or 
Scenarios) for use in national, Federal, State, and local Homeland 
Security preparedness activities. The Scenarios are planning tools 
and are representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and 
natural disasters and the related impacts that face our nation.235 * * 
* “[T]he scenarios developed generally reflect possible terrorist 
capabilities and known tradecraft... * * * As there is a possibility that 
multiple incidents will occur simultaneously or sequentially, 
organizations should always consider the need to respond to 
multiple incidents of the same type and multiple incidents of 
different types, at either the same or other geographic locations, in 
preparedness planning efforts. These incidents will invariably 
require the coordination and cooperation of Homeland Security 
response organizations across multiple regional, State, and local 
jurisdictions.236 
The National Planning Scenarios ask:  
1. What should we prepare for as a Nation? … [and] illustrate the 
scope [sic] magnitude, and complexity of major events that we 
should prepare for as a Nation. 
 2. What Tasks need to be performed, under what conditions, and 
to what standards? The Universal Task List (UTL) provides a 
comprehensive menu of tasks that can be performed in major 
events outlined in the scenarios. Federal, State, local, and tribal 
entities, with private sector support as appropriate, select the tasks 
that apply to them. 
3. Which tasks are critical? Critical tasks derived from the UTL, with 
associated conditions and performance standards, provide the 
foundation for developing measurable readiness targets.  
4. What capabilities are needed to perform the critical tasks? The 
Target Capabilities List (TCL) identifies the capabilities to perform 
the critical tasks. A capability provides a means to achieve a 
                                            
235 National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, April 2005, ii. 
236 Ibid., iv. 
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measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more 
critical task(s), under specified conditions and performance 
standards.237 
The National Planning Scenarios list ten broad Mission Areas.238 
Prevention/Deterrence – The ability to detect, prevent, preempt, 
and deter terrorist attacks and other man-made emergencies.  
Infrastructure Protection – The ability to protect critical 
infrastructure from all threats and hazards. 
Preparedness – The ability to plan, organize, equip, train, and 
exercise Homeland Security personnel to perform their assigned 
missions to nationally accepted standards – this mission area 
includes public education and awareness. 
Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis – The ability to achieve and 
maintain a common operating picture, including the ability to detect 
an incident, determine its impact, determine its likely evolution and 
course, classify the incident, and make government notifications. 
Emergency Management/Response – The ability to direct, control, 
and coordinate a response; manage resources; and provide 
emergency public information – this outcome includes direction and 
control through the Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency 
Coordination Systems, and Public Information Systems. 
Hazard Mitigation – The ability to control, collect, and contain a 
hazard, lesson its effects, and conduct environmental monitoring – 
mitigation efforts may be implemented before, during, or after an 
incident. 
Evacuation/Shelter – The ability to provide initial warnings to the 
population at large and at risk; notify people to shelter-in-place or 
evacuate; provide evacuation and shelter support; and manage 
traffic flow and ingress and egress to and from the affected area. 
Victim Care – The ability to treat victims at the scene; transport 
patients; treat patients at a medical treatment facility; track patients;  
 
                                            
237 Capabilities Based Planning Overview 12-17, DHS/SLGCP/OPIA/Policy and Planning 
Branch, 5, https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=11767 (accessed 
11/25/05). 
238 National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, April 2005, v. 
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handle, track, and secure human remains; provide tracking and 
security of patients’ possessions and evidence; and manage the 
worried well. 
Investigation/Apprehension – The ability to investigate the cause 
and source of the incident and identify, apprehend, and prosecute 
those responsible for terrorist attacks and other manmade 
emergencies. 
Recovery/Remediation – The ability to restore essential services, 
businesses, and commerce; cleanup the environment and render 
the affected area safe; compensate victims; provide long-term 
mental health and other services to victims and the public; and 
restore a sense of well-being in the community. 
The Planning Scenarios are239 
1. Nuclear Detonation – 10-kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device. 
2. Biological Attack – Aerosolized Anthrax. 
3. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza. 
4. Biological Attack – Plague. 
5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent. 
6. Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals. 
7. Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent. 
8. Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion. 
9. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake. 
10. Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane.  
11. Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Device. 
12. Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device. 
13. Biological Attack – Food Contamination. 
14. Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot & Mouth 
Disease). 
15. Cyber Attack. 
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APPENDIX B   UNIVERSAL TASK LIST, PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
SECURITY RESPONSE 
“The Universal Task List … has been reorganized … to provide a way of 
organizing the tasks required to achieve the four Homeland Security missions: 
Prevent, Protect against, Respond to, and Recover from acts of terrorism, 
natural disasters, and other emergencies.”240 
 
Public Safety and Security Response241 
CAPABILITY DESCRIPTION 
The capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or 
major event by securing the affected area in coordination with HAZMAT, 
fire/rescue, and law enforcement disciplines. 
OUTCOME 
Successfully secure the incident scene while protecting first responders 
and affected community from further harm. 
ESF/ANNEX 
ESF#13: Public Safety and Security 
UTL TAXONOMY LOCATION 
Respond, Minimize Impact, Manage Incident 
ASSOCIATED CRITICAL TASKS 
Identify and establish incident perimeter and zones 
Identify force protection requirements 
Establish force protection 
Conduct public safety and security response 




Yes/No  Public safety and security plans, policies, and 
procedures are in place 
Number  Of incident sites that can be secured 
Number  Of trained personnel available and equipped to 
effectively control  ingress and egress of emergency vehicles and 
equipment 
Yes/No  Traffic control plans, policies, and procedures are in 
place 
Yes/No  Public safety and security plans have been exercised 
                                            
240 “Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1,” 7. 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/getfile.cfm/Target%20Capabilities%20List%201%2E1%5
FFINAL%2Epdf?id=13112 also http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TCL1_1.pdf, (accessed 
3/16/06). 
241 Ibid., 87-88.   
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Performance Measures 
Yes/No  Safety and security plans and procedures were 
successfully  implemented 
Number  Of new or secondary injuries 
Percent  Of incident site that was secured 
Time  To communicate a site safety plan to all first responders at incident 
site 
Time  To identify and segregate hot, warm, and cold zones for incident   
 response 
Time  To secure incident site 
Yes/No  All traffic control and alternate ingress/egress routes 
were identified and  staffed addressing damage/debris 
Yes/No  All incident site control zones/points were clearly 
identified and staffed. 
Yes/No  Damaged buildings and debris blocking emergency 
response  ingress/egress were removed 
Yes/No  Perimeter zones were coordinated jointly by 
HAZMAT, fire/rescue, and  law enforcement 
Yes/No  Personnel demonstrated the ability to establish NIMS 
/ ICS command  for response 






  Law enforcement and security personnel 
  National Guard 
  Traffic control personnel (including traffic engineers) 
  Building officials 
  Dam safety officials 
 
Planning 
  Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) consistent with National Response 
Plan (NRP) 
  National Incident Management System (NIMS), and applicable laws and 
regulations 
  Traffic control plan 
 
Organization and Leadership 
  National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
  National Response Plan (NRP) 




Equipment and Systems 
  Barrier/perimeter equipment and supplies 
  Transportation/traffic control equipment 
  Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
  Interoperable communications systems 
 
Training 
  Safety and security 
  Safety and security operations in a potential WMD/CBRNE environment 
  NIMS 
  PPE 
 
Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions 
  System for incorporating lessons learned into plans and procedures 
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APPENDIX C   TERRITORIAL EMERGENCY SERVICE FUNCTION 
#8 
Territorial Emergency Service Function #8 Health and Medical 
Services Annex, Section III, SITUATION, A. “Disaster Condition and B. 
Planning Assumptions.” 
III. SITUATION 
A. Disaster Condition 
A significant natural disaster or man-made event that overwhelms 
the Virgin Islands would necessitate both public health and medical 
care assistance.  Casualty estimates for a major earthquake could 
be substantial, depending on population density, quality of building 
construction, and the location, time, magnitude and duration of the 
earthquake.  The sudden onset of such a large number of victims 
would stress the territory’s medical system necessitating time-
critical assistance from the Federal government.  Such a natural 
disaster would also pose certain public health threats, including 
problems related to food, vectors, water, Wastewater, solid waste, 
and mental health effects.  
Hospitals, nursing homes, pharmacies and other medical/health 
care facilities may receive severe structural damaged or may even 
be destroyed.  Those facilities, which survive with little or no 
structural damage, may be rendered unusable or only partially 
usable because of a lack of utilities (power, water, sewer), because 
staff is unable to report for duty due to personal injuries, and/or 
because of damage/disruption of communication and transportation 
systems.  Medical and health care facilities which remain in 
operation and have the necessary utilities and staff will probably be 
overwhelmed by the "walking wounded" and seriously injured 
victims who are transported there in the immediate aftermath of the 
occurrence.  In the face of massive increases in demand and the 
damage sustained, medical supplies (including pharmaceutical) 
and equipment will probably be in short supply.  Most health care 
facilities usually maintain only a small inventory stock to meet their 
short term normal patient load needs.  Disruptions in local 
communications and transportation systems could prevent timely 
re-supply. 
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Uninjured persons who require daily medications such as insulin, 
anti-hypertensive drugs, and digitalis may have difficulty in 
obtaining these medications because of damage/destruction of 
normal supply locations and general shortages within the disaster 
area. 
Although other disasters such as hurricanes, floods, etc., may not 
generate the casualty volume of a major earthquake, there will be a 
noticeable emphasis on relocation, shelters, vector control, 
Wastewater, and solid waste facilities. 
A major emergency resulting from an explosion or toxic gas release 
could occur that might not damage the local medical system.  
However, such an event could produce a large concentration of 
specialized injuries that could overwhelm the territorial and island 
medical system. 
B. Planning Assumptions 
1. The Health sector resources within the affected disaster area 
of the Territory will be inadequate to clear casualties from the 
scene or treat them in local hospitals.  Additional mobilized 
Federal capabilities will urgently be needed to supplement and 
assist the Territorial government to triage, and treat casualties in 
the disaster area and then transport them to the closest 
appropriate hospital or other health care facility.  Additionally, 
medical re-supply will be needed throughout the disaster area.  
In a major disaster, operational necessity will probably require 
the further transportation of patients, probably by air, to the 
nearest area with sufficient concentrations of available hospital 
beds where patient needs can be matched with the necessary 
definitive medical care. 
2. Damage to chemical and industrial plants, sewer lines, and 
water distribution systems and secondary hazards such as fires 
will result in toxic environmental and public health hazards to 
the surviving population and response personnel including 
exposure to hazardous chemicals, and contaminated water 
supplies, crops, livestock, and food products. 
3. The damage and destruction of a catastrophic natural 
disaster will produce urgent needs for mental health crisis 
counseling for disaster victims and response personnel.  
4. Assistance in maintaining the continuity of health and 
medical services will be required. 
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5. Disruption of sanitation services and facilities, loss of power, 
and massing of people in shelters may increase the potential for 
disease and injuries.242 
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APPENDIX D   EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS 
1. RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRST ON SCENE: 
 
“WINDSHIELD ASSESSMENT” (what do you see from your vehicle) then 
order resources based on this assessment. 
 
SCENE SIZE UP. Give on scene report answering questions:  
What kind of situation do I have? 
What action will I take?  
What resources do I need?  
Approximate number and condition of patients. 
 
Survey scene and identify hazards or safety concerns, establish safe zone 
for further rescue operations. 
 
For HAZMAT: identify the hazardous material 
 
 
2. TIME, DISTANCE and SHIELDING 
 
Civil Disturbance, Hazardous materials emergencies. 
 
Spend as little TIME in the area as possible. Forgo treatment on behalf of 
your safety and get the patient out as quickly as possible. 
 
Maintain as much DISTANCE as possible from the hot zone area. 
 
Put as much SHIELDING (protection) between you and the 
violence/hazard as possible. 
 
Establish Incident Command Posts UPWIND and UPHILL 
 
3. TRIAGE:  
 
Effective triage is vital to any multi casualty or mass casualty incident. 
 
S.T.A.R.T. Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment. 
 
Use “RPM” Respiration, Perfusion, and Mental Status. 
  




If after you open airway there are respirations, tag IMMEDIATE. 
If respirations more than 30 per min. tag IMMEDIATE 
 
Perfusion. Check capillary refill, if more than 2 seconds tag IMMEDIATE.  
       Can also check radial pulse. 
 
Mental Status: if altered (can’t follow simple commands), tag IMMEDIATE. 
 
Only treatment rendered by triage team is if not breathing, to open airway, 
or direct pressure to stop obvious bleed, or elevate extremities for shock. 
 
IMMEDIATE: those whose RPM is altered.  
DELAYED: unable to leave on their own but whose RPM is intact. 
MINOR: able to leave on their own, “walking wounded”. 
 





4. SAFARI BUS OFF ROAD or MULTI-PASENGER VEHICLE 
ACCIDENT 
 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRST ON SCENE: Windshield Assessment - 




Police, Fire, EMS & REQUEST BACKUP EMS FROM STT, NPS, Rescue, 





Police: scene security, traffic, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed. 
Fire: fire suppression, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed. 
Rescue: vehicle stabilization + extrication, First Responder/EMS, lighting, 
assist as  
    needed. 
EMS: supervise all on-scene medical. 
Tow truck: stabilize or move vehicles. 
 
Maybe heavy equipment for vehicle stabilization, movement 
Maybe taxicabs for people transport (rescue personnel, wounded to clinic) 
Maybe food and water for rescuers (logistics) 
Maybe ARES for off island or dead zone communications 
Maybe WAPA for utility pole damage 
 
OBJECTIVE: To rescue as many survivors as possible.     
Remove, triage and transport the injured.  Establish a    perimeter and secure the 
area 
 
PLAN: stabilize scene (perimeter), stabilize vehicle(s), triage (walking 
wounded to Delayed Treatment area), extricate, triage, transport. 
 
TRIAGE AREA: either at accident site or entry to Treatment Area. 
 
TRIAGE: S.T.A.R.T. “RPM” Respiration, Perfusion, Mental Status. 
 
TREATMENT AREA: upwind and uphill; sufficient space for all injured; 
unimpeded access for EMS; separate areas for patients classified as immediate, 
delayed, minor. 
 
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) ORGANIZATION:  
SAFARI BUS OFF ROAD or MULTI-PASSENGER VEHICLE  
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Incident Command: __________________________ 
 
Planning: Chief ___________________ 
  Situation Unit, keep IC advised on status 
 
Operations: Chief ___________________________ 
 
       :  staging area manager __________________ 
 
       :  treatment area manager __________________ 
 
                  :  vehicle stabilization team(s)  _________________ 
 
                  :  vehicle stabilization team(s)  _________________ 
 
       :  vehicle extrication team(s) __________________ 
 
 vehicle extrication team(s) __________________ 
 
 medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w  First  Responders   




 medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w First  Responders   




  medical team(s) maybe one EMS assigned w First  Responders   
 






(Medical Team work with extrication teams for patient care during extrication, 




5. LANDSLIDE – EARTHQUAKE 
 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRST ON SCENE: Windshield Assessment - 




Police, Fire, EMS & REQUEST BACKUP EMS FROM STT, NPS, Rescue, 





Maybe VITEMA EOC 
Police: scene security, traffic, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed. 
Fire: fire suppression, First Responder/EMS, assist as needed. 
Rescue: vehicle stabilization + extrication, First Responder/EMS, lighting, 
assist as needed. 
EMS: supervise all on-scene medical. 
Tow truck: stabilize or move vehicles. 
Heavy equipment for moving large rocks, removing obstacles 
Maybe taxicabs for people transport (rescue personnel, wounded to clinic) 
Maybe food and water for rescuers (logistics) 
Maybe ARES for off island or dead zone communications 
Maybe WAPA for utility poles. 
Wood for building collapse (4X4X16, 4X6X16, 4X8X16) double headed 
nails, plywood 








OBJECTIVE:  Search all structures for casualties by ___________ 
hours 
   Provide medical care as needed 
   Transport injured to clinic 
   Clear all roads by ___________ hours 
 
PLAN:  
Organize search teams, determine scale of damage and injury  
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LIGHTLY DAMAGED STRUCTURE: search, triage, report, treatment, 
transport. 
 
MODERATELY DAMAGED STRUCTURE: utilities, search, ABC’s, 
remove from structure, treatment, transport.  
 
HEAVILY DAMAGED STRUCTURE: stay out, utilities, stabilize structures 
with potential or known occupants, search these now stabilized structures 
triage all injuries, transport, clear roads 
 
ICS ORGANIZATION:  
LANDSLIDE – EARTHQUAKE 
 
Incident Command: VITEMA? __________________________ 
 
Information Officer: ____________________ 
 
Incident Command Post (ICP) VITEMA’s EOC? 
 
Operations: Chief ___________________________ 
 
Cruz Bay Division: ________________ 
         
 staging area manager __________________ 
 
 
Gift Hill Division: ________________ 
         
 staging area manager __________________ 
 
 
Westin Division: ________________ 
         
 staging area manager __________________ 
 
 
Coral Bay Division: ________________ 
         
 staging area manager __________________ 
 
 
East End Division: ________________ 
         
 staging area manager __________________ 
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 Air Operations: _____________________ 
 
 ARES: off island and dead zone communications 
 
 Strike Teams: semi-non-entry searches to prioritize search 
 sites (e.g., this building was vacant, this one had several 
 inhabitants), neighbors can do this. 
 
 Task Forces: Heavy equipment, EMS, Building Collapse 
 Team 
 
Planning: Chief ___________________ 
  Situation Unit  
  Resources Unit   
 
Logistics: Chief ____________________ 
  Food Unit 
  Supply Unit    
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6. ST. JOHN CARNIVAL PARADE 
 
POTENTIAL HAZARDS: usual medical problems – normal occurrences, 
public health (water and porta-potty), vehicle collision, crowd control, clean up, 
fight-riot, fire at location on parade route, amusement ride collapse, power failure, 
marine based threat, terrorism. 
 
VULNERABILITIES: facilities: NPS, Post Office, EMS/DeCastro, Jurgen 
Command, Sprauve School, Texaco Station, MKS. 
 
NOTIFIED - ON SCENE - AVAILABLE: 
 
Police+Police boats, Fire, EMS, NPS, Public Works, VITEMA, MKS, 








Incident Command Post: Jurgen? _______________________ 
 
Incident Commander: _________________________ 
 
Operations: Chief ___________________________ 
 
Police-Fire-EMS-Rescue-NPS Branch ____________________________ 
 
  Police Group Leader _____________________ 
        Fire Group Leader ______________________ 
  EMS Group Leader ______________________ 
 Rescue Group Leader ___________________ 
  NPS Group Leader _____________________ 
 MKS Group Leader ______________________ 
  Facilities Branch ________________________ 
`  Public Works Group Leader _______________ 
 WAPA Group Leader ____________________ 
 
   
Planning: Chief ___________________ 
  Situation Unit  




OBJECTIVE: To operate an organized and safe Carnival Parade 
 
 




POLICE: to be developed. 
POLICE MARINE: to be developed. 
FIRE: to be developed. 
EMS: to be developed. 
NPS: to be developed. 
PUBLIC WORKS: to be developed. 
MKS: to be developed. 
WAPA: to be developed. 
 
RESCUE PLAN: Preposition staff and vehicles and equipment  
 
Rescue 1 positioned so it can move out of town, maybe at Dolphin Market 
 
 Private Rescue Member vehicles positioned similarly:  
NPS Maintenance Area  
Dolphin Market 
 
 Rescue Members prepositioned at strategic areas with oxygen and trauma kits 
 NPS Maintenance Area – Mongoose Junction 
 Natures Nook 
 Post Office – EMS  
 Foot of pier 
 First Bank –Connections 
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APPENDIX E   DRAFT VERSION OF PROPOSAL TO 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH FOR CRISIS RESPONSE 
PLAN FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 
The following are excerpts from a paper written for a course at the CHDS. 
I asked the Department of Health what I could do that would both satisfy my 
course requirements and help them. This was their suggestion. I quickly learned, 
however, that devising such a plan is a major task, on the level of writing a whole 
thesis, and time limitations did not permit my efforts to be more detailed. I will not 
repeat here what has been said elsewhere in this thesis. This information is 
included to point out the problem and as a starting point for further planning. 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
“In general, an effective infrastructure should provide the following 
functions to adequately prepare for and respond to psychological 
consequences: 
 
1. Basic resources including food, shelter, communication, 
transportation, information, guidance, and medical services 
2. Interventions and programs to promote individual and community 
resilience and prevent adverse psychological effects 
3. Surveillance for psychological consequences, including distress 
responses, behavior changes, and psychiatric illness, and markers 
of individual and community functioning before, during, and after a 
terrorism event 
4. Screening of psychological symptoms at the individual level 
5. Treatment for acute and long-term effects of trauma 
6. Response for longer-term general human service needs that 
contribute to psychological functioning (e.g., housing, financial 
assistance when the event creates job loss)  
7. Risk communication and dissemination of information to the 
public, media, political leaders, and service providers…”243 
Items 1 and 6 are not the province of the Department of Health but are 
necessary prerequisites to psychological well-being. Psychological intervention is 
                                            
243 Butler et al. "Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism,” 64.. 
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meaningless if people are in crisis regarding the most basic necessities listed in 
number 1. Intervention is made that much more difficult and the numbers of 
those needing care will be greater if the longer-term needs listed in number 6 are 
not satisfied. The Department of Health will be hampered by the Territory’s 
complete lack of Risk Communication discussed in number 7. 
The Department of Health, Division of Mental Health, is thus responsible 
for items 2, 3, 4 and 5. They have caring and dedicated employees but not 
enough of them. They have 1 full-time psychiatrist on St. Croix and 2 part-time on 
St. Thomas. There are 9 counselors in Mental Health territory-wide and more in 
different sections of the Department of Health. In the private sector, there are 
approximately 7 psychiatrists in the territory (4 on St. Croix & 3 on St. Thomas), 
approximately 11 psychologists in the territory, and approximately 100 
counselors, territory-wide.244 
 
A. POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
The U.S. Virgin Islands has a population of approximately 108,000. There 
is thus insufficient staff in the Division of Mental Health to meet the need and 
private sector psychiatrists, psychologists and counselors must be enlisted for 
any intervention program. They should be contracted with before they are 
needed. Psychiatric First Aid and Crisis Intervention training should be provided. 
Lay people can receive this training as well. 
A small start in this direction took place on St. Croix in December 2005 
when 40 first responders on St. Croix received training on how to deal with the 
mentally ill and substance abusers. This was the first such training of its kind in 
the Virgin Islands.245  
                                            
244 Denese Marshall, Ph.D., Director, Virgin Islands Department of Public Health, Division of 
Mental Health, Alcoholism and Drug Dependency Services, email to the author dated January 03, 
2006. 
245 Aesha Duval, “First responders get training in situations involving mentally ill,” Virgin 




B. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 
In the space and time limitations of this paper, it was impossible to do 
more than clarify the need, identify the problems and obstacles, and propose the 
possible solution of enlisting private sector and off-island assistance. 
Below is a list of resources. Although only preliminary, these are an 
excellent starting point. The plans are detailed and thorough, well documented 
and presented and readily available. Most of these can be downloaded free of 
charge and they are promulgated by respected institutions.  
“Communicating in a Crisis: Risk Communications Guidelines for 
Public Officials” (1-800-789-2647 reference number SMA02-3641 
http://riskcommunication.samhsa.gov). It is currently out of print with no 
information as to when it will be in print again. It is available as a pdf file that 
can be downloaded and printed, at 
http://www.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/RiskComm.pdf (accessed 
3/15/06).  
Many other publications are also available and can be located at 
http://www.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/index.htm (accessed 3/16/06). 
The National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/)(accessed 3/16/06) has a fact sheet for Terrorist 
Attacks and Children with recommendations broken down according to age 
group. There are references, links to additional sources including a FEMA link 
designed for children. The National Center for PTSD Children’s Fact sheet 
can be found online at 
http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/facts/disasters/fs_children_disaster.html (accessed 
3/16/06). Information about Disasters and Terrorism in general can be found 
at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/facts/disasters/index.html, (accessed 3/16/06). 
The National Center for PTSD offers Disaster Handouts and Manuals 
at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/pfa/PFA.html, (accessed 3/16/06). This site has 
many links including Provider Handouts, Survivor Handouts and a 47 page 
Psychological First Aid Manual. The First Aid Manual is available at 
http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/pfa/PFA_9_6_05_Final.pdf, (accessed 3/16/06). 
The Center for Cognitive Development and School Psychology Program, 
Department of Psychology, George Mason University in Fairfax Virginia has 
developed a “Psychological First Aid Kit for School Professionals.” John D. 
Wasserman, Jack A. Naglieri, and Scott P. Merydith, September 12, 2001. This 
10 page paper has sections on Administrative Planning, Handouts for Crisis 
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Management and Follow-up, How to Talk to Children about Disasters, Handout 
for Leading Class Discussion and another handout for parents. It is available and 
may be reproduced without permission at: 
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/psychology/homepage/PsychFirstAidKit.doc, 
(accessed 3/16/06). 
Information about EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and 
Reprocessing) is available from the EMDR Institute at 
http://www.emdr.com/,(accessed 3/16/06) and the EMDR International 
Association at http://www.emdria.org, (accessed 3/16/06).  
Information about CBT (Cognitive Behavior Therapy) is available from 
http://www.cognitivetherapy.com/, (accessed 3/16/06). 
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